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Abstract 
 
Housing Programs in the Historic Center of Quito:  
Case Studies in the Need for Planning Direction, 1990-2007 
 
 
 
Rosa Elena Donoso Gómez, M.S.C.R.P. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2008 
 
Supervisor:  Elizabeth Mueller 
 
Since the 1990’s, the Historic Center of Quito (HCQ) has been the center of a 
pioneering urban renewal experiment in Latin America (Rojas, 2004). The local 
government implemented a series of housing programs to help improve low-income 
overcrowded living conditions, increase the resident population and protect the 
patrimonial structures. These policies are relevant to current global trends aimed at 
historic centers as new places to live, invest or attract tourism.  
This report will examine the housing policy and its implementation in the context 
of Quito’s overarching planning and development strategies. In particular, the paper will 
focus on the programs (1) “Casa de los Siete Patios”, (2) “Vivienda Solidaria” and 
(3)“Pon a punto tu casa,”. By examining the planning and social policies behind the 
programs, related financial constraints, issues of gentrification, and consistency with the 
 vii 
Quito Historic Center Comprehensive Plan, the report will look for coherent housing 
policies to apply to the current urban and population environment. 
Using data from field research such as interviews and document review, I will 
analyze the benefits and deficiencies of these programs. Published data states that 70 
percent of the total numbers of housing units in the HCQ are rented by low income 
populations (INEC-Census 2001); however, the current planning approach seems to 
ignore this trend and is reducing the possibility for low and middle income inhabitants to 
maintain their residence due to rising land prices and rents. This analysis will produce 
constructive policy critiques and provide recommendations for housing policy 
formulation and improvement.   
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Preface 
  
Some ten years ago I worked as an architecture student intern in the Program for 
Urban Management, section of Habitat, UN in their office located in the historic center of 
Quito. During the six months I worked there, I helped to develop habitability diagnostics 
for some neighborhoods in the historic center. While walking and talking with the people 
we interviewed for our survey, I saw a range of very different living conditions. From 
very classic middle income families living in the medium size single family historic 
house to indigenous and young people renting cramped single rooms. Before that 
internship, the historic center had been for me what it is still for most of the people of 
Quito, and for tourists in general: an amazing historic and contemporary urban place; a 
center full of activities, commerce and people. But after the internship, I realized how 
much work and coordination needs to happen if we really want to preserve the cultural 
heritage of this diverse and unique place. Human diversity is to me the main 
characteristic that best describes the life that the historic center has and any planning 
approach should consider this urban characteristic as part of the rehabilitation process. 
Still today you will see people from all parts of Ecuador and from the world, from 
different incomes and different racial and ethnic groups.  
Later through my undergraduate studies at the San Francisco de Quito 
University’s School of Architecture I was able to get involved with the Junta de 
Andalucía, the international cooperation agency that is being helping the municipality to 
put in practice several housing programs for the low income people with the goal of 
preserving the built historic environment. This work allowed me to learn about the 
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comprehensive special plan for the Historic Center while assigned to the development of 
urban design proposals for the San Blas area on the northern edge of the Historic Center.  
San Blas was the neighborhood where the original Vivienda Solidaria program 
built and rehabilitated housing for low income and very low income residents of the 
historic center in the nineties. I observed that housing renovation policies aimed towards 
low income people were having positive results: all units sold out even though the 
Ecuadorian economy has undergoing its worst crisis in our history. The three year 
Vivienda Solidaria program demonstrated that a very high demand for housing exists in 
the historic center, proven by the one-block-long line of people waiting everyday for 
several days in the sales office to apply for the new apartments that the Historic Center 
Corporation (ECH) built. 
Following up on that demand, the ECH designed a number of new projects for 
sale, and once again the one-block-long line was there to apply or buy a housing unit. But 
this time, the apartments were not part of the Vivienda Solidaria’s social program. Those 
days were over now, the new mayor of Quito did not continue with the program. 
Interested people from the waiting line, me included, realized that the new housing being 
produced was two or three times more expensive than that of the Vivienda Solidaria 
apartments. Why this increase? Was the ECH blind to the real income range of the 
population that comprises the housing demand for the historic center of Quito? Had the 
land prices become twice as expensive already? What was going on in the historic center? 
The proof of the mistake in targeting those new housing products away from the 
real demand for it is the fact that today, four years later, ECH – which is now EMDUQ – 
is not able to sell the units in their new projects, many of which are delayed due to lack of 
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funds. What happened to the one-block-long line of people interested in buying 
reasonably-priced condos in the historic center?  Who were they? And what happened 
with higher income people? Why are they not buying in the historic center? Higher 
income people are not desperate to buy the apartments that EMDUQ is building at a scale 
big enough to call gentrification. If at some point higher income people become 
interested in living in the Historic Center, the market will respond, but for the present 
housing production is anticipating a high-end market that does not exist. Meanwhile, low 
and middle income people may represent a strong demand for housing to rent or to own 
and the new EMDUQ should be thinking about that demand, a demand that it is not going 
to access within its current market target.  
Today, historic center planning policies and programs need to attend to housing 
issues in addition to maintaining and restoring monuments and open spaces if we want to 
have a livable and healthy historic center. But there is no discussion about housing as one 
of the main planning components needed in order to achieve livability of urban areas.  
This report expands on the state of affairs of housing programs and policies in the 
historic center of Quito. I hope it will become a fundamental source for planners and 
citizens interested in understanding and learning about what has been done over past 
years in order to creatively plan for our future.  
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 Chapter 1:  The Driving Question 
 
Despite the fact that population in the area has declined, the Historic Center of Quito 
remains a place of residence for a substantial population, mostly consisting of low 
income renters rather than owners (Jones 1996, IMQ 1991 Vol.1B, Census 2001). 
Comparative analysis of Ecuadorian Census data from 1990 and 2001 showed a negative 
population growth rate of -1.2% in the Historic Center, while the city as a whole has a 
population growth rate of 2.6% (http://www4.quito.gov.ec/), demonstrating that in 2001 
the funds invested and the policies applied in the Historic Center still had not been 
enough to bring residents back. 
Policies implemented by the City of Quito to tackle housing problems, such as its 
subsidized housing programs (like Casa de los Siete Patios [House of the Seven Patios] 
and Vivienda Solidaria), offers of strategic incentives and special loan programs (like 
Pon a Punto tu Casa [Put your house up to date]), stated as one of their main objectives 
the renewal and improvement of residential uses in the historic area. However, studies 
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have demonstrated that attempts to conserve historic structures and to renew 
neighborhoods in the Center before and during the 90’s, using incentives for new 
homeowners such as exemption of property taxes, actually made little impact on Quito’s 
Historic Center. Gareth A. Jones in his article “The relationship between conservation 
programmes and property renovation: evidence from Quito, Ecuador” shows the results 
of research in three historic neighborhoods where he surveyed 282 renovated properties, 
only 13 of which were exclusively residential. Comparing these properties in the Historic 
Center, Jones concluded that “it is clear that the renovated properties are much less likely 
to be dedicated to residential use” (1996, 380).  
Comprehensive Plans elaborated by municipal planners and approved by City 
Council also established goals to rehabilitate the Center, taking into account the current 
low-income resident population’s economic and social characteristics. There is a high 
probability that low income residents might end up struggling to find affordable houses 
because of the relationship between urban upgrading and rising land and rent prices. 
Displacement is not a desired outcome for policymakers and advocates of Historic 
Center comprehensive rehabilitation. The current plan proposes lowering population 
densities in some of the Center’s neighborhoods while raising density by attracting new 
residents to some other neighborhoods.  
Evidence from past and current housing programs show an inconsistent approach 
towards the housing needs of low income resident population of the Center.  Inconsistent 
and short lived policy approaches are seen in the  switch from monument conservation 
policies before the 1990’s to current comprehensive rehabilitation strategies that are more 
focused on global tourism than local and metropolitan needs.  
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The strategies applied towards a comprehensive rehabilitation approach are all 
motivated locally by the municipality with influence from UNESCO and other 
international organizations. Officials from Quito participated in declarations for historic 
center rehabilitation such as the one in Lima in 1997 and in Havana in 1998, which were 
made with UN partnership. Are low income residents and housing options that meet their 
needs included in the approach taken by these initiatives? More evidence of inconsistent 
and unsustained housing policies is shown by the lack of documentation and analysis of 
previous housing programs.  
The lack of research and studies of positive and negative outcomes of the 
previous and current subsidized projects gives an idea of the haphazard way that planning 
in terms of housing has been done within the comprehensive rehabilitation plans of the 
Center.  
After 17 years of trying different small scale pilot housing programs, it is difficult 
to say if the objectives of the Quito Comprehensive Plan and of the Historic Center 
Special Plan such as facilitating current residents to remain in some areas and while 
decreasing density in others are being achieved.  
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The central focus of this thesis will be to research and analyze current and past 
housing programs in the Center of Quito, in order to identify what has been the most 
promising approach for increasing and stabilizing residential use and the actual resident 
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population of the Center and to assess how such policies might be use to achieve the 
goals of comprehensive development plans as well as real population needs.  
To start, it is necessary to examine whether other historic centers in the region have 
been able to achieve this goal, since often historic centers share similar social and 
housing problems. This analysis will be useful first, to see how other exemplary historic 
centers approach a housing problem and, second, to understand how Quito’s Historic 
Center could develop its own housing policy to in order to be an example for the region 
in terms of historic center renovation.  
At least since winning its status as the a UN World Heritage Site, Quito has been a 
center of urban development ideas for the regions’ [do you mean Latin America?] 
historic centers, fostering recognition of the planning interests of its municipal officials 
and helping them to see the beauty of the city itself as a resource. Urban scholars and 
cultural heritage researchers such as Hardoy (1992) have described the unique urban 
characteristics and problems of the Historic Center of Quito: 
“Mas allá de su belleza de emplazamiento…Quito sobresale entre las 
ciudades iberoamericanas por su conjunto de obras de arquitectura 
colonial y del siglo XIX. Pocas ciudades han mantenido la coherencia 
arquitectónica y urbanística que presentan los distritos antiguos de Quito, 
a pesar del deterioro que han experimentado durante los últimos años”  
…y  “constituye un caso especial en Iberoamérica por el tipo de problemas 
que presenta y el elevado número de sus habitantes.” 
(Hardoy, 1992: 448) 
 
(Beyond its beautiful layout…Quito stands out among other 
Iberoamerican cities because of its architectonic complex from the 
colonial epoch and from the 19th century. Not many cities were able to 
maintain the architectural and urban coherence that the old districts of 
Quito present, despite the deterioration it has experienced during the last 
years… and constitutes a special case in Iberoamerica because of the type 
of problems that it presents and its high number of inhabitants).  
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The history of planning efforts to address the Historic Center’s problems, especially 
in terms of housing and its population, will be examined in chapter 2. In this chapter, in 
order to understand the scope of the research question, it will be necessary to look at 
historic center urban rehabilitation trends first globally and later specifically by looking at 
some examples of historic center housing programs. Sadly, I found only examples of 
individual programs rather than a sustained housing policy for the historic center from the 
case studies I examined.  
Historic Center Global Trends 
 
Global trends are a major factor influencing urban development strategies in the 
historic central cities of Latin America. The promotion of heritage tourism, including “the 
industry of travel that promotes cultural landscapes that hold great historical and 
symbolic landmarks, monuments and neighborhood” (Scarpacci, 2005:7), is the main 
objective behind comprehensive rehabilitation policies. The touristy-historic city 
(Ashword, 20001) is being redeveloped in the last decade to conserve it as an antique 
nucleus of the city, considering its central characteristic and “transforming progressively 
the residential areas and in general its popular activities toward more marketable uses as 
tourism” as is happening, for example in Puebla, Mexico (Milán, 2003).  
The objective of this section is to understand how the approach to urban problems in 
historic centers approach is so similar around Latin America. If it is possible to talk about 
                                                 
1
 G. J. Ashword is a scholar from Europe who wrote “The tourist –historic City: Restrospect and Prospect 
of Managing the Heritage City”. This book describes a model of how to redevelop the historic center as a 
space for tourists but for nobody else! The local people are not mentioned in the book at all, maybe because 
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the Latin American historic centers as somewhat comparable, what can be learned in 
terms of housing policies implemented towards upgrade or construction of housing 
without displacement of low income residents? There have been some good experiences, 
similar to but on different scales from Quito’s experiences. For some planning agencies, 
retaining the central neighborhood’s traditional residents is a goal specified within 
comprehensive rehabilitation programs. The main focus for this section is on literature 
that specifically addresses best practices for addressing low income housing in the 
historic center, rather than on the hundreds of publications about strategies for monument 
restoration, recuperation of public space, problems with street vendors and other issues 
related to the habitat and the “touristy” environment of historic centers.  
Latin American historic centers are for the most part places that maintained their 
quality as livable parts of the city but that show characteristics of physical deterioration. 
Contrary to trends in US downtowns, Latin American downtowns never stopped playing 
the role of central areas; however, some similarities to the US can be found as well.  The 
management of historic center rehabilitation around Latin America addresses common 
challenges such as precarious housing conditions, services and infrastructure, land use 
changes, lack of resources for plan implementation, and limited political will (Cantú, 
2005); urban problems that have also been identified as inner city constraints.  
Others have investigated similarities between historic districts and inner city areas 
in the US or Europe (Bromley and Jones 1996, Ward 1993). As Bromley and Jones 
(1996) put it, “inner city is a well-recognized concept in the First-World urban context” 
                                                                                                                                                 
historic centers en Europe do not have local people living in there. This book is not a very relevant 
reference for Quito’s Historic Center conditions.  
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but when trying to recognize a Latin American “inner-city”, the historic centers are partly 
comparable to this idea because of similarities such as location or demographics (p: 179), 
even if their evolution has been distinct from that of inner cities in other parts of the 
word. 
This point of view is important in order to see the urban problems experienced in 
historic centers without focusing exclusively on historic preservation or conservation. If 
historic centers and inner cities have similar characteristics, the scope of urban policy can 
be expanded to explore different cases as examples and to look for best practices. Under 
this perspective, regional conservation agreements such the “Havana Declaration” come 
up short in terms of urban policy recommendations. The region can learn from inner 
cities’ urban problems in other parts of the world, even when they are not UNESCO 
world heritage relics. 
Ward (1993) explored the divergences and convergences of inner cities in Latin 
America as compared to global trends and inner cities in the US and UK.  He suggests 
that inner cities can be evaluated from different points in order to see “differences of 
degree” and “differences of kind” (p: 1140) Macro-level processes shaped the inner city 
in terms of demography and economic conditions while micro-level processes are 
shaping local re-investment and the return of the middle income or upper income classes 
to the central city (Ward, 1993: p.1141).   
When looking at the spatial context of the Latin American inner city, Ward also 
suggests that the colonial condition of the architecture adds “a challenge to the 
contemporary inner-city planning” (p: 1141). However, besides the different architectural 
landscape, there are other more similar characteristics shared with inner cities in other 
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places, to some extent based on the demographics and social cohesion of the population 
living in there.  As Ward points out, when applying urban rehabilitation policies “the 
retention of people in the inner city is important, since another common feature is the 
existence of a strong popular culture” (ibid p: 1141), such as the important cultural 
traditions of the East End ‘Cockney’ in London or the Jewish working class in the Bronx.  
Even though there are similar trends to be found in inner cities and historic 
centers, Ward’s article helps us understand that historic centers’ urban changes are in 
some ways different from inner city changes in the US and the UK, especially in terms of  
some aspects of demographics (1993, p: 1155). Global economic trends and processes of 
industrialization produced different outcomes in Latin America. For example, 
gentrification in the Latin American inner city and commercial recentralization “are 
likely to be modest” and the “private sector has not sought rapacious profits through 
reconstructing the inner city” (p: 1155). If a small percentage of the Latin American 
city’s population is actually high income, this might be related to the lack of a large 
population desiring to re-colonize the historic center. In the case of Quito, there are very 
clear areas of the city identified as good places to live for upper income populations: 
affluent neighborhoods and suburbs that are not even close to the city core and are in 
“proximity to white-collar places of employment” (Scarpaci, 1999.p:4). To what extent 
are policy ideas implemented in other inner cities or other historic centers appropriate for  
a place like Quito? 
Global ideas for approaching urban problems, such as housing policies, are 
valuable to learn from, but should be carefully evaluated before trying to apply them in a 
local context. When looking for ways to implement housing rehabilitation programs, 
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ideas come as models from the stakeholder that finances the policy implementation. 
Fernando Carrion (2007) in his article “Dime quien te financia y te dire quien eres” 
(“Tell me who is financing you and I will tell you who you are”), helps to emphasize the 
need for concrete and comprehensive policies to set the path for external or local 
investment. Carrion says that without such policies, “the city policy gets subordinated to 
the financing conditions and then ends up defining the Historic Center project” (p: 43). 
The solution that he proposes to avoid this subordination effect is to create a self-
sufficient economic source or different diverse sources.  
The following section describes several regional meetings that took place over the 
past 40 years at which scholars got together to attempt to understand the problems of 
historic centers. It appears that through these meetings many ideas about housing 
programs were spread throughout the region. The section then goes on to discuss some 
examples of housing programs in exemplary historic centers as a short study of cases to 
learn about (1) their goals and objectives, (2) how the local government planned and 
financed housing program and (3) who benefited and why. 
Exemplary Historic Center’s Housing Programs  
 
This regional network formed in Havana followed some of the ideas established in 
the UNESCO Quito Letter Declaration of 1977 (Scarpaci, 2005) or the Venice Letter of 
1964 (Carta de Venecia 2) in which the conservation of historic centers of world cities 
gained new importance as they came to be seen as urban repositories of shared cultural 
                                                 
2
 http://www.icomos.org/docs/venice_es.html 
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and architectural history. The letter calls for global cooperation and global ideas in order 
to restore their built environment.  
As the Havana declaration established, the development of a historic center’s identity 
is linked to processes of globalization because it brings together a nucleus of regional 
interests and common problems and “sets up a path to assume, empower, and document 
from a united position, a dialogue with diverse international actors that might be in a 
position to cooperate or invest in the region’s historic centers” (Havana Declaration, 
1993)3. One of the important goals of the Havana Declaration was to set up a network to 
share knowledge and research and to strengthen cooperation to solve problems in historic 
districts. This type of agreement among local governments helped to develop similar 
strategies to implement urban rehabilitation programs such as RECUP-Boca in Buenos 
Aires (1984), Casa de los Siete Patios in Quito (1994) or Manazana 127 in Cuzco (2000). 
It is hard to say where these new ideas about historic center redevelopment started, but 
international cooperation agencies played an important role in their spread. Housing 
rehabilitation experiences from Europe, especially from Spain, were brought to Latin 
American through cooperation between local governments and agencies like AECI and 
the Junta de Andalucía.     
A 1977 colloquium in Quito produced the Quito Letter that advocated strengthening 
historic preservation throughout Latin America (Scarpaci, 2005). The Letter defines 
historic districts as “those living settlements that are strongly conditioned by a physical 
structure stemming form the past, and recognizable as being representative of the 
evolution of a people” (PNUD, UNESCO 1977, n.p. at Scarpaci, 2005: 10). As Scarpaci 
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states, this is a good beginning for historic centers’ management because it includes the 
built environment as well as “non material culture such as people, their lifestyles and 
traditions, productive activities, beliefs and urban rituals” (Scarpaci, 2005:10) 
These international colloquiums addressing the problems of historic centers recently 
organized into a formal group called OLACHI (Organización Latino American y del 
Caribe de Centros Históricos). The seat of the organization will be established in Quito, 
setting up a new framework for regional organizing and giving new responsibilities to 
Quiteño citizens for maintaining and developing the historic center as an exemplary case 
for the region.  
The historic centers of Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Santiago and el Cuzco have 
developed exemplary housing programs and had experiences that contain interesting and 
compelling lessons for Quito. It is specifically interesting to compare different planning 
experiences in terms of the established goals, the planning and finance methods, and the 
intended and actual beneficiaries.  
Low-income housing renewal (PRHP); Mexico City. 
Housing emergency and renter’s organization 
The housing rehabilitation approach that was implemented in Mexico City’s 
historic center is remarkable because the goal was to respond to a housing emergency 
and, through federal policy, to ensure that the organized renter population benefitted. The 
program had very positive results in terms of number of housing units but also in terms of 
social organization. Housing policy emerged after the earthquake Mexico City 
experienced in 1985 and that revealed the deteriorated conditions of the vecindades and 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 http://www.cenvi.org.mx/lahabana.htm 
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the housing need of the renting population that was living there. But does it take an 
earthquake for a city to recognize itsemergent housing needs and in order to get renters 
organized? 
In this case, the origin of the program was with the declaration of a housing 
emergency after the 1985 earthquake that caused one of the biggest major disasters ever 
known in the City’s history (Peniche, 2004). The planning process of the program 
Renovación Habitacional Popular  PRHP (Low-income Housing Renewal) started with a 
federal act to create an autonomous entity to implement housing reconstruction projects. 
The PRHP rebuilt 48,000 housing units in two years, 13,562 of which were located in the 
historic downtown area (Delgadillo, 2003).  The program expropriated 769 buildings of 
the historic area for the residents, not as an immediate strategy to solve the housing 
problem, but primarily to create a mechanism to stop expulsion of residents. After the 
earthquake, property owners and landlords had the perfect excuse to evict their tenants 
(from rent-controlled properties in many cases) in order to regain control of their 
properties for more lucrative redevelopment (Azuela, 1987; Duhau, 1987).  
The official rationale for the Expropriation Act and the related housing policy was 
to create benefits for “the affected residents whose housing was located in the city center” 
(Duhau, 1987. p: 79). According to Duhau, the act conceptually returned to issues of 
housing degradation caused by rent control measures, it recognizes the modest impact of 
other rehabilitation programs to reinforce the population’s sense of belonging and it 
recognized the “urban value” of the neighborhood characteristics (Duhau from CME, 
1985:12 p: 79). 
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Among the affected properties, 30 percent of the houses were subject to rent 
freezes during the 1940’s. Furthermore, 97 percent of the houses that would be rebuilt by 
PRHP were inhabited by renters rather than owners (Peniche, 2004).  The active role of 
renters’ in the reclamation of their housing rights is the highlight of the Mexican 
programs of these years. After the act passed, expectations and social organization grew 
to the point that to ignore it would have brought political and social problems (Duhau, 
1987). To manage residents’ claims, the program developed three strategies: (1) right 
certification (Certificado de Derechos), which was not an actual legal document but was 
more like an agreement for management, transparency and conflict resolution; (2) 
facilitation to constitute reconstruction committees for each vecindad, and  (3) the 
development of a policy called “Puertas Abiertas” for the affected groups; this was a 
strategy to establish direct relationships for management and negotiation with the 
affected population. The “chaotic universe and broadly mobilized affected population 
was transformed in an organized waiting line in the government subsidies window” 
(Azuela, 1986: 4 in Duhau, 1987: 92).  
It is interesting to note that later in Quito, in the management of the House of the 
Seven Patios (1993) pilot project, those same three strategies for working with renter 
organizations were applied (Chapter 4). Of course the scale of the problem and the 
magnitude of the number of affected population are not comparable. The Mexico City 
case is an exemplary case in response to housing problems in an emergency, but many of 
the policies employed could be applied more generally, not just after major disasters.  
Today, when housing is still such a large problem begging to be addressed in 
historic areas, it might be a good idea to declare them “emergency areas” rather than 
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“historic areas” (Peniche, 2004). As Scarpaci (2005) pointed out, UNESCO recognition 
and other acts of appreciation do not always come with good sources of funding for 
historic centers. When a policy has a framework of an “emergency” it has the possibility 
of attracting national or local government attention in order to quickly bring the 
important stakeholders to the table in order to put a program into practice.  
RECUP-BOCA; Buenos Aires 
Mutual Esperanza renters’ organization 
The planning of this program began in 1984 with a cooperative agreement 
between different public agencies of Buenos Aires and the signing of Act No. 3473/84, 
mandating the rehabilitation 21 conventillos4. The two objectives of the program 
RECUP-BOCA were:  (1) “To improve habitat conditions of the population with scarce 
resources, and (2) to recuperate, for the city as a whole, a degraded area (Carreira, 1994: 
150). This program specified three “axes” for delineating the participation of different 
agencies that would put the program into practice.  The first axis coordinated the diverse 
team of agencies involved, the second applied three different specific strategic 
approaches (pilot or single projects at the time) to address the degraded area and the third 
managed the use of federal resources.   
The team of three agencies was comprised of (1) the Urban Planning Council 
(CPU) section of the public works secretary, (2) the Policy and Plans Management Office 
section of the Sub-secretary of Planning and (3) the Development Management and 
                                                 
4
 Conventillos are single houses historic houses that were converted into multifamily buildings often in 
overcrowded conditions in Latin American historic centers. Conventillo means little convent which refers 
to the architectural layout of little rooms directed to a central patio. Each Latin American country has a 
local name to call this type of multifamily living, in Mexico for example are they are called Vecindades. 
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Urban Renewal Office section of the Municipal Commission of Housing. Among them, 
they created a technical team that was to be responsible for the program’s development; 
CPU was the agency responsible for coordinating action among the others.  
 In her article about the program, Ana Maria Carreira (1994) explains that it was 
designed according to three different levels of action, outlined as “axis number two” of 
the program’s planning strategy. The three different levels were: (1) an Immediate Action 
Plan, to take action on urgent needs that do not require previous studies because the 
population has already identified the problem, and (2) rehabilitation and development 
program, which collects proposals and studies to (a) identify factors that influence in the 
deterioration process, and (b) to prepare strategies that will help to reverse the 
deterioration process (Carreira, 1994: 150). The last action level (3) was the identification 
of a pilot area; this is the highlighted strategy of this program. The pilot activities were  
just one part among many within the overall program, but as this pilot project explicitly 
considered the habitat problems of the families living in the area, it is a good 
demonstration of how social aspects were considered in the policy, which is my main 
concern for the present analysis.  
 With regard to social aspects, the objective of the pilot project was to consolidate 
the social fabric of the area through housing stabilization and through the generation of 
economic activity. The majority of the population that lived in the La Boca area where 
the pilot project was carried out was classified into households with unsatisfied basic 
needs, a classification that considered not only income but also whether the housing 
conditions are considered precarious, overcrowded, or with insufficient sanitary services 
(Carreira, 1994: 153). The idea of “social fabric” was important for this program, and it 
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considered the advantages of good neighborhood social interaction such as strong 
community relationships and also considered the facilities and social benefits gained by 
being located close to central areas of the city. Another remarkable component of the 
program’s policy is that for the technical team it was important that people living in 
conventillos as renters be considered as having a type of tenure beneficial for the 
household economy; Carreira also explains that people from these conventillos recognize 
these rental opportunity as a good avenue towards a potential for appropriation (1994: 
153). This group of renters, as in the Mexico City case, also achieved a level of 
organization that helped them to be able to ensure access to the new renovated housing.
 Looking at the social components of this program, one of the most interesting 
aspects is its recognition of the renters’ organization as a legitimate stakeholder. The 
owner of 21 of the properties that had rental housing was a corporation called “Celestina 
La Grande” which went into bankrupcy, leaving the banks with the task of evicting 1,200 
renters. The inhabitants knew about the possibility of eviction and created the 
organization called “Mutual Esperanza” to demand municipal action to address their 
housing problem. This led to the renters’ organization negotiating with the technical team 
to elaborate what they found was the best possible solution: to buy the deteriorated 
properties, to rehabilitate them, and to sell them to their previous inhabitants.  
 In order to participate in the program, households had to be registered with the 
social organization and to participate in the organization’s decision-making. “Mutual 
Esperanza” had rules for maintaining the organization’s stability and its housing 
adjudication; a certain amount of money was required as a monthly payment by members 
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of the organization, money that also counted as part of the down payment for the housing 
unit purchase.  
 The way this program was developed and the way that the conventillos inhabitants 
organized to enforce their housing rights by negotiating with the municipality is a 
remarkable example of a strategy for addressing the housing needs of an organized 
population. This program is not only an example for policy makers and planners; it is 
especially an example for all those renters that do not feel that they are part of the 
neighborhood fabric. These neighborhood residents of Buenos Aires provided a lesson 
for the rest of the people living in conventillos about how to get things done in their 
favor.  
Repoblamiento de La Comuna; Santiago 
Public-private partnerships to achieve different goals  
 
 In 1940 the historic center area of Santiago known as “La Comuna” had a 
population of 430,000, which by 1992 had decreased to 232,000. In response to this 
decline, a program was created with the goal of bringing residents back (repoblamiento) 
to the historic center while also maintaining the current population.  
 The military regime that controlled the country after 1973 had specific plans for 
the low income population living in the central areas. As Hardoy (1992) explained, while 
the population of historic centers in Latin America can be characterized generally as low-
income (p: 163), this characterization contrasts with Santiago’s center, where this general 
tendency is not reflected and “where government policies implemented during de 1980’s 
decennial promoted the mobilization of the low income population to the urban 
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peripheries” (Hardoy, 1992: 163). However, people like Pablo Contrucci5 have argued 
that the depopulation process in the Comuna of Santiago was similar to processes seen in 
other Latin American centers. Since the 1980s, the Comuna has experienced a process of 
deterioration, resulting indeclining population due to the migration of its inhabitants to 
the periphery (Contrucci, 1999). 
The planning structure of the program involved a broad housing policy approach 
that includes the national government’s initiatives along with local-public and private 
partnerships. ReHA program offered subsidized credit, technical assistance and 
government housing incentives to (1) respond to the current residents of the area’s 
housing needs, (2) preserve the historic heritage of the area and (3) stop the residents’ 
exodus. In addition, the “Programa de Repoblamiento” utilized municipal funds to invest 
in new housing production for people of different income levels.   
Both programs are managed by the public-private corporation “Corporación para 
el Desarrollo de Santiago” (Cordesan) (Corporation for Santiago Development), within 
its department of housing. Since 1991, Santiago’s municipality put these programs into 
practice as a response to the demands generated by citizen participation, its ‘open 
cabildos’ (open public meetings) and the allegados6 committees.  
The program for new housing established a subsidy for urban renovation by 
designating housing options with different subsidies according to different target income 
levels. This demand-side subsidy could be used to purchase market-rate housing; it was 
directed towards low income first-time homeowners and its application process was done 
                                                 
5
 FLACSO, (no year). http://www.flacso.org.ec/docs/sfdesculcontrucci.pdf 
6
 Allegados are a group of people or  individuals that share housing with king.   
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through the ministry of housing. The policy established the need to develop housing for 
different types of income levels, using values adjusted for inflation called “UF” (Valores 
de Unidad de Fomento7): housing for the low and very low income was 500 U.F. or 
below, housing for the middle income was from 500 UF to 1000 UF, and housing for the 
upper middle income sector was from 1000 to 2000 UF. Housing for the higher income 
groups was included in the policy because at first the private housing market did not see 
the center as a place to be developed and therefore the municipality started the program 
to help private market see the real demand for housing. The program also hoped to 
accomplish the goal of bringing residents of all different income levels back to the 
Comuna.  
According to Contrucci, the middle and upper middle income groups are the 
groups that are mainly attended to by the program (1999). It is based on a “Bolsa de 
Demanda”, which is a system that registers interested families that are able to buy new 
housing at an average of 900 UF. The system helps to assist and prepare households to 
apply for the government subsidy and bank financing and to receive training about 
community living. It keeps a record of the applicants’ savings and when they have 
enough they jump to the list of custumers that are ready for purchase. In 1993 the system 
had 1,500 interested families and the data gathered from them helped inform the design 
of how the program was going to work during the following years, especially in terms of 
subsidy calculation, which had special regulations for the historic area.  
                                                 
7
 UF according to Contrucci is a fictitious number used in the financing market of Chile and in particular in 
real estate market. The current value to the article’s data was $14, 950 or approximately US $33. 
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The part of program with the goal of improving existing housing is focused on 
about 8,000 housing units that are in poor condition and need to be rehabilitated. Fifty 
percent of them are inhabited by their owners. These units belong to a type of housing 
built during the beginning of the 20th Century, a collective housing design called Cités. 
This part of the program is called ‘ReHa’ and helps to provide government and private 
financing to families that normally are not eligible for credit. With the Corporation of 
Santiago as a cosigner, owners can develop rehabilitation processes with technical 
assistance and municipal management (contracting and assisting construction process).  
 The Chilean experience combines policies for both existing and new housing in 
the historic area. The combination of approaches allows the program to serve a broader 
target population with a range of different needs. Also, it allows the participation of 
different scales of involvement beginning with the national government, which also has 
the responsibility to guarantee good housing for the population, and also including 
municipal public-private partnerships and private developers. The programs have 
generated a good urban development synergy to rehabilitate the Comuna area; the fact 
that it is bringing residents back is proved by the enormous change in the urban 
environment and increased number of building permits (Valenzuela, 2004). In 1990 the 
building permits for housing purposes represented only 10 percent of the construction 
activity, by 1996 they had increased to 60 percent of total construction activity in the 
area. The program’s most innovative idea is the creation of a “Bolsa de demanda,” 
allowing public and private housing developers to gauge the size of the population 
interested in living in the area and its level of income.  
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Housing rehabilitation, Pilot program; Cuzco  
Social Strategic Planning for Urban Rehabilitation 
 In 1995, a consulting agency called the “Guaman Poma de Ayala Center” 
developed a new urban “cadastre” or property registration system in GIS format for the 
municipality of Cuzco. During the same consultancy, the Center collected more 
information about housing and habitability conditions in order to have enough 
information to develop the proposed rehabilitation projects. Building on this planning 
background and using the previously collected information, in the year 2000 the Center 
developed a pilot project to rehabilitate an entire block.  
To identify the block to be rehabilited (manzana 127), the Center developed a 
detailed diagnostic through GIS analysis using data about land use and tenure as well as 
about overcrowding conditions, sanitation conditions and housing conditions. With the 
GIS information, it was possible to identify that specific block as one of the blocks with 
the worst conditions in terms of habitability in the whole city. With that data, the pilot 
project team went to meet with the owners and after some time the owners agreed to 
participate at a level of 40 percent of the capital investment needed to rehabilitate the 
housing. The participation of the property owners was a prerequisite for cooperation of 
the Spanish Junta de Andalucía, which planned to fund theother 60 percent of the project 
(Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005: 52)     
  The conceptual ideas behind housing rehabilitation were not only ideas of 
conservation of the patrimonial structures but also ideas of the conservation of the 
traditional uses of urban spaces and places where its multiple users encounter each other, 
especially all those sectors that live in the area and those who could not find places to live 
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other than in the deteriorated historic houses (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005). The 
pilot program assumed that one of the main problems was “the uncontrolled growth of 
economic activities generated by the tourism” which is changing land uses and 
transforming the urban fabric (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005: 8).     
 The pilot program assumed urban rehabilitation as a planning strategy that 
“revalorizes or improves the quality of the current urban fabric” (Centro Guaman Poma 
de Ayala, 2005: 8), which means taking into consideration not only the physical aspects 
of the urban layout but also social conditions and the local economy, in order to preserve 
the current vitality and culture of the center (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005: 11)     
  Block 127 had a total of 13 parcels with 22 different property owners. Of these, 
just 17 of the owners agreed to participate in the first phase of the project. As part of its 
ideas for sustainable urban rehabilitation, the program’s managers were to help the 
residents to get organized with a legal base in order to be able to participate as a unified 
actor, facilitating the project administration relationship with the public sector. This 
process was the first phase of the rehabilitation process. The second phase was the actual 
physical intervention, based on the information generated in the previous work with the 
residents’ organization. The project was launched when the inter-institutional agreement 
was signed with the Junta de Andalucía, and the architectonic projects began to be 
developed together with the residents, after a hundred meetings between the residents and 
the planning agencies. (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005: 68) 
During the second phase of the program the manager encountered a number of 
limitations. One of them was the inability of all 17 owners to produce their 40 percent of 
the investment. In order to continue with the construction process, the management office 
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decided to intervene on an individual basis, considering the situation of each property. 
This was also helpful for accomplishing the project goals with respect to international 
cooperation. It was also thought to be the easiest way to manage architectonic 
rehabilitation projects with respect to each individual family. The housing design 
processes attempted to taken into account the resident families, although in practice the 
construction process within each family residence was sometimes difficult to handle in 
the case of this pilot program. In the end the project benefited 50 families for a total of 
302 inhabitants. (Centro Guaman Poma de Ayala, 2005: 72). 
Conclusion and Follow up 
 
 This report is focused on promising policies for housing in Quito’s Historic 
Center..  The programs reviewed above help us to understand the differences in approach 
that municipalities can develop to address housing needs with new or existing renovated 
housing in historic central areas. 
The study of these four examples sets up a background from which to 
contextualize the following report and also sets up commonalities of housing needs in 
historic centers around the region. It was important to understand, through these case 
studies, what proved to be important for different municipal governments in how they 
addressed housing problems and to what extent they are still working and implementing 
housing programs in the central areas of their respective cities.   
 The cases of Mexico City and Buenos Aires are good examples of how housing 
needs became evident after emergencies such as the Mexico City earthquake and highly 
deteriorated buildings in central areas of Buenos Aires. Both are also good examples of 
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renter activism where renters organized to demand housing rights which were finally 
included in the programs’ policies and strategies.  
 The case of the Comuna of Santiago, Chile is the only program mentioned that is 
currently an ongoing process. The public-private corporation Cordesan followed specific 
policy guidelines to approach housing needs for target sectors of the population. Also, in 
both of the programs that Cordesan manages the national government is involved with 
the special subsidy program for new housing in the historic area; this strategy provides 
key financing and sustainability components for the program. However, housing 
opportunities for very low income residents are limited to the old and renovated housing 
stock. For this reason the new housing constructed and the policy that accompanied it did 
not improve the housing access of the very low income population.  
The case of el Cuzco, Peru is a good example of a systematic approach based on an 
organized geographic information system of the land uses and housing quality of the area. 
The system allowed the municipality to identify the block that was going to be 
rehabilitated with the cooperation of the Junta de Andalucía. The problem with this 
policy is that it relies on continued outside funding in order to continue with renovation 
and rehabilitation of other blocks and to avoid the “pilot program scale.” Similar 
problems arose in some of the housing programs that Quito developed with the Junta de 
Andalucía. 
 Other Latin American cases were analyzed in order to complement the information 
about and local experiences of Quito. In the following section I will describe the field 
work and literature review process developed in order to evaluate local housing programs 
in Quito.  
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1.2 RESEARCH METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Field Work 
 
During the summer of 2007 municipal officials agreed to facilitate my research, 
providing access to information and logistical support for the fieldwork stage of the 
project. I had an office space in the department of studies and information where scholars 
from different countries arrive to do research about Quito. With the objective of 
beginning to understand the scope of the analysis I should develop, my methodology 
during the summer consisted of (1) a stage of archival research, and (2) a stage of field 
observation and interviews with different stakeholders involved with housing issues. 
Each of the different institutions and organisms involved in the Historic Center of Quito 
has its own documentation center holding unpublished reports with valuable information 
about housing programs, such as documentation about planning objectives, resources, 
policies, and some financial information, as well as demographic information on 
beneficiaries’ incomes, on the planned density for areas of intervention, etc. 
The first step in my research was to collect and analyze the available primary 
archival documentation about the strategic housing programs in the Historic Center of 
Quito. These documents allowed me to determine what information and what published 
documents were available about the different programs. Other information was recorded 
in letters and internal reports (such as socio-economic analysis of the beneficiaries). For 
this phase it was necessary to spend a number of weeks frequenting the municipal 
buildings that are located in the Historic Center to search through the data in their 
archives, which are in varying states of disorganization. Sometimes I collected 
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information from one program or another without any specific order because I was not 
able to foresee what I was going to find or from what year it would date.  
After a first search of bibliographic sources available in the Documentation 
Center of the Planning Department and through talking with city planners I confirmed the 
fact that there is no comprehensive analysis or previous evaluation of previous strategic 
housing programs (see Table 1.3.1). There is one thesis about the economic benefits that 
the Vivienda Solidaria Program produced for the Historic Center’s land and housing 
market, and I found just a few published reports that were more focused on the 
architectural concepts of the housing rehabilitation than on the actual management and 
application of housing policies (FONSAL publications).  
Table 1.2.1.  List of Strategic Housing Programs 
Housing Programs Developed in the Historic Center of Quito 
Year Strategic Projects Agencies Involved 
1989 - 2000 House of the Seven Patios DMQ-FONSAL-Junta de Andalucía 
1998 - 2000 FONREVIV DMQ-Unidad de Vivienda 
1995 - 1997 San Roque and La Victoria Condominium 
Buildings 
FONSAL 
1995 - 2003 Casa Ponce and El Penalillo Unidad de Vivienda - Junta de Andalucía  
1997 - 2003 Vivienda Solidaria ECH-IDB-MIDUVI-BEV-Pact_Arim 
1994 - 2007 Caldas 508 ECH-Pact_Arim 
2004 - now Camino Real, Casa Pontón INNOVAR.UIO 
2003 - now Pon a Punto tu Casa QUITOVIVIENDA-Junta de Andalucía 
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Consequently, I decided to look for internal archives, seeking old reports, project 
documents and anything not published but related to the program’s management. I 
developed a list of key documents to guide my search: (1) inter-institutional agreements, 
(2) reports in which the public-private investment mechanisms were established, (3) 
policies for sales and unit adjudications, (4) data on the beneficiary population, (5) 
reports on the social work process done with tenants, (6) inter-institutional 
correspondence, (7) summaries and reports to the IDB and the Municipality,  (8) the 
Junta de Andalucía’s Strategic plans, and (9) theses and other student studies developed 
on these issues.   
By the end of this research I had found a series of documents which described the 
existing and available data that I use to describe and analyze the different housing 
programs. For readers that would like to know how I found all these documents, 
Appendix 1 contains the description of the process of going around to the different 
agencies and the process of looking through their documentation and archival centers. 
Thematic areas of Analysis 
 
The part of the research involving literature and document review was developed 
during the fall of 2007 and the beginning of spring 2008 at UT Austin. The purpose of 
this section is to explain the rationale behind the collected resources and references 
included as they relate to the development of an understanding of the different relevant 
components that I need to consider in order to develop my final analysis and conclusion.  
The analysis process that I followed was organized into thematic areas such as (1) global 
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trends of planning towards housing rehabilitation in historic centers, (2) inner city 
rehabilitation experiences and ideas about sustainable urban approaches for stopping 
sprawl, and (3) the history of planning in Quito’s Historic Center relevant to housing 
problems and strategies.  
To understand the planning context for the housing programs I looked through the 
extensive literature about the most recent period of policy intervention in historic centers 
of Latin America (Rojas, 2004, 2006, 2007; Rojas, and Castro, 1999; Scarpaci, 1999, 
2005);   and sometimes in other parts of the world (Ahmed, 2002; Blanc and Lessard and 
(ed) 2003; Bromley and Jones, 1995). I chose to look for literature that discusses ideas of 
historic center rehabilitation policies specifically to understand their evolution and how 
they approach the housing problem (Alvarez, 2006; Martinez, 1996).  
Some regional scholars tend to focus their research on the conservation aspect of 
historic center rehabilitation, but there are a number of examples of research done on 
historic center rehabilitation with an urban redevelopment approach similar to those used 
in other parts of the world to tackle inner city problems (Ward, 1993; Zaaijer, 1991; 
Bromley and Jones, 1996). I extract from this literature review some examples of housing 
policies and programs implemented in other Latin American historic centers such as the 
ones in Mexico City, Puebla, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Cuzco (Contrucci, 1999; 
Cullen-Cheung, 2005; Estrada, 2005; Valenzuela, 2004; Middleton, 2003; Pantoja, 2002; 
Peniche, 2004; Martinez, 1996; Pérez Mendoza (editores) 2003; Carrion, 1990, 2000, 
2007). 
The thematic area about inner city redevelopment (Middleton, 2003; Rakodi, 1995) 
takes into account some examples and trends from current urban renewal efforts in US 
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and European downtowns as a strategy for sustainable development to encourage higher 
density within cities in order to stop sprawl (Bromley and Jones, 1996; Wagner and 
others (ed), 2005 ). This review was done with the purpose of learning what kind of 
arguments we can make when applying the concept of sustainability to urban 
rehabilitation and when thinking about the role of housing policy within the strategies 
implemented to guarantee housing affordability access (Azuela, 1987; Apgar, 2007; De la 
Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler, 2006).   
The next theme, analysis of population demographics and of the Historic Center’s 
housing stock in Quito, was done through compilation of information from the Census 
from 1990 and 2001 available on the Quito Municipality web page, and from other 
surveys and studies done by the Historic Center Corporation (ECH), as well as academic 
research on the topic (Bromley and Jones, 1995; Andrade, 1991, Coulomb, 1989).  
The department of information and studies of the Metropolitan District assisted me in 
developing GIS maps of some of the data from the census. With respect to the validity of 
these maps I have to mention that department’s technicians notified me that there is some 
error with the geo references between barrio codes from the census (like the US census 
tract number) and the actual spatial location; they said that data is geo referenced to one 
parcel to the left of the correct location.8 
I also reviewed the different comprehensive plans implemented for the Quito 
Metropolitan area. I review all of the comprehensive plans since 1942, examining the 
Historic Center’s role within planning approaches to solving city problems or building 
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future visions. I found that the Historic Center of Quito has been a concern since the first 
1942 comprehensive plan. Since then, the area was already considered a historical part of 
the city because by that moment the Quito elite had already migrated to the peripheries 
and populations from other parts of Ecuador had immigrated to the Center. The focus of 
this literature review section is to understand how long and in what ways the municipality 
has historically tried to solve habitability problems in the center. For this research I 
considered housing as one of the troubled urban components playing a role in general 
habitability problems and I investigated each plan looking specifically at the housing 
component.  
1.3. CONCLUSION 
 
The following report will argue that, to be successful,planning for the rehabilitation of 
the Historic Center of Quito must address real housing needs while comprehensively 
improving urban conditions. At the moment, there is one program in practice and the 
analysis of it (chapter 5) shows that it is not addressing resident population needs, at least 
not the needs of the bulk of residents. According to research developed during the 
summer 2007, this program only considers the conservation of the historic house, and the 
improvement of physical housing quality. What would be a genuine housing policy for 
the historic center that can help improve the current program to enhance it benefits and 
also to diversify the approach?, What are the most promising policies for increasing and 
stabilizing residential use and the actual resident population?  
                                                                                                                                                 
8
 For this reason I modify some of the maps because I am familiar with the Historic Center of Quito and 
can tell that a park or certain monument is not a multifamily building. That does not mean that I can fix the 
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The previous analysis demonstrated that plansfor the problems of  historic centers’ in 
the region are comparable and suggest that global trends exist, such as the ideas for 
redevelopment of inner cities as a sustainable strategy for growth management. In 
planning for historic centers as inner cities (Ward, 1993), planning strategies are again 
similar because historic centers’ population characteristics are comparable. 
 If other historic centers have similar urban problems to those in Quito, I asked what 
kind of policies other historic centers in the region implemented or are implementing that 
might help to understand Quito’s case. I found several examples, but I had to choose only 
those I knew to be comparable to Quito, specially the ones that had tenants involved. The 
examples of Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Cuzco, and Santiago to some extent feature 
policies and programs similar to those implemented in Quito over the last decades. 
Considering the experiences of these programs helps both to frame a methodology 
with which to evaluate Quito’s programs and to demonstrate that the housing component 
in other historic centers is an important element for urban rehabilitation in which the low 
income population, the characteristic population of these areas, was considered.  The four 
examples provide lessons from their planning processes, their targeted income groups and 
their management strategies which are important in the formulation of the research 
questions considered in this report.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
geo referenced mistake, and therefore I do not base data analysis on these maps for reasons of reliability. 
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In 1985 the historic center of Mexico City was declared an ‘emergency area’ to be 
able to put into action the combined local and federal planning strategy that helped the 
renters’ organization to become homeowners of renovated units. In 1984, another renters’ 
organization from Buenos Aires was able to ensure their right to own one of the housing 
units on which they once live in a context of neighborhood rehabilitation in the central 
area.   
Since 1991, Santiago implemented a program with broader objectives. The program 
does not focused on the rehabilitation on specific units but in a more comprehensive 
approach based on new neoliberal planning ideas. They created the public-private 
partnership CORDESAN to be the responsible agency to manage the programs for the 
repopulation of the historic center. The set of housing programs tackle different housing 
markets and needs with the participation of private developers. It combines local and 
national resources to give subsides and incentives to generate the rehabilitation synergy 
in the Comuna area or Santiago’s center. Even though the downside of these programs is 
that low income housing receives the least attention, it is valuable to look at it as an 
example of a sustainable policy that is in practice since 1991. 
The last case study is from 2000 and it is about the renovation of a block in the 
historic center of Cuzco in 2000. Program managers encounter difficulties in dealing with 
the 17 different economic conditions of owners that were asked to participate in the 
rehabilitation of the selected block. Different form the organized renters of Mexico City 
and Buenos Aires, these owners did not felt their property rights threaten. Property 
owners of the 127 block suddenly found themselves involved with the municipal 
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program. The public agency drove them to get organized with other property owners of 
the block and to invest in the rehabilitation of their properties.     
Why are housing programs and planning strategies so similar to what happened in 
Quito during those days? From 1990s onward the Historic Center of Quito, like other 
places around Latin America, began a rehabilitation process aimed at improving the 
urban environment. Urban strategies have been applied following comprehensive 
rehabilitation goals which were motivated both by the UNESCO designation of world 
heritage status and by the need to rehabilitate the central area and integrate it into the 
metropolitan city.  
The UNESCO recognition increased support for policies towards historic 
preservation, especially of historic monuments in their role as important icons of a 
cultural history. The newly-renovated monuments and the lively, bustling environment of 
the Historic Center became the first attraction that brought tourists into the neighborhood. 
As they traveled around the region tourists have recognized the cultural heritage that the 
Latin American centers have preserved through the passage of time up to the modern 
years, and they have made historic centers important stops on their itineraries.   
The idea of improving the condition of historic centers with the goal of attracting 
tourism became possible because, in the case of Quito, its unique monuments and urban 
layout are an evident source of economic activity for the city’s benefit. As this report will 
further describe in the following chapters, comprehensive plans in Quito recognize the 
economic value of the center and its role in the metropolitan area. In historic centers 
around Latin America similar ideas are supporting programs aimed at improving the 
tourist industry, and through these processes global trends in ideas of urban renewal in 
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historic centers also started to be introduced (Scarpacci, 2005; Carrión 2007; Milan, 
2003). But in the meantime in Quito the housing component within comprehensive 
rehabilitation planning remains secondary even though it is known that housing 
rehabilitation is an important element to guarantee a livable center that is attractive for 
tourists. Other examples of housing programs in the cases of different historic centers 
around Latin America are useful for understanding how global ideas for urban 
rehabilitation in historic centers are also influencing housing programs.  
What are the most promising policies for increasing residential use and stabilizing 
the current resident population of the center? How can the city achieve the housing goals 
stated in their comprehensive plans? Building on this background of international global 
trends and examples of individual programs, the next chapters will focus on a detailed 
study of the case of Quito. The following sections continue with the study of the city’s 
demographics and its current plans and policies. Later, it continues with a study of past 
and current housing programs, concluding with a set of recommendations for the 
formulation and improvement of policy and directions for follow-up research.   
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Chapter 2:  Urban Development Conditions and Planning 
 
Quito’s Historic Center corresponds to the main urban core of the now greatly-
expanded metropolitan city. Inhabited since the pre-Inca period, it has been a center of 
government since Colonial times and today remains the seat of the national government. 
The total area of the historic district is 375 hectares with a total population of  50, 982.  In 
comparison with the rest of the city, population density in the area is relatively high and 
corresponds to 135 habitants per hectare (see Table 2.1.1). 
  The following chapter will first examine the Historic Center’s demographics and 
urban trends: Who lives there, what are the conditions of the housing stock and what are 
current land uses? Second, this chapter will explore whether and how the previous and 
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current policies and plans recognized that there is a housing problem in the Center, what 
policies they proposed and what policies have actually been implemented.  
Table 2.1 Quito Demographic Data 
Quito Demography  
  Area (Ha*) % Population % Populatio
n Density 
(Hab./Ha.) 
Metropolitan Area 425,532   1,842,201   4.33 
City of Quito 19,135 4.50% 1,397,698 75.87% 73.04 
Central Administrative 
Zone** 
2,362 0.56% 277,233 15.05% 117.37 
Historic Center 375 0.09% 50,982 2.77% 135.95 
            
* One Hectares= 2.47 Acres ; ** Administración Centro Manuela Saenz ; Source: DMQ-MDMQ, Censo de 
Población y Vivienda 2001 
 
The pattern of urbanization experienced by Latin American cities during the 20th 
century, characterized by rapid expansion in the peripheries (see Figure 1), attracted 
research and urban intervention in areas were cities where expanding (Carrión, 2007; 
Ward, 1993). However, by the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of 1990’s, neoliberal 
and global ideas for urban intervention switched the focus back to the built city, 
specifically to the inner city and downtown redevelopment.  
In the case of Quito, this redevelopment would take place in its historic center as a 
key part of the municipality’s agenda, encouraged by the process of globalization in 
which historic centers came to be seen as important areas because of their central location 
and unique history. The central city was converted into a strategic and fundamental 
platform for the city’s local integration and for its integration into the global city as well. 
(Carrión 2007 p.28, referring Castells, 1997; Sassen 1999 ) (Figure 1). Its special role in 
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the metropolitan city is because of its characteristics of stored cultural history and 
popular activities for people from around the city. And after urban rehabilitation, these 
areas will be a greater part of the global cultural tourism industry.  
Figure 1:  Historic Center of Quito Location Map 
 
Global ideas to redevelop historic centers or inner city areas are sometimes 
carefully developed in order to protect the current urban fabric. In the case of Quito, the 
comprehensive rehabilitation programs in some respects do care about the social 
component of its inhabitants. The municipality develops, for example, social assistance 
 38 
programs to reinforce local traditional business9. But on the other hand, rehabilitation 
programs like housing rehabilitation and construction are implemented with little 
reference to the benefit of the current low income residents. The following section will 
examine the demographics of the Historic Center to learn about the social and economic 
context urban in which rehabilitation is taking place.   
2.1 LAND, HOUSING AND DEMOGRAPHIC REVIEW 
 
The goal of analyzing the Historic Center’s land, housing and population data is 
to understand the social and economic context in which housing rehabilitation is 
happening. In order to respond to the research questions of this report, it is necessary to 
know who lives in the Center, how the current housing stock is configured and how land 
use is organized.    
The congested Historic Center of Quito is currently subject to urban development 
policies aimed at rehabilitating the Center’s conditions of centrality and of habitability, 
but also at reestablishing some of the upscale spaces that existed when the Ecuadorian 
elites once lived there. Not too long ago during the urban disequilibrium of the 70’s 
caused by rapid population growth and residents’ mobilization from the city core to the 
peripheries, the Center’s services became increasingly fragmented and the area began to 
feel crammed with commercial uses that were taking over the streets. At the same time 
houses were changing from their earlier architectural function as single family dwellings 
with servants to overcrowded conventillos. Storage spaces and single rented rooms 
                                                 
9
 These programs for social development are commonly responsibility of the Municipal Local 
Administrative Zone Manuela Saenz.  
 39 
became the most common form of occupation of the colonial houses10, while the elite 
class left this magnificent urban area to the middle and low income working classes.  
The Historic Center’s housing stock consists of 18,772 housing units which are 
occupied by an average of 2.67 habitants per household. In 2001, 49 percent of the units 
were single rooms, 33 percent were apartments and 18 percent were full houses11 (Figure 
2). These types of housing and occupation of the neighborhood are reflected in 
population density data that can be mapped by neighborhood. The Historic Center of 
Quito has fourteen separate administrative neighborhoods and each of those have 
different population density.  (Figure 3 and 4).    
Figure 2: Historic Center Housing Type 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Protected historic houses date from the colonial period, but some also date to the early republican period. 
11
 Censo de Población y Vivienda 2001. 
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Figure 3: Historic Center Neighborhoods 
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Figure 4:  Map of Historic Center Neighborhoods Densities 
 
As a result of singular periods of urban transformation, the Historic Center’s 
population now represents one of the parishes with the highest concentration of 
indigenous people in the entire metropolitan area, many of whom migrated from rural 
areas during the 70’s to fill the spaces left open by the fleeing upper class. Data from the 
2001 national census claim that 3.3 percent of the metropolitan area’s population is 
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indigenous. But only in the Historic Center parish12, indigenous people represent 8.2 
percent of the population; the highest percentage among parishes in the city13. While 
many recent migrants live in the area, especially students from other provinces that find 
cheap rooms in the Historic Center, the majority of families have been well established in 
the area for many years. Data from homeowners show that on average they acquired their 
homes 22 years ago and 88.8 percent of continue to live in those houses. There is no data 
available on mobility rates in rental units.   
Another important group of residents in the historic center is the population that 
receives the voucher for human development (welfare payments) that the government 
gives to the poorest sector of the population. According to the data provided by the 
Ministry of Human and Economic Development, in the Historic Center area there is a 
total population of 2,564 people who are receiving the vouchers and live in 
neighborhoods such as San Blas, San Marcos, San Roque, San Sebastian (See Table 
2.1.2). The recipients of vouchers are single mothers, elderly and people with disabilities. 
It is interesting to note that 86 percent of the voucher recipients have some kind of 
disability. This information provides an account of who some of the very poor people that 
live in the historic center are, and it leads to questions about what kind of housing they 
are these people occupying, whether or not they are renting and how much they pay. Are 
the housing units that people with disabilities occupy adequate for their needs? 
                                                 
12
 The Historic Center parish belongs to one of the nine different Administrative Zones (Administraciones 
Zonales) of the Metropolitan District of Quito. The total percentage of indigenous people in the Center 
Administrative Zone “Manuela Saez” is 5 percent, still high when compared with other parts of the city.  
Data Souce: http://www4.quito.gov.ec/mapas/indicadores/etnia_discapacida.htm 
13
 Other parishes like Guamani or Calderon are other areas with recognized indigenous populations.  
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  The Historic Center of Quito is a ‘popular’ (low income) urban space, featuring 
activities that do not often attract high end commercial activities.  As Scarpaci (2005) has 
mentioned, Latin American historic centers are frequently places with cheap housing and 
affordable commercial services and products. Lots of lower and middle class people visit 
these areas everyday on different administrative, commercial or personal errands, and 
together with tourists form the bulk of the crowd on the streets. The municipality of Quito 
has calculated that almost 200,000 people use the Historic Center during the day. That 
means that there is intensive activity during the day and relatively minimal activity 
during the night, especially in the areas where residential land uses are not representative. 
(Figure 5)  
Table 2.1.1: Population holders of Vouchers in the HCQ. 
 
While at the beginning of the 20th Century the Historic Center comprised 
practically all of Quito, by the end of the 20th Century it comprised just 2 percent of the 
Population holders of Voucher for Human Development, CHQ, 2007 
Historic Center 
Neighborhoods 
Single 
Mothers 
Elderly Disable Total 
San Blas 87 8 593 688 
San Marcos 18 5 142 165 
San Roque 165 15 1,170 1,350 
San Sebastian 49 4 308 361 
Total 319 32 2,213 2,564 
Source: Ministerio de Bienestar Social del Ecuador,  
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urban area and held 5 percent of the city’s population (Rojas, 2004). Residential use had 
decreased to 45 percent while the mean of the whole city was 75 percent. However, as the 
land use map (Figure 5) can demonstrate, residential use is still an important type of land 
use and a major function for the area. The main core of the Center, called the ‘nucleo’ of 
the Historic Center, is the area where most of the monuments stand and where most 
service activities take place. This area is the most visited by local and international 
tourists and is the area that receives the majority of the activity during the day. Its 
residential density is 65.19 hab./ha; with 1383 housing units, which is the lowest share of 
housing in the whole Historic Center (see Figure 4). Land prices in this nucleus tend to be 
higher than in other parts of the historic center, but not as high as in other parts of the 
city. This can be demonstrated by looking at the appraisal map that the Municipality of 
Quito uses to calculate property taxes by looking at homogeneous areas.  
Quito’s Ordinance 150 created a system to calculate property taxes in accordance 
with a map of homogeneous areas (Figure 6). The ordinance divided the city into nine 
different groups of homogenous areas where most properties in each area had similar 
appraisal values. The value of the land plus the value of the built structures make up the 
total appraisal of the parcel. The Historic Center’s nucleus is ranked at three on a scale of 
nine land value levels, level one being the most expensive; the land is valued at $85 to 
$102 per square meter, the same price as in the more upscale northern part of Quito. The 
most expensive areas in the city are found in the central north part of Quito, around La 
Carolina Park.    
 The Historic Center’s current residential areas are located in the neighborhoods 
surrounding the nucleus. These areas ranked at level four ($50 - $ 85 m2) and level five 
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($24 -$50 m2) on their pricing scale. Parcels with historic buildings are valued depending 
on whether the structure is protected either entirely or partially. Land prices and property 
taxes are not high enough to be a serious discouragement to investment in developing the 
area and rehabilitating housing units in the Historic Center.  
Figure 5: Historic Center Land Uses Trend 
 
 
 46 
Figure 6:  Homogeneous Areas and Land Prices 
 
Table 2.1.2: Homogeneous Areas and Land Prices  
Homogeneous Areas 
Land Price per sq. meter (dollars) Ranking 
0 hasta  4 9 
4 hasta 8 8 
8 hasta  16 7 
16 hasta 24 6 
24 hasta  50 5 
50 hasta 85.0 4 
85 hasta 102 3 
102 hasta 172 2 
172 hasta 580 1 
Source: DMQ-Centro de Estudios e Información, 2007. 
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The area of the Historic Center has a total population of 50,982 with a negative 
growth rate of -1.2. Its median monthly income is $202.65 when the median for the 
metropolitan area as a whole is $355.6714.  77.85 percent of the population of the Center 
is old enough to work, however 60.49 percent of that portion is economically active. 
According to the 2001 census, 52 percent of the Historic Center households have a 
monthly salary as their source of income and 48 percent of households have incomes that 
come from small business or informal jobs.15  Ecuador’s basic legal minimum salary was 
set by the government at the end of 2007 at $198.26 dollars. Even though the medium 
income salary of the Historic Center is higher than the legal minimum, taking into 
account the cost of a standard basket of goods (“canasta familiar” or “de pobreza”), 
which was $322.03 in September of 2007, helps us to understand the poverty level of this 
area. According to 2001 census data, 21.2 percent of households in are classified as being 
in conditions of poverty, with 3.2 percent in extreme poverty and a full 80.9 percent at 
the poverty line.   
In terms of housing tenure, 69.97 percent of the households rent a housing unit 
and 23.95 percent are owner-occupied. The proportion of renters is high in comparison to 
the metropolitan area as a whole, in which 41.58 percent of the households rent and 49.67 
percent are owners. 16  
The area’s housing stock (Table 2.2.2., Figures 7 and 8) currently includes 1480 
single and bi-family houses, which represent 37 percent of total housing. The rest of the 
                                                 
14
 Source: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 2005-2006 Unidad de Estudios e Investigación; DMPT-
MDMQ. 
15
 PE-CHQ p: 29 
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housing stock is made up of a total of 2470 multifamily buildings: 1708 of these 
buildings house between two and eight households, 588 buildings house between eight 
and fifteen households, and 84 buildings house more than fifteen households each.17   
Table 2.1.3: Housing Stock 
Housing Stock 
   
  
Number of Buildings  Share 
Single Family Houses 1,480 38.34% 
Multifamily-house between 2 to 8 households 1,708 44.25% 
Multifamily-house between 8 to 15 households 588 15.23% 
Multifamily-house more than 15 households 84 2.18% 
Total 3,860   
Source: PE-CHQ, 2003.p:32   
 
Data about demographics, housing stock and land uses inform us about the people 
that live in the historic center. Data informs about the houses that are in existence and 
about trends of land uses and land prices.  Besides providing this contextual information, 
the data helps to create the social and urban background on which comprehensive plans 
are based.  The next section will examine the city’s comprehensive plans and ordinances 
by looking at the goals, objectives and strategies that they propose in terms of housing for 
the city as a whole and specifically for the Historic Center. The national government also 
has its own housing strategy that will be also analyzed because it was applied a program 
that was used in some of the housing programs that the municipality put into practice 
during the years 1999 until 2002.  
                                                                                                                                                 
16
 Source: Censo de Población y Vivienda, 2001 ; INEC  Unidad de Estudios e Investigación; DMPT-
MDMQ 
17
 PE-CHQ, 2003. p. 30 
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Figure 7:  “Caldas 508”, Multifamily building 
 
Figure 8: Benalcazar Street Multifamily Buildings 
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The area’s housing conditions are not really critical, as 75.93 percent of the 
housing units are in ‘regular’ or ‘good condition’; 11.47 percent of the housing stock is in 
‘bad condition’ and 12.6 percent is in ‘very bad condition’. The two last categories sum a 
total of 24 percent of the housing stock, which corresponds to 970 housing units.18 In 
2000, 71 percent of households had a private bathroom inside the housing unit and 29 
percent had a bathroom outside the housing unit. Of the last group, 20 percent of those 
external bathroom facilities were shared with other households in the historical 
arrangement of the multifamily house.  
Table 2.1.4 : Housing Condition 
Housing Condition 
   
  
Number of Buildings  Share 
Buildings in bad and very bad condition 393 7.71% 
Building in regular condition 4,453 87.31% 
Buildings is good condition 254 4.98% 
Total  5,100   
Source: PE-CHQ, 2003.p:32 
  
 
2.2 PLANS AND POLICY 
 
Global trends are evident as a major factor that has influenced urban development 
strategies in the central historic cities of Latin American countries around issues of the 
promotion of heritage tourism including “the industry of travel that promotes cultural 
landscapes that hold great historical and symbolic landmarks, monuments and 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, p:33.  
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neighborhoods19”. It is here that the main point of tension is created: for some, the 
Historic Center is a place to exploit for its iconic urban qualities and to sell them as 
cultural heritage to the world – but not necessarily to local people – encouraging urban 
policies that help set up new high end businesses such as five star hotels and expensive 
restaurants and boutiques. But on the other side, urban policies encourage the 
participation of neighborhood residents and economic development with semi-local 
businesses as part of their housing rehabilitation strategies.  How can these two ideas of 
the Historic Center be promoted at the same time? How can the policy be implemented in 
a way that helps middle income and lower income people to remain as residents of a 
Historic Center like that of Quito, that is being transformed towards different and 
unaffordable ends?  How can urban strategies be thought through in such a way as to not 
reinforce urban inequalities? How can the Municipality with its housing policies help to 
focus on the real goals stated in the plans, and how can it manage potential contradictions 
between these goals?   
Since this is happening in a global context, when talking about the Historic Center of 
Quito as a place to develop urban policies it should be possible to discuss reinforcing the 
vibrancy of neighborhood life according to current global trends that call for denser 
existing urban areas as a way to control sprawl and create more ‘sustainable’ cities.  
 
 
                                                 
19
 Scarpacci, p.7 
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As Carrion has explained, the revalorization of the built city goes along with the 
revalorization of its historical and functional conditions (Carrion, 2007), but it is 
ambiguous to whether this means its elite colonial history or its more recent function as a 
residential area for lower income people.  In Quito, the residential function of the Historic 
Center needs to be addressed not just in terms of the people that would like to live there 
but in terms of the people that already live there: current homeowners and renters. At 
least that is what the rhetoric of the municipal plans has articulated throughout its 
planning history. The following is a brief policy history of the Historic Center of Quito 
reflecting changing priorities on the part of the local government and growing 
international emphasis in intervention in historic areas. 
Quito Comprehensive Plans 
 
In 1941-1945 the ‘Jones Odriozola Plan’ established the Historic Center of Quito 
as one of the nine functional centers of the new modern city. This plan delimited the area 
of the Historic Center but did not establish any policies for its preservation. During that 
period the Center was called “Quito Colonial”. This plan set up the new poles for 
development that stretched far out from the urban core.   
In 1967 the ‘Plan de Reordenamiento Urbano de Quito’ 20 the municipality 
developed the first special plan for the Historic Center inspired by the Venice Letter 
(Carta de Venecia) of 1964, an international agreement prioritizing historic preservation. 
In the same period, a pilot plan was put in place with the objective of setting up a model 
for valorizing Quito’s architectural heritage.  
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In 1973 the plan called ‘Quito y su Area Metropolitana Plan Director 1973-1993’21 
assigned roles of tourism, service provision and commerce to the Historic Center, but 
treated its residential role as secondary. The plan did not give any specific norms under 
which to apply its recommendations, allowing the deterioration and overcrowding of the 
area to continue. This period coincided with the demographic transformation of the 
Center from a neighborhood with residents of all class levels to being a mostly 
homogenously low income area. 
In 1978 Quito was declared a World Heritage City by UNESCO, motivating the 
historic preservation agenda of the newly-created National Institute for Cultural Heritage. 
During that period monument preservation and restoration became a major part of the 
development agenda for the historic area, while more comprehensive planning initiatives 
including infrastructure construction and service expansion were relegated to the rapidly-
growing peripheries.  
In 1979 concerns for housing rehabilitation in the Historic Center began to surface 
with a housing inventory with a scope of 23 hectares, including 984 houses. This project 
was the first attempt to document and catalogue the historic housing stock, but was more 
aimed towards surveying structures for preservation than for improving housing 
conditions for residents. In 1980, Quito’s master plan continued along these lines, (Plan 
Quito – Esquema Director)22 establishing the need to “identify, qualify and make an 
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 Ordinance 1165, 20-06-67 
21
 Ordinance 1353, 04-05-71 
22
 Ordinance 2092, 27-02-81 
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inventory of the zones, groups and monuments that are part of the historical-cultural 
heritage of Quito and its micro-region”23. 
Since 1988 planning in Quito has been based on a new ‘regional’ idea of the territory, 
and the new organizational structure established in the plan of the ‘Quito Metropolitan 
District’ (1993) ideally is founded on principles such as democracy, participation and 
decentralization24. However, decentralization has been the most evident of these 
principals in policy implementation. To decentralize the responsibility for the planning 
and management of historic heritage areas, the new Metropolitan District of Quito 
created the agency FONSAL25 (“Fondo de Salvamento”), which was in charge of 
implementing rehabilitation plans. 
In the same context, the Municipality made agreements with the Spanish Agency for 
International Cooperation (AECI) and the Spanish National Commission of the Fifth 
Centenary to write the Plan Maestro de Rehabilitation Integral de las Areas Históricas 
de Quito, approved by ordinance in 1992.  Its basic goals are divided into four 
statements: Urban Adaptation, Environment Upgrade, Social Sustainability and 
Institutional Reinforcement. Later, the city included the housing aspect as an important 
macro-project to be developed and to be included in the budget; the loan-granting agency 
IDB found no objection to such use of the money.26   
                                                 
23
 Ilustre Municipio de Quito, Dirección de Planificación (1980). Plan Quito, Esquema Director. Segunda 
Edición 1984, Editora Mantilla Hurtado S.A. Quito. P.55 
24
 DMQ, Plan Especial Centro Histórico p.21 
25
 FONSAL, created by National Congress, Law No. 82 and its funded by a 3 percent tax imposed to the 
tickets of public shows practiced in the metropolitan area. Quito, June 16th, 1989.  
26
 Rojas, Eduardo. Principal Housing and Urban Development Specialist in the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s Sustainable Development Department. Phone interview on October, 2007 
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In order to finance rehabilitation plans in the context of processes of modernization 
and privatization, the Municipality created the public-private corporation Empresa del 
Centro Historico (ECH) as the required managing organism of the 51 million dollars 
designated for implementing the Program for Integral Rehabilitation, 41 million of which 
was from an IDB loan27.  The ECH was a partnership created between the Municipality 
of Quito and the private Caspicara Foundation.28   
In 2003 the Municipality together with the cooperation of the Spanish agency Junta 
de Andalucía elaborated the Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito that is part of 
the bigger planning structure mandated by the Plan General de Desarrollo Territorial 
(PGDT, 2001). This is the current plan for urban development and it states that the 
Municipality has the obligatory responsibility to restore the urban equilibrium of this 
emblematic area of the Ecuadorian capital. The Historic Center should gradually redefine 
its land uses as well as its present and future functions. At the same time, urban policies 
should substantially improve the quality of life of its inhabitants and users29. This plan 
recognizes the Historic Center as an important economic source for the Metropolitan 
District and for that reason hopes to propose a balance between the conservation of its 
heritage historical and its cultural identity and between economic development and social 
equilibrium.30  
                                                 
27
 Loan No.822/OC-EC, October 13th 2004.  For the Rehabilitation Program of the Historic Center of Quito 
28
 This public-private corporation was created as an IDB requirement for loan submission. The IDB 
considered in that time that because of its inefficiency as a public agency, the municipal government’s 
budget was not the best place to manage the credit. Since then, as Fernando Carrion explains, urban 
management in the Historic Center of Quito got divided by different stakeholder’s entities, managing 
different funds towards different policies.  (Carrión, 2007p. 46) 
29
 Plan Especial del Centro Histórico de Quito (PE-CHQ) At: http://www4.quito.gov.ec/ 
30
 PE-CHQ 
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Plan Especial Centro Histórico (PE-CHQ) 
In 2003 the Municipality together with the cooperation of the Spanish agency 
Junta de Andalucía elaborated the Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito that is 
part of the bigger planning structure mandated by the Plan General de Desarrollo 
Territorial (PGDT, 2001). This is the current plan for urban local development and it 
states that the residential component is one of its key strategic planning approaches 
together with other areas of emphasis such as culture and economic activity: “To 
strengthen the habitation capacity of the CHQ,, recuperating the presence of stable 
residents with the goal of giving them permanent livelihood” (PE-CHQ,p:63).  
The plan mentions that the Municipality has the obligatory responsibility to restore 
the urban equilibrium of this emblematic area of the Ecuadorian capital. It also states that 
the Historic Center should gradually redefine its land uses as well as its present and 
future functions. At the same time, urban policies should substantially improve the 
quality of life of its inhabitants and users (PE-CHQ,p:62).  
This plan recognizes the Historic Center as an important economic source for the 
Metropolitan District and for that reason hopes to propose a balance between the 
conservation of its heritage historical and its cultural identity and between economic 
development and social equilibrium.(PE-CHQ p:22)  
In the section enumerating different municipal programs, program number six 
addresses housing and habitability conditions. Its objective is “to recuperate the 
residential function to give the habitability and neighborhood condition back to the 
diverse sectors of the historic center” (PE-CHQ p:101). One of the specific projects for 
housing up-grade is the PPC program, which is currently being implemented and will be 
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analyzed in the following chapter. Is the program helping “diverse sectors” to have better 
housing? There are three other projects mentioned in this section with corresponding lists 
of actions for putting them in practice but none of them have been implemented yet and 
are not relevant to the PPC program externalities.   
Plan General de Desarrollo Territorial 31 
This document is the current comprehensive plan (2007) that applies to the whole 
metropolitan area. It establishes and directs the general development strategies for the 
Metropolitan District of Quito looking forward to the year 2025. It is based on both the 
Plan Equinoccio 21 (2004) and the Plan Quito Siglo XX (draft) (2003).   
  This plan proposes a vision of the future for the city with strong ideas to orient the 
municipal actions and the actions of different stakeholders as well. The plan basically 
seeks to motivate citizens to participate in the construction of the city of Quito (Plan 
Quito: 26). The main vision statement talks about social equilibrium and accessibility, 
and both are important concepts for housing policy ideas:  
“Territorio ordenado, accesible, y eficiente; socialmente equilibrado y sustentable; con 
optima calidad ambiental y estética, con su patrimonio histórico recuperado y 
enriquecido” (PGDT, p:29) 
(Organized territory, accessible and efficient; socially balanced and sustainable; with 
optimum environment quality and aesthetics, with its historical patrimony 
recuperated and enriched) 
 Within the strategic objectives that the Plan Equinoccio 21 proposed there is one 
specific objective that concerns about housing. The strategic objective calls for providing 
the population with access to an adequate habitat, good housing, and healthy and stable 
                                                 
31
 PGDT: Plan General de Desarrollo Territorial. Final Version, Quito 2007. This report follow a previous 
version of the same plan, 2004.  
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conditions. The PGDT with these strategic objectives in mind propose several strategic 
elements to organize the territory. One of them is the idea of a compact growth model, 
which involves policies that look to the built city. Within this framework, the plan seeks 
to re-structure the central urban areas of Quito, one of them being the Historic Center.  
 To some extent re-structuring the Historic Center involves certain programs and 
policies that hope to preserve and strengthen positive aspects of the current activities of 
the Historic Center. According to the plan, the Historic Center’s vision is to: 
“…la protección, rehabilitación y modernización del Centro Histórico de 
Quito y de su vitalidad central, socioeconómica, ecológica, ambienta, 
urbanística y arquitectónico, para potenciarlo como motor económico y 
nodo simbólico” (PGDT, p:36) 
 
(“…the protection, rehabilitation and modernization of the Historic Center of Quito and 
its lively central location, socioeconomics, ecology, environment, urban and architectural, 
to empower it as an economic motor and symbolic node”) 
   
The idea is to achieve the vision through the implementation of programs and 
projects to improve infrastructure, services, transit, parking buildings and housing. In this 
section the plan does not talk about specific ways to implement such projects; it just 
articulates comprehensive strategic ways to achieve the vision. One of those ways refers 
to housing:  
“La recuperación integral del uso residencial; mejorando la 
calidad de los usos complementarios, la seguridad y las condiciones 
ambientales” (PGDT,p:36) 
 
(The comprehensive recuperation of the residential use; by improving 
the quality of its complementary uses, safety and environmental 
conditions)  
 
The policy as articulated here does not use active verbs or imperative forms such 
as “should” or “must” that indicate a mandatory action. Also, the policy does not 
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specifically state who is the responsible agency or municipal department to ensure its 
accomplishment.  
The integral concept of the plan is understood as “sustainable economic growth, 
with environmental equilibrium, social justice, institutional efficiency and citizen 
participation for decision making to forge a common destiny” (Plan Quito Siglo XXI: 
27). 
It is important to understand these concepts as they are included in the official vision 
for the whole metropolitan area and in the policies that include the role of the Historic 
Center of Quito within them.  
Section three of the PGDT talks about more specific policies to be implemented 
within the general municipal system. The first one is a policy that addresses “land and 
housing habitation” with the goal of improving living condition in the metropolitan 
district. It states: 
“El ampliar y mejorar las condiciones de habitabilidad digna, segura 
y saludable de la población del Distrito, en particular de los sectores 
sociales mas vulnerables implica promover y facilitar la oferta constante 
de suelo urbanizado y la provisión, mejoramiento y la rehabilitación de 
viviendas que se adecuen a las necesidades de diversos tipos de familias y 
que se encuentren localizadas en un entorno habitable adecuado y servido 
de modo que contribuya al desarrollo integral y equilibrado tanto de sus 
habitantes como del territorio” (PGDT, p:59) 
 
(to broaden and improve the dignified habitability conditions, safe and 
healthy of the District’s population in particular of the social vulnerable 
sectors implies to promote and to facilitate the constant supply of 
urbanized land and the provision, improvement and rehabilitation of 
housing that are adequate to the needs of diverse types of families and that 
are located in a habitable environment, adequate and serviced is such a 
way that housing will contribute to the comprehensive development of its 
inhabitants and the territory”    
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The plan states that to achieve a goal like those mentioned one, it is necessary 
to put into practice a list of activities which are relevant to mention and 
summarize here: 
- To put into practice legal, institutional, and management mechanisms 
to generate enough urban land at the right prices to satisfy the market 
demand; this is indispensable for stabilizing land and housing prices.  
- To promote creative and innovative solutions to solve the housing 
problem and to reduce its quantitative and qualitative deficits. 
- To facilitate the housing opportunities accessible to families of diverse 
income levels that cannot find solutions in the current market.  
- To support the rehabilitation of the existing historical building stock, 
involving homeowners and renters in the rehabilitation as well in order 
to avoid gentrification. (PGDT, p:61)  
The list articulates the elements above as desired activities that should happen in 
some cases, but they are not mandatory and the documents do not suggest which 
department is responsible for managing and administering towards these goals. The only 
specific housing program mentioned within this policy is the Pon a Punto tu Casa (PPC) 
(“Put your house up to date”) program and a program for neighborhoods improvements 
primarily in informal settlements around the periphery.  
Specifically regarding housing issues in the Historic Center, the plan suggests that the 
intervention approach should take into consideration the recuperation and conservation of 
the historic value and the improvement of the quality of life of its residents, emphasizing 
that this includes residents of all different social segments.  
 61 
The Plan does not provide information about the housing needs of residents of 
different income levels, and therefore there are no specific goals in terms of number of 
units or recommended prices per unit in accordance to an area median income.  
Even though this plan was developed before the PE-CHQ, it does not mention any 
regular guidelines to follow the PE-CHQ. PGDT can be more specific and say that PE-
CHQ has the more accurate guideline to for project and program implementation in the 
Historic Center of Quito.  The integration of plans and policies towards specific housing 
ends could be a better way to accomplish some of the previously mentioned goals that 
were articulated as policies. The PPC program is currently the only program in practice 
and it is not enough to address all housing goals (Chapter 5). Policies should be specific 
guidelines, mentioning specific mechanisms, the agencies responsible for implementing 
them, and the benefited social groups.  
The PGDT document has articulated a holistic city vision and sound goals and 
policies to implement housing programs in the Historic Center. These analyses inform the 
research questions with respect to understanding the policy background into which a 
sound housing policy could fit. Because the PPC program focuses on rehabilitation and 
not on new housing, the plan is broad and calls for more creative and innovative ways to 
address the Center’s residents housing needs.  
National Housing Policy: SIV 
 
In March, 30th, 1998 the Ecuadorian government created the SIV (Sistema de 
Incentivos para la Vivienda, Housing Incentives System) and through a ministerial 
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agreement in November 1998 the name ‘Housing Down Payment Subsidy’ (Bono para la 
Vivienda) was adopted to refer to the monetary incentive that families and private 
developers received to buy or build new urban housing.  
During the same period of time, the Housing Ministry (MIDUVI) created the SIV 
chapter for Ecuador’s historic centers in accordance with the original 1998 document32, 
noting some issues, background and objectives: 
- To recognize the existence of deteriorated neighborhoods, especially the ones in 
the centers of consolidated cities, which have some basic infrastructure and 
facilities, and constructions that need rehabilitation, 
- To rehabilitate and rescue the historic centers, this policy recognizes the need for 
community co-participation with the municipalities.  
- To consider that housing is one of the biggest problems for the population and 
that solutions require more effective public participation, and that organizational 
capacity and public and private entities exist that can help in the promotion 
process, financing, management and execution of housing projects 
- To recognize that in Ecuador there is an important housing deficit which can be 
descreased through new financing mechanisms and through economic incentives 
to facilitate the access of Ecuadorian families to a better housing.   
 This policy sets up an interesting background for the national government’s 
involvement and for it to take the responsibility to help to address housing problems and 
needs together and in cooperation with local governments and the private sector. The 
                                                 
32
 Republic of Ecuador, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Agreement No. 0028 “Reglamento 
del Sistema de Incentivos para Vivienda en Centros Históricos” , Quito, 1998.  
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policy assumes that ‘housing’ in the Historic Center is the type of housing unit that can 
be purchased under a condominium-type ownership and that it can be of different types: 
new, rehabilitated, renovated, reconstructed or complementary to an existing property.  
Beneficiaries with the right to apply for a housing voucher can be any Ecuadorian 
over eighteen years old, single or married, with the requirement that neither the applicant 
nor the spouse should already be a home owner or land owner. The applicant’s income 
level will correspond to a household monthly income equivalent to a hundred and twenty 
UVC33 as a maximum.   In 1993, one UVC corresponded to 10,000 Sucres, meaning that 
the highest household income level that was able to apply for this housing down payment 
incentive was a low-income household earning 1,200,000 Sucres. In 1993 the minimum 
income monthly salary for a person was 63,00034.  This data can help to understand that 
the government policy set up the limit of applicants earnings to such a range that just the 
very poor and low wage labor workers’ households were able to apply.     
The incentive is emitted as a voucher by MIDUVI under the beneficiary’s name 
and it may be used to acquire or build new housing located in a property that has been 
rebuilt, renovated, remodeled or rehabilitated and that is contained in any historic center 
in the country.  The owner endorses the voucher and transfers it in favor of the housing 
supplier who will be the one that makes it effective in the MIDUVI offices. The voucher 
is not cash money and will not be directly given to the customer or voucher beneficiary. 
                                                 
33
 UVC means ‘Unidad de Valor Continuo’ and like the UF in Chile is a fictitious number used in the 
financing market and in particular in real estate market. In Ecuador, UVCs where established in 1993 under 
the “Ley de Valores” and they were abolished in 2000 with the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. 
UVC values were adjusted daily by the INEC in accordance with inflation rates.   
 
34
 Banco Central del Ecuador, web page data bases, 2007. 
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Its value, during the years after 2000, was in Sucres, applying the current UVC 
value set up by the Ecuador’s Central Bank; its value corresponds to a percentage of the 
definitive price of the housing unit. Besides the voucher application, households need to 
prove a corresponding percentage of savings to be able to purchase the house.  
The SIV system works with three components: subsidy, savings and credit. The 
idea is to give households the motivation to save some money in order to gain access to 
the credit that will allow them to complete the rest of the housing value. 
It was important to explain the characteristics of the beginning period of this 
program because this is the origin of the incentive that Vivienda Solidaria program was 
able to use to sell the affordable apartments in the Historic Center (Chapter 4). Today the 
SIV does not work in the Historic Center anymore because voucher holders need to buy 
housing within a certain range of prices ($12,000 and $20,000) and developers need to be 
registered with the Housing Ministry as affordable housing developers to ensure that 
housing is in compliance with the law of housing for social interest (Ley de Desarrollo de 
Vivienda de Interés Social35).  
Applicants now have to be qualified by SELBEN36 as a person with income 
within levels 1, 2 and 3 on their scale, or live in a household with a monthly income no 
more than $600.37  The value of the voucher for a new housing38 unit is $3,600 for a 
house that costs up to $20,000, including the value of the land. The minimum savings that 
                                                 
35
 Registro Oficial 233: 22 jul, 1985. This law requires a specific number of square meters of construction 
according to the location and the registration of the development with the ministry and local government, 
after following different requisites listed in the law.  
36
 SELBEN: Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales; Sistem of identification of 
Social Program’s beneficiaries.  
37
 MIDUVI, http://www.miduvi.gov.ec/Default.aspx?tabid=284. Accesed, March, 2008. 
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the applicants need to have at the time of application should be at least 10 percent of the 
value of the house and the applicant is responsible for getting securing the credit to 
complete the value of the house.   
The SIV policy was put into practice in 1993 and since then the housing ministry 
has been helping the urban and rural poor to purchase, remodel it or construct housing. 
This is a demand-side subsidy to purchase housing that must be registered with the 
housing ministry as ‘social interest housing’ in order to use the down payment voucher. 
The Municipality of Quito with the Historic Center Corporation (ECH) signed an inter-
institutional agreement with the Housing Ministry in 1999 that lasted until 2002. The 
cooperation agreement was necessary for registering some of the units of the housing 
program Vivienda Soldaria as ‘social interest housing’ so that low income residents of 
the Historic Center had the possibility to apply for the down payment voucher. 
The period of 1999-2002 was the only time that a municipal housing program used 
government SIV policies to help provide housing for the urban poor residents of the area. 
The Vivienda Solidaria program which will be examine in chapter 5 is an example of a 
program that utilizes a range of available resources, including SIV, in order to create 
housing opportunities for low income people.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
38
 The SIV gives incentives for new housing, remodeling or construction if the applicant has a piece of 
land.  
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The present chapter explored the current urban trends and policies that have been 
applied in the Historic Center. While examining the center’s urban trends I narrowed the 
analysis towards the data necessary to understand housing problems in the Historic 
Center. I first researched the population demographics (who lives there?); second, I 
explored the urban land uses (residential uses? where?) and third, I looked at the housing 
stock and tenure characteristics (what kind of housing can people afford and occupy?). 
The data that I used for this research comes mainly from the Ecuadorian Census 
2001, and from the PE-CHQ. I did not find representative information about household 
incomes and rent prices, however I used the “Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 2005-
2006”, a document that has some sample data that was taken in three different places of 
the Historic Center. If more data about the rent prices, incomes, housing quality and 
tenure were available on the same system in order to enable comparison, it would have 
been possible to do a mismatch analysis. This suggests that the next census should ask 
enough questions to collect economic data such as house prices and mortgage monthly 
payments, monthly rent prices, and monthly individual and household incomes.  
Analysis of urban trends in the Historic Center shows that there are about 50,982 
people living in the area. Demographic analyses between the 1990 and 2001 censuses 
demonstrate a negative population growth rate of -1.2. To some extent, the decrease in 
population in some dense areas of the Historic Center is a positive trend because it 
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alleviates overcrowding conditions in deteriorated houses, which is not considered an 
acceptable quality of life. 
Considering that the legal medium monthly salary in Ecuador is $198.26 dollars, 
the Historic Center’s population median monthly income is $202.65 when the median for 
the metropolitan area as a whole is $355.67.  Even though the medium income salary of 
the Historic Center area is higher than the legal minimum, poverty rates are high because 
Ecuador’s basic basket of goods was in 2007 at $322.03.  
A total of 21.2 percent of households in the Center are in poverty, with 3.2 
percent more in extreme poverty. There is no data about homeownership and its relation 
to poverty; however, in terms of housing tenure it is known that 69.97 percent of the 
households rent a housing unit while 23.95 percent are owner-occupied.  
Demographic and housing data inform the current state of the Historic Center’s 
urban configuration. Some data show social economic deficiencies such as the high rate 
of poverty and low rates of housing ownership. Any of these demographics are 
specifically mentioned in the city’s comprehensive plan (PGDT). However, PE-CHQ did 
analyzed first the Historic Center’s data and later proposed general sound goals such as 
the following:  
 “To strengthen the habitation capacity of the CHQ,, recuperating 
the presence of stable residents with the goal of giving them permanent 
livelihood” (PE-CHQ,p:63).  
 
Currently the only program in practice that is supposed to address goals like the 
one stated above is the PPC program, which will be examined in Chapter 5. The PPC 
program has specific objectives towards housing rehabilitation to preserve the historic 
urban heritage but that do not necessarily “reinforce the habitation capacity of the CHQ”.  
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At the local level, goals stated in comprehensive plans are still waiting for a 
specific policy with which to address those urban needs. At the national level, there is a 
consistent and solid subsidy program that is in practice but that does not have the means 
to apply itself to the Historic Center without additional agency support. Poor residents of 
the Historic Center cannot use the governmental down payment assistance to purchase a 
home in the same area because there is no supply of housing qualified to be acquired with 
the incentive. 
The SIV national system is a three-component policy that incorporates the 
government down payment incentive with the applicant’s savings and the available 
credit. Applicants need to be first-time homeowners and to qualify by SELBEN’s 
standards. Housing units available for purchase need to be registered with the housing 
ministry as housing for social interests. Therefore poor or low income residents of the 
Historic Center may not have the opportunity to participate in the program because they 
will have to acquire additional credit beyond their means. Socio-economic barriers such 
as unstable jobs do not help them to access to the rest of the money needed to purchase 
the home. Also, currently there is no national–municipal governmental agreement to 
provide housing in the Historic Center of the type that can be purchased by using the SIV 
system.   
  From the case study of housing programs of other historic centers of the region, 
it was evident that the combination of resources, such as institutional local and national 
funds as one of the key strategic elements that housing policies should take into 
consideration. Sound goals in comprehensive plan documents are not enough to solve the 
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problems. It is necessary to assign responsible entities with designing and putting into 
practice creative policies for addressing housing needs.  
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Chapter 3: “House of the Seven Patios” 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1990’s, the Historic Center of Quito (HCQ) has been the center of one 
of the pioneering urban renewal experiments in Latin America (Rojas, 2004). The 
government implemented a series of housing programs to help improve overcrowded 
low-income living conditions, increase the resident population and protect historic 
structures, all as part of the comprehensive rehabilitation plans that the Municipality 
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developed with the assistance of international cooperating agencies. These strategies 
were implemented both during Ecuador’s 1990 - 2000 economic crisis and during the 
more recent neo-liberal municipal restructuring, and are an example relevant to current 
global trends aimed at historic centers as new places to live, invest or attract tourism.  
The following chapter analyses the first municipal experience that addressed a 
housing problem in the Historic Center: the “House of the Seven Patios”, which consisted 
of the rehabilitation of only one large historic house that had seven different patios with 
almost 50 rental units in deteriorated conditions. The house rehabilitation was a pilot 
project that the Municipality put into practice together with the international cooperation 
of the Junta de Andalucía.  
It is important to look at this pilot program because it set a precedent for the 
following housing programs and policies that the municipality created in an attempt to 
solve some of the housing issues of the Historic Center. As the current coordinator of the 
cooperation between Ecuador and the Junta de Andalucía architect Manolo Ramos 
mentioned in my interview with him, the House of the Seven Patios was more than a 
single housing project; it was the project that helped the municipality and the rest of the 
city to believe that the rehabilitation of the Historic Center’s housing was actually 
possible39. 
 There is no comprehensive policy analysis done about this program, and the 
majority of the written documents about the House are focused on the 
architecturalrehabilitation proposal rather than on the policy and planning mechanisms. 
This chapter is an attempt to look at the House of the Seven Patios as a precedent for 
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historic center housing policies that is more than just a good physical rehabilitation 
project. The analysis also helps to show that global and regional ideas for addressing 
housing needs in inner cities or historic centers have actually influenced this process in 
Quito as well. The case of RECUP-Boca in Buenos Aires (1984) was very similar to the 
planning process of the House of the Seven Patios. RECUP-Boca’s lessons from its 
implemented mechanisms may have influenced the methodology by offering an approach 
to housing rehabilitation that involves organized renters. At the same time, lessons from 
European rehabilitation experiences were brought through the international cooperation 
agreement. To examine this pilot project it will be necessary to look at the planning 
process and the process of identification of needs. Finally I will look at some of the 
results and lessons to illuminate the research question of this report.  
3.2 PLANNING PROCESS, IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
Political and Planning Trends 
 
The House of the Seven Patios is a dwelling located in neighborhood of San 
Roque close to a central market of food produce at the south west side of the Historic 
Center. In 1971 the Municipality of Quito bought the house under the right of eminent 
domain because the owners had stopped paying property taxes. Since then, the 
municipality administered the deteriorated dwelling as rental housing until 1992 when the 
house was targeted for rehabilitation. The House of the Seven Patios project rehabilitated 
a historic house that included 1,380 m2 of built deteriorated structure on a piece on land 
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 Personal Interview, Quito: August 2007.  
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of 1,860m2. The rehabilitation turned the house into an improved multifamily building 
over 1992 and 1993. A group of seventeen families were renters and they informally 
organized themselves into a cooperative and these tenants collectively enforced their 
rights of being the first occupants of the newly rehabilitated house.  
During the construction process tenants were relocated to other municipal rental 
houses on nearby Caldas Street in the northern area of the Center. At that time, the 
Municipality still operated these deteriorated buildings as rental properties with tenants 
living in generally overcrowded conditions – but with some available space for relocating 
the House of the Seven Patios’ tenants. That situation was maintained until the renovation 
of the House was complete, when the tenants returned and the Caldas street houses were 
left ready for another later housing program (Vivienda Solidaria). The eventual goal was 
for the Municipality to get rid of these properties and to cease functioning in the capacity 
of a landlord, which was not a welcome activity in the context of state reduction during 
the modernization period of the 1990s.   
In the view of the neo-liberal development ideas popular in the 1990’s, 
modernization of the state had to take place in order to simplify public services40. 
Meanwhile at the city level, growth management in planning started to look at the 
revitalization of existing communities as a planning strategy to contain sprawl and to 
enhance the tax base of the inner city. This combination of state modernization policy 
and urban planning strategies set the stage for further intervention in the Historic Center. 
Political and planning trends during that period were changing towards the 
privatization public services. Ecuador entered the 1990’s with high inflation as well as an 
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increasing foreign debt. Austerity programs were introduced in 1988 leading to economic 
emergency measures such as raising gas and food prices, generating a large-scale social 
discontent. In 1990, the elected president Rodrigo Borja opened trade with international 
markets and in 1992 the Ecuadorian currency started to show signs of devaluation (26 
percent). In 1993, Congress passed the first law for state modernization (RO/349) setting 
the scene for planning through public-private partnerships. 
 The elected mayor of Quito, Rodrigo Paz (1987-1992) started a new era of city 
planning managed by the party “Democracia Popular”. Paz, concerned about the Historic 
Center’s condition and influenced by global trends, directed municipal management and 
city planning towards the ‘modernization’ approach. Policy and program implementation 
aimed at the recuperation of the Historic Center were influenced by these trends and 
agencies looked for external funding and international cooperation in order to put plans 
into action. Quito was recovering after the earthquake of 1987, when most of the 
monuments in the Historic Center suffered serious structural problems. When the House 
of the Seven Patios was being renovated, many of the monuments were in restoration 
processes, as were many public spaces and sidewalks; while such renovations of the area 
had been mandated earlier in the 1980 comprehensive plan, the critical situation after the 
earthquake was a motivation to seriously apply this part of the plan.  
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 State Modernization Law, Law No.50 RO/349 of December 31, 1993. Congreso. 
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The comprehensive plan “Plan Quito 1980” established the urgent need to 
develop some kind of policy to stop the deterioration of the historic district. The first 
inventory of historic houses was done under this plan, generating new information about 
conditions in the Historic Center.  
The later Diagnostic of the Historic Center (1992) was more influential, and up to 
now remains the most comprehensive data collected about the urban, social and 
economic conditions of the area. It is a three-volume document which superficially 
described how the housing policy for the Historic Center should be addressed by taking 
into consideration a diversity of relevant factors such as socio-economic trends and 
tenure, density, structural conditions of housing and housing demand. However, in the 
implementation process we can see that the municipality embarked on just one specific 
pilot program to rehabilitate the tenement house Casa de los Siete Patios (“House of the 
Seven Patios) in cooperation with the international agency the Junta de Andalucía.  
The rehabilitation project and housing adjudication program of the House of the 
Seven Patios came out of to the first cooperation agreement between Quito and the Junta 
de Andalucía. It was signed in Seville on March 29 of 1990 between Rodrigo Paz 
Delgado, Mayor of Quito and Jaime Montaner Rosello, Advisor of the Public Works and 
Transportation of the Junta de Andalucía.  The judicial basis for this contract rested in the 
precedents of a sequence of previous agreements such as: first, the cooperation agreement 
between the government of Spain and Ecuador signed in 1975; second, the cooperation 
agreement between Quito’s Municipality and the Spanish International Cooperation 
Agency (AECI in Spanish) with the purpose of intervening the Historic Center of Quito, 
signed in Quito in 1989; and third, the agreement between the Spanish International 
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Cooperation Agency and the Junta de Andalucía to cooperate in the execution of 
international commitments to “Iberoamérica del Estado Español” (“Iberian America on 
the part of the Spanish State”) signed in Sevilla in 1989. 
In 1978, Quito had recently become the first World Heritage city designated by 
UNESCO and, under the Municipality’s Master Plan implementation tool, housing 
rehabilitation in the Historic Center had been made the agenda of three institutions: 
FONSAL (Fondo de Salvamento), the Historic Center Commission and the Caspicara 
Foundation. These institutions were still in similar capacities by the 1990s, when the 
Municipality of Quito began to request international cooperation for financial and 
technical assistance in order to accomplish the Plan Quito Metropolitan District’s (1993) 
objectives. Under this agreement, the Municipality designates that the Planning 
Department is responsible for the technical, financial and economic management of the 
programs. However, the House of the Seven Patios was developed under the 
responsibility of different institutions: FONSAL and the Unidad de Vivienda.  
The House of the Seven Patios project was founded under the fourth clause of the 
agreement with the Junta de Andalucía in which the co-financing of the complete 
operations for the housing rehabilitation for housing and other social uses (Agreement, 
1990-1994) was established. A commission was formed for the control and supervision 
of the different activities with decision-making power. Two Ecuadorian members were 
designated by the Municipality and two Spanish members were designated by the 
Spanish cooperation agency. The commission establishes the specific and concrete 
programs to be developed, including the financial and management mechanisms, control 
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and follow-up mechanisms and evaluation. However, in term of the financial decisions 
the mayor of Quito had the last word.   
In 1993 Dr. Jamil Mahuad, from the same Democracia Popular political party as 
earlier mayor Rodrigo Paz was elected as the Mayor of Quito. Mahuad’s neoliberal 
policies at the municipal level encouraged the House of the Seven Patios project to get rid 
of any municipal responsibility towards the tenants, who had returned to the renovated 
rental property by that time. A municipality in the process of modernization, institutional 
reduction and decentralization did not have room for a department like the Unidad de 
Vivienda, which was only department taking care of this project while also planning new 
housing interventions. From 1993 until 1996, the high expenses of the house’s 
administration and the default of rental payments by the tenants started to be considered a 
problem. The financing director of the municipality approved the sale of the housing 
units to the current selected inhabitants as a way to recuperate part of the municipal 
investment41. In chapter number four I will explain how the Unidad de Vivienda 
department evolved into a public-private partnership after the Ecuadorian Modernization 
Law (1993) mandated public sector modernization and decentralization, setting up the 
legal framework for such public-private partnerships.  
The main source of information on which this historical reconstruction and 
analysis of this pilot projects is based is the review of institutional documentation and 
interviews with functionaries and other people involved. Documents were found in the 
old archives that still exist in the last office space that Unidad de Vivienda department 
occupied in one of the housing units of the House of the Seven Patios. Today, these units 
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are still functioning as office space for the cooperation between the Junta de Andalucía 
and the Municipality of Quito.  
Interviews were developed during the summer of 2007 with key stakeholders such 
as the architect Jorge Carvajal, director of Unidad de Vivienda during The House of the 
Seven Patios days and architect Manolo Ramos representative of the Junta de Andalucía 
cooperation agreement; these interviews also included some informal conversations with 
residents.  
Planning Process and Assessment of needs 
  
 To summarize some of the complex history discussed earlier, at the beginning of 
the program there was a municipal concern to address the House of Seven Patio’s 
problems specifically because of deterioration of the structure, and this concern was 
supported by the agenda of addressing housing problems in general mentioned in the 
comprehensive Plan Quito (1980), based on ideas of urban modernization. The 
cooperation agreement with the Junta de Andalucía had been signed and FONSAL was 
already a consolidated semi-public entity, setting up the institutional basis for the 
planning process and allowing planners to start to work on the project of intervention in 
the House of Seven Patios. At the same time that they were working on architectonic 
plans, social workers were developing social studies to more deeply understand the socio-
economic situation of the families. Also at the same time, tenants were being relocated in 
new housing, as mentioned above, and planning managers of the project were working on 
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 Municipio Metropolitano de Quito, Oficio No. 0030404. 9 Feb 1995. 
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the official documents and mechanisms that were going to guide the program’s 
performance.  
The official objectives of the program were (1) to rehabilitate the building for 
housing purposes, and (2) to adjudicate the rehabilitated housing units to the tenants 
under the best mechanism to guarantee their return to the house and to guarantee their 
housing stability as well. The responsible agencies were Unidad de Vivienda and 
FONSAL; the latter was in charge of developing a socio-economic analysis of the tenants 
that were living in the house in order to approach the best architectural design proposal 
for the house’s rehabilitation and to analyze the household’s economic possibilities in 
order to develop a sales strategy.  
From this research the Unidad de Vivienda project managers learned that after the 
1970’s fire the house had started to shift in demographics and tenure trends. Before the 
fire, middle to lower income working class people were living there, such as 
seamstresses, tailors, and a few professionals (such as a writer)42. The fire and the 
continued deterioration of the house attracted tenants with even lower incomes, and this 
new environment discouraged the earlier tenants to stay. Before the cooperation 
agreement several other mayors of Quito tried to rehabilitate this house because it was 
known as the house of “thieves and drug addicts”43, each time announcing some kind of 
restoration project including the possible eviction of tenants. These uncertainties of 
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tenure motivated tenants to become organized into a group know as “Pre-cooperative 
House of the Seven Patios”. This tenement organization remained active in order to 
enforce respect for tenant rights under the rehabilitation program and to keep it true to its 
objective of allowing tenants to maintain their residence after the rehabilitation process.  
The study developed by the FONSAL’s Social Department investigated 
households characteristics such as (1) demographics, (2) family configuration, (3) labor 
and economic situation, (5) tenure and living conditions, (6) neighbors relationships.   
In terms of demographics, study results mentioned that 78.3 percent of the tenants 
were from Quito while 17.3 percent were form other provinces of Ecuador. From a total 
of 102 people, cohort component analysis demonstrates that there was a high population 
(22) of males in the age range of 26-30 years old (see Table 3.2.1). Fifty three percent of 
the residents were infants and young, while 32 percent were adults (26-60).  
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Table 3.2.1: House of the Seven Patios, Cohort Component 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants -1991 
Cohort Component 
Age Total  Women Men 
0 - 1 4 2 2 
1 - 5 10 7 3 
6 -10 11 8 3 
11 - 15 16 7 9 
16 - 20 14 7 7 
21 - 25 14 7 7 
26 - 30 5 3 22 
31 - 35 8 4 4 
36 - 40 3 2 1 
41 - 45 2 0 2 
46 - 50  6 4 2 
51 - 55 1 1 0 
56 - 60 4 3 1 
61 -  4 2 2 
Total 102 57 65 
Source: Llerena, Margarita , Socio Demographic Análisis of the House of the Seven Patios, FONSAL, 
1991.  p:2 
 
Family configuration is correlated with the high number of young people that 
happened to be single, corresponding to 64 percent of the population of the house; 4.6 
percent of the singles were adult single mothers. 20.6 percent of the population was 
married couples, and 6.8 percent couples in common law marriages. These data, together 
with the labor and economic facts, were important for designing the financing mechanism 
to let these families change their status from renters to owners in the renovated house.  
Information about labor and the economic situation of the house’s inhabitants 
explained that the household had a variety of education and training levels and therefore 
residents’ professional activities created a very diverse range of incomes inside the house.  
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52.2 percent of the renters had a monthly income of about fifty thousand (50,000) Sucres 
and 47.8 percent had a monthly income of about three times more than the other group, 
between 176 thousand to 251 thousand Sucres. The legal Ecuadorian minimum monthly 
wage in 1990 was thirty two thousand (32,000) Sucres 44; however, with the basic food 
basket (“canasta familiar”) monthly price at 250 thousand Sucres, both groups could be 
considered very low income groups (see Table 3.2.2.) 
Table 3.2.2: House of the Seven Patios, Household Income 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants -1991 
Household Income 
Income Range (Sucres) Number Percentage 
Less than 50,000 4 17.4 
51,000 - 75,000 4 17.4 
76,000 - 100,000 0 0 
101,000 - 125,000 2 8.7 
126,000 - 150,000 1 4.3 
151,000 - 175,000 1 4.3 
176,000 - 200,000 4 17.4 
201,000 - 225,000 3 13 
226,000 - 250,000 3 13 
250,000 o more 1 4.3 
   
Total Number of Households 23 100 
Note: The monthly minimum wage in 1990 was 32,000 Sucres, and price of basket of goods 250,000 
Sucres (Source: Central Bank data) 
Source: Llerena, Margarita , Socio Demographic Analysis of the House of the Seven Patios, FONSAL, 
1991.p:13 
 
The tenure conditions variables of the research showed the number of years 
people had lived the house as tenants (see Table 3.2.3), the ways that they prefer to use 
the house (see Table 3.2.4), and their interest in ownership on returning to the house (see 
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 Banco Central del Ecuador, data acceded Nov. 13th 2007. 
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Table 3.2.5) . Results from the number of years living in the house are similar as the long 
tenancies seen in the Mexico City and Buenos Aires case studies. Seven families had 
been living there for between 16 and 20 years and five families had been there for 21 to 
25 years. In terms of use of the house, because some of the habitants were artisans like 
seamstresses who work at home, results showed that 60.9 percent of the households 
consider that the new design of the house should consider it as space to live as well as 
work. However, this characteristic was not considered in the final design for the house 
renovation. In terms of interest in ownership of or returning to the rehabilitated house, 17 
households mentioned interest in ownership while five of them considered the possibility 
of continuing to rent.      
Table 3.2.3: House of the Seven Patios, Years of Tenancy 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants -1991 
Number of Years Living in the House 
Number of Years Number of Households Percentage 
Less than 5  2 8.6 
6 – 10 4 17.3 
11 -15 3 13 
16 – 20 7 30.4 
21 – 25 5 21.7 
25 – 30 1 4.3 
31 – 35 0 0 
36 - more 1 4.3 
Total Number of Households 23 100 
Source: Llerena, Margarita , Socio Demographic Analysis of the House of the Seven Patios, FONSAL, 
1991 p:23 
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Table 3.2.4: House of the Seven Patios, House Use 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants -1991 
Use of the house 
Type of Tenure Number of 
Households 
Percentage 
Housing Only 9 39.1 
House and Work 14 60.9 
Other 0 0 
Total Number of Households 23 100 
Source: Llerena, Margarita , Socio Demographic Analysis of the House of the Seven Patios, FONSAL, 
1991.p:26 
 Table 3.2.5: House of the Seven Patios, House Use 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants -1991 
Interest in Type of Tenure 
Type of Tenure Number of 
Households 
Percentage 
Ownership 17 73.9 
Rental 5 21.7 
Loan for Use (contract)* 1 4.3 
Total Number of Households 23 100 
* In Spanish: Comodato 
  
Source: Llerena, Margarita , Socio Demographic Analysis of the House of the Seven Patios, FONSAL, 
1991.p:24 
 
The final architectonic project transformed the house into 38 apartment units (see 
Table 3.2.6, Appendix A) for rent or sale; at that point the Municipality was not sure 
about the method that they were going to implement to sell the housing units. There were 
enough units for old tenants and for new coming residents interested in buying a housing 
unit in this renovated house. The rent or total price of the units was not defined because 
the general uncertainty of what to do with the property. The Unidad the Vivienda had to 
develop two different strategies in order to manage the sales process, one designed to 
deal with the old tenants and other one to select the new interested purchasers.  
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According to a report written by FONSAL to the mayor of Quito in November 
199245 the house was at this point half-built but ready to house the first 14 households. 
The process for housing adjudication was not yet defined and several other reports show 
that the Municipality found itself in discussion about the best option for keeping control 
of the rehabilitated housing units while following the agreements made with both the old 
tenants (1991) and with the international cooperation agency (1990).  
The concern with keeping control of the rehabilitated house was due to its 
location close to the San Roque Market. In general in the Historic Center when a market 
is close to such a property it is likely to be used or rented out for storage to accommodate 
merchandise; the Municipality wanted to prevent this kind of use.  
In May of 1991 the Municipality signed an agreement with the seventeen heads of 
households that were living in the house. The agreement established that the Municipality 
would allow them to live under rental conditions in another of the Municipality’s 
properties while the renovation took place. At that time the Municipality owned 3 historic 
houses on Caldas Street located at the northern border of the Historic Center’s urban 
limits. These properties were Caldas 454, 494 and 459, which later would be used for the 
Vivienda Solidaria housing program. 
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 Document # 02827, Quito, November 20th 1992.  
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Conditions on the rental contracts established temporary housing for the tenants, 
and the document of agreement states that once the house was rehabilitated the 17 
families can go back, but only under municipal rules, rules which were not specified in 
this agreement but later established in a regulatory document. Under this signed 
agreement the tenants accept leaving the house and moving to the designated temporary 
rental places, while continuing to pay for rent and services. The rental price in the Caldas 
houses was to be controlled and frozen during the time that the House of the Seven Patios 
was under construction.  
From the total of 38 apartments, 23 were given to the old tenants as rental 
apartments with the right to buy and the rest were made available for people that fit the 
stipulated conditions recommended in the document “Selection criteria to select new 
inhabitants of the House of the Seven Patios under the rent with the options to buy 
modality”46 and under the Junta de Andalucía conditions of the cooperation project. 
According to the agreement, the vacant units were to be offered to families with housing 
needs and limited economic resources, ensuring the exclusive use of these units for 
housing on a permanent basis. It was preferable if these eligible families were living in 
the same area of the city47.  
The sales mechanism that the cooperation agreement demanded was by a ‘system 
of access to property in the long tem’48 establishing the legal framework to guarantee that 
the Municipality can be the owner of the house for a 15 year period, at the end of which 
                                                 
46
 “Criterios de selección para nuevos habitantes de la casa de los Siete Patios, segun modalidad de 
arriendo con opción de compra” 17 de agosto del 1993. 
47
 Programa de Actuaciones 1994-1996 
48
 Programa de Actuaciones 1994-1996 p.3 
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the property can be transferred individually to the owners as a condominium property. 
According to Jorge Carvajal, architect in charge of House of the Seven Patios program 
during those years, the idea of maintaining the property of the house was to ensure a good 
coexistence (convivencia) among tenants and future owners, and to guarantee those who 
would remain in the house would live in harmonious conditions49.  
The social and economic study of the tenants’ income conditions was helpful in 
defining the range of rental prices that the agencies needed to set. It was a rent that also 
counted as a monthly payment towards the total price of the housing unit.  According to 
an internal document of the Housing Department50, it was also important to define the 
prices in order to be able to recuperate the investment and financial costs accumulated 
during that period.  
The General Administration of the Municipality resolved that the future buyers of 
apartments in the House of Seven Patios would pay, besides the monthly payments, other 
small payments for maintenance of communal space (Figure 9 and 10) This was a 
strategy that the Municipality hoped would be enough to lead to the abandonment of the 
paternalistic approach that the rehabilitation of the house had begun with. Making the 
tenants pay for the maintenance of the house themselves was assumed to be motivation 
enough for them to take responsibility of the remodeled House of the Seven Patios. This 
resolution established that the contracts for deed that the buyers signed had to state that 
each monthly payment, for a period of 20 years, would add an additional 25% as a 
payment for communal maintenance.  
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Figure 9. “House of the Seven Patios”, First Patio (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. “House of the Seven Patios” Second and Third Patio (2007) 
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A letter from January 2000 signed by a representative of the Municipal 
Attorney’s51 Office and sent to the Municipal Administration Office narrates the story of 
defaults and monthly payment delays that some of the prospective owners incurred since 
the signature of the contracts for deed in 1996. In 1999 defaults were so common that the 
attorney’s office had to meet with the tenants to reorganize payment agreements 
considering the “difficult economic situation that the country was experiencing”52. 
However, as the letters states, some people defaulted again and the office had to file law 
suits to evict them.  
The mechanism for the maintenance of the house was set up in a way that the 
25% payment would be collected by the Municipality, which would then send the money 
back to the house as a check. A house administrator appointed by the Housing 
Department would manage it in order to pay for the corresponding maintenance labor. 
Even though the system for house maintenance was set up in this way, personal 
observations and conversations with residents can show that the maintenance factor was 
actually never resolved with the result of keeping the house in good shape. 
Visitors can testify that House of the Seven Patio’s residents do not take care of 
the public areas and communal parts of the house like homeowners might be expected to 
care for their own property. However there is some hope that this situation will change; in 
summer 2007, a new resident organization was elected and some residents expressed that 
hopefully they will be able to get organized to get the house into basic good shape again.  
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 Official Letter No.149, Quito, January 2000.  
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3.3 PROGRAM OUTCOMES 
 
The House of the Seven Patios pilot program (1993-2000), became the entity 
through which the municipality initiated its first endeavors in housing rehabilitation 
projects aimed at increasing the quality of distressed neighborhoods of the Historic 
Center. To analyze the program’s outcomes I will reframe the program’s processes and 
results to be able to draw some conclusions, lessons and implications for the next 
programs implemented in Quito’s Center.  
The Municipality took ownership of the property starting in 1971. From then until 
1993 the Municipality administrated and rented the deteriorated units. The 1990’s global 
ideas of political and administrative modernization and the growing planning trends for 
inner city redevelopment influenced the mayors of Quito to take intervene and improve 
the House of the Seven Patios condition.  
The process of this pilot program can be divided in three phases, beginning after 
the cooperation agreements were signed with the Junta de Andalucía agency (1990, 1994-
1996) through which the Municipality was armed with planning tools and was allotted 
700,000 Sucres to fund the project. The first phase involved (1) the preparation of the 
architectural and construction project, (2) the relocation of tenants and socio-economic 
study of their situation and (3) the design of the planning process to sell or rent the 
housing units to old residents and new homebuyers that had to be from the neighborhood 
as it was established in the cooperation agreement.  
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At the end of what I call “phase one” the house was still under construction but 
was already housing some families. The socio-economic study showed project managers 
that just 1153 of the 17 original tenant families were able to go back. The renovated house 
with 38 units was initially to be inhabited by 20 families54, leaving 18 units for other 
prospective buyers. During the second phase of this project, the Municipality decided to 
rent the units to the 20 selected prospected homebuyers and started the process of finding 
other families interested in living in the house. It was 1993 when the old tenants moved 
to the rehabilitated house and signed an agreement with the Municipality that established 
that the monthly rent payments were going to be added to their housing down payments. 
At the same time project managers were implementing the planning process designed to 
select the new homebuyers. In 1996 the new contracts for deeds were signed with all 30 
prospective condominium owners. Some units were left for office space for the 
cooperation agreement and for the use of the Junta de Andalucía.  
The third phase of the project went from 1996 until 2000, during which the 
project managers encountered problems with the monthly payments, the maintenance and 
the administration of the house. The Junta de Andalucía retained offices in two housing 
units of the house; this space forms part of the condominium ownership this presence 
continues to create uncertainty among the rest of the owners. As one owner told me, 
some people think ‘that office’ is going to take care of the house’s communal needs 
                                                 
53
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 Eleven of these are old tenants while the other ones are probably from the neighborhood or, according to 
their last names, may be family members of some of the other 11 original households’ tenants. 
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‘because they built it’55. Owners were often incurring payment defaults involving the 
municipality in litigation and administration expenses which to some extent complicated 
the process of closing up and concluding the project to leave the homeowners in charge 
(Table 3.2.7).  
Table 3.2.7: House of the Seven Patios, Timeline 
 
                                                 
55
 Informal conversation with a resident of the House of the Seven Patios. Quito, Summer 2007. 
House of the Seven Patios Tenants 
Timeline 
1971 Municipality of Quito acquired the property by the right of eminent domain 
1990 Cooperation Agreement between the Junta de Andalucía and Municipality of Quito 
1991 Agreement with tenants and relocation in Caldas Street houses 
1991 Socio-Economic Study of tenants developed by Social Work Department of FONSAL 
1991 Start of construction work 
1993 Old residents and new ones renting the apartments 
1996 Contract for Deed with all renters, including rent payments as part of the down payment 
2000 Monthly payments’ default problems 
2007 First homeowner association formed 
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New housing units were sold with a 50 percent price subsidy to 20 households, 11 
of which were old tenants; the other 50 percent of the price was financed by monthly 
payments over a period of 20 years.  The rest of the units were sold with a 33 percent 
price subsidy; the other 67 percent of the price was financed by monthly payments over a 
period of 15 years (see Table 3.2.8). I never found a report or document in which the 
rationale for the finance policy and the allowable subsidies were explained. Some 
documents mentioned that the Municipality had the interest of recapitalizing at least some 
of their investment in order to be able to continue rehabilitating other houses. The Junta 
de Andalucía cooperation was going to support other projects only if the municipality 
was able to match the funds.  
One possibility for explaining their rationale is that they had to ensure affordable 
prices to match the old tenants’ and new prospective buyers’ income levels, which to 
some extent were very low economic resources with which to purchase the housing units. 
I found a document which proposes different schemes for financing the rents or sales of 
the housing units suggesting that the social objective of the project is a priority 
“established by the Municipal Administration for the human and social development of 
the City”56. At that time the national government along with the BEV (Ecuadorian Bank 
for Housing) offered mortgage credits for very low income people. The House of the 
Seven Patios’ households had even lower incomes than the target group for this 
assistance and had housing needs different from the ones that government programs were 
designed to address.  
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Siete Patios , Report, 1993. 
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Housing for the low income people able to participate in the national government 
assistance program had to apply to buy a house with a maximum cost of s/.15,000,000 
Sucres and required a minimum household monthly income of s/.600,000 Sucres. As 
tables 3.2.9 and 3.2.10 (Appendix A) show, House of the Seven Patios’ households’ 
monthly income was below the government standard, before and after the renovation. 
Therefore the municipality assumed the management of the rent-to-own scheme (during 
the first three years) and later of the monthly payments over the corresponding period of 
time. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The House of the Seven Patios was the first municipal experience that addressed 
the housing needs of some of the long-term tenants that were living on deteriorated 
municipal property. I think there are two main lessons that the Municipality learned 
through the process. The first was that, as in the cases of other programs in other historic 
centers, inter-institutional cooperation for management and implementation could 
function as a base structure in order to use broader resources and to lower the program’s 
administrative burden; however, in such agreements coordination can be slow and 
inefficient if there is no department responsible for the comprehensive results.  
The second lesson that came out of this process consisted of ideas and 
experiences about how to negotiate with older residents and about how to select new 
ones. In both cases the analysis was done on a case-by-case basis. In the case of a 
sustained housing program, this kind of analysis can be extensively bureaucratic and time 
consuming at moments when units need to be occupied quickly in order to get some 
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return on an investment. To lighten this burden the House of the Seven Patios and the 
Municipality could have learned from the Santiago’s experience of creating an ‘Interested 
Households Data Base’57 from which to select prospective buyers; this would have been a 
much more manageable system. However, while The House of the Seven Patios was in 
the process of culmination, the Vivienda Solidaria program was starting to be planed 
(1999). The lack of evaluation of the first experience led to a reproduction of the same 
deficiency in the next program (chapter 4) without considering the administrative burden 
of working case-by-case and the need for creating a database of interested buyers to keep 
track of housing demand.  
 The reconstruction of the history of this program, looking at the political and 
planning context, the planning process, and the outcomes suggest a program that must 
have been reinventing its strategies throughout the period of implementation. Flexible 
and small-scale pilot projects can be a good study mechanism and a way to test planning 
strategies; however The House of the Seven Patios started its story without knowing 
where it was supposed to end up. 
The management difficulties during the period when the House’s residents were 
all renters may have had negative influence towards any other policy advocating rental 
housing. The defaults on monthly rent payments, litigation and evictions of tenants 
discouraged the maintenance of the house as rental housing. Ecuador does not have 
public rental housing and local housing authorities like in the U.S. or some European 
countries, from which to draw on an experience of housing management. Among the 
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different agencies involved in the project, none of them had the experience of rental 
housing management.  
Another disadvantage is that at the moment that the House of the Seven Patios 
project was being developed managers did not consider that the government was 
developing the SIV system to help the very low income have access to housing, which 
could have been used as an advantage. 
  The main objectives of the program were accomplished to some extent; the 
architectonic rehabilitation of the house was a success and old tenants, or at least some of 
them, were able to go back to the house to consolidate their ownership rights. But as I 
mentioned before, visitors to the House of the Seven Patios can tell that something did 
not go well. Even though the architectural project for the renovation of the house was 
nice at the beginning, renters and prospective buyers’ stories tell of how, due to problems 
among them, the residents started to neglect the maintenance of the house.  
The most important lesson from the program is that assisting local residents to 
remain as renters and or to buy houses does not guarantee the comprehensive success of 
the program, beyond the main objectives. When local residents do not have any income 
source, it becomes impossible to guarantee them a housing unit, and at the same time it 
becomes impossible to guarantee good neighborly condominium relationships among 
new owners if the program does not facilitate this process.  
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Chapter 4: “Vivienda Solidaria” Program 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Vivienda Solidaria program was implemented in Quito at the same time that 
the House of The Seven Patios was finishing the sales process in 1999. This program was 
also part of those pioneering urban renewal experiments in Latin America that Rojas 
(2004) mentioned and it also took place in the same controversial economic and political 
environment that Ecuador as well as other counties in the region was experiencing.   
The Vivienda Solidaria program produced new and rehabilitated housing by 
renovating ten properties that the municipality owned in the northern part of the Historic 
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Center. Some of them were inhabited and rented by low income households that 
immediately organized in order to ensure their participation and access to the new 
housing. These properties were located on both Briceño and Caldas Streets which are part 
of the area known as the “San Blas” neighborhood.  
This area is considered in the PE-CHQ as one of the main urban ‘doors’ to the 
Historic Center, as it is on the major access route to the Center from the northern parts of 
Quito. Strategically, these housing renovations caused a lot of expectations about the 
Historic Center’s renovation because of its prominent location. Different from the House 
of the Seven Patios, which is hidden in the southwest corner of the Historic Center’s 
limits, the Vivienda Solidaria condominium houses have a much more accessible 
location.  
Since these steeply-sloping streets branch off a central point of access through the 
area, everyone crossing the city was able to testify that some kind of urban renewal was 
going on. The Municipality built a parking garage on the corner of Caldas and Guayaquil 
as part of its transit plan, giving additional developable value to the surrounding 
properties. These properties are close to bus and trolley system stations as well as to 
major civic buildings such as the Central Ecuadorian Bank, the Red Cross and to 
important cultural and tourist points such as the Sucre Theater with its plaza and the large 
Basilica Cathedral. Today Caldas Street is one of the points of interest noted on the 
Historic Center’s official tourist map.  
The following chapter analyzes the subsequent municipal experience (following 
the House of the Seven Patios) that addressed housing problems in the Historic Center, 
this time as a more systematic program involving multiple properties, not just a single 
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rehabilitated house. The implementation of this program was a little more ambitious than 
the House of the Seven Patios and a few other contemporary single-house projects58 
because it managed the rehabilitation of ten properties in different phases in order to 
provide more housing opportunities for Historic Center’s residents.   
 It is important to look at this program because Vivienda Solidaria sets up a 
different precedent in housing rehabilitation within the comprehensive rehabilitation of 
the Historic Center compared to the previous House of the Seven Patios. As this chapter 
will demonstrate, the Vivienda Solidaria program depended on a stronger public and 
private institutional structure that was able to manage the program from 1999 until 2003. 
That was the time period when Ecuador changed its currency from Sucres to Dollars, and 
for this reason some of the data I was able to collect is sometimes listed in Sucres, 
sometimes in dollars and sometimes in both.    
 The data on which this analysis is based was collected during the summer of 
2007 from the old archives of the ex-ECH, now EMDUQ or INNOVAR.UIO, which is 
the public-private corporation that was formed at the beginning of the program to manage 
an IDB loan to develop projects that would follow the comprehensive rehabilitation plan 
for the Historic Center; one of those strategic programs was for housing.  
 Vivienda Solidaria is a good example of a housing program that had the 
opportunity to become a sustainable housing program and policy by producing mixed 
income condominiums in rehabilitated or new houses. It did not become a sustained 
program because there shifts in the ECH management that I believed caused several 
                                                 
58
 Single housing projects built with the junta de Andalucia cooperation include Casa Ponce and el 
Penanilillo and others built by FONSAL such as “San Roque” and “La Victoria”.  
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changes in how the housing problem was to be approached. This study has the objective 
of examining Vivienda Solidaria’s mechanisms and outcomes to be able to assess the 
positive and negative components of the program to inform the research questions of this 
report.  
4.2 PLANNING PROCESS, IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
 
Political and Planning Trends 
 
In June 1995 the Historic Center Corporation (ECH) was formed with the 
Municipality and the non-profit Caspircara Foundation as partners. The partnership has a 
time frame of fifty years of existence. The objective of the Corporation was to “drive, 
promote and manage projects, operations and businesses oriented towards the 
development and preservation of the historic monuments’ areas of the Metropolitan 
District as well as to facilitate the adequate conditions of profitability, the advantage of 
areas with historic and tourist interests with special architectural value for the city of 
Quito”.  
Dr. Jamil Mahuad, the same mayor of Quito elected in 1992 whose administration 
managed to finish the House of the Seven Patios project, decided to merge the Unidad de 
Vivienda department’s responsibilities with the ECH to continue developing housing 
projects in the Historic Center. According to the mayor’s resolution (Dec, 1997) the 
Unidad de Vivienda’s merger process had the intention of concentrating the management 
of housing programs into just one department in order to make them a more efficient 
venture. The creation of this public and private partnership has its bases on the 
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Modernization Law (1993) that continued the process of decentralizing municipal 
responsibilities and management and also incorporated private participation in public 
projects.   
At the same time FONSAL, with the assistance of the Junta de Andalucía, 
continued rehabilitating deteriorated single houses into condominiums for low income 
people (Casa Ponce and El Penalillo ) and also built two large housing projects on empty 
lots (San Roque and La Victoria). This condominium housing was built and ready to be 
inhabited when the Vivienda Solidaria program started and when the Unidad de Vivienda 
merged with ECH. The merging of Unidad de Vivienda and ECH was a key strategy in 
order to consolidate efforts and funding towards housing programs.    
Condominium housing projects such as La Victoria and San Roque were handy 
for relocating the tenants from some of the Briceño Street houses that Vivienda Solidaria 
was going to rehabilitate. These two condominium housing projects remained empty until 
the Vivienda Solidaria program signed the inter-institutional cooperation agreement 
(1997) with different local and national agencies in order to set up sales mechanisms. 
One of the institutions involved was the Housing Ministry (MIDUVI) because part of the 
planning strategy to manage the Vivienda Solidaria was to incorporate the national 
government subsidy (SIV) to help guarantee housing opportunities to the low income 
population.  
In a previous section I mentioned the SIV national housing policy. It is important 
to point out that the director of MIDUVI or the housing minister during the SIV 
formulation and implementation was the architect Teodoro Peña. He became the first 
manager of the new Historic Center Corporation (ECH) and signed the inter-institutional 
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agreement with the required partners to put the Vivienda Solidaria program to work. The 
inter-institutional agreement was signed with MIDUVI, Housing Ecuadorian Bank 
(BEV), the Historic Center Corporation (ECH) and Pact-Arim, a French NGO that had a 
previous experience with the rehabilitation of a house at 508 Caldas Street59 (Figure 7).   
The ECH structure is similar to the Chilean corporation Cordesan in terms of how 
it uses inter-institutional cooperation to manage housing projects together with the private 
sector in order to bring residents back to the center. Quito’s municipality, like that of 
Santiago, was able to incorporate the national subsidy for low income housing into its 
programs. In Quito, MIDUVI was in charge of managing the subsidy applications. BEV 
was part of the cooperation agreement with the capacity to help some of the prospective 
owners to get mortgages to complete payments. ECH was the agency that had to 
coordinate the funds that were coming from an IDB loan. Pact Arim, in Vivienda 
Solidaria, was the agency responsible for managing the construction process, the 
relocation of tenants, the selection of prospective buyers and the sales process.  
The agreement was signed in August 1997; at that time MIDUVI’s Minister of 
Housing was architect Diego Ponce, architect Teordoro Peña was the director of ECH 
and Dr. Jamil Mahuad was mayor of Quito. Under this agreement, MIDUVI committed 
to providing one million dollars for housing subsidies for the Historic Center’s housing 
program. This commitment was linked to the continuation of a credit agreement between 
                                                 
59
 Caldas 508 was a rehabilitation pilot program (1995) executed under a cooperation agreement between 
the French Government. The non-profit Pact-Arim established a branch office in Quito to manage the 
project. The house is a beautiful intervention and until now it is well maintained by its condominium 
owners. This experience allowed Pact-Arim to be the NGO that was going to be in charge of Vivienda 
Solidaria program.    
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MIDUVI and the Inter American Bank (IDB) and with other financing agencies in order 
to be able to include the corresponding entries (partidas) in the budget.   
The document of agreement also established the transfer of the condominium 
projects built by FONSAL to the ECH so that sales profits could stay in the ECH to be 
invested in the new condominium housing that Vivienda Solidaria program was 
developing.  The agreement recommends that new housing programs in the Historic 
Center of Quito incorporate new and different forms of financing for Vivienda Solidaria, 
including the resources of members of the community, of investors, of non-profits, and of 
public agencies with the objective of achieving new proposals for constructing and 
rehabilitating adequate housing in the Historic Center of Quito. It recommends that both 
the Municipality and MIDUVI need to prepare the required documentation to present to 
the Inter-American Bank to obtain financing for housing rehabilitation programs in the 
Historic Center of Quito. At that time the IDB had already loaned 41 million dollars 
(822/OC-EC, 1994) to the Municipality of Quito to address Historic Center’s 
rehabilitation projects. 
The objective of the project funded by the IDB loan was “to preserve and 
rehabilitate the Historic Center of Quito as a cultural treasure, to restore its functional 
importance, to revitalize traditional services and commerce by affording easier access to 
the goods and services these businesses supply and to foster the appropriate use and 
maintenance of its public and private buildings to make them more attractive to 
visitors”60.  The loan protocol mentioned that funds were to be invested in: 
                                                 
60
 http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/ec822e.htm, Accessed in Dec. 2007.  
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“rehabilitation of historic buildings, upgrading of sidewalks, 
installation of signs and other street facilities, construction of five parking 
garages, establish of a Rehabilitation Fund, creation a semi-public firm to 
promote private investment in the Historic Center, as well as the 
administrative, technical and managerial strengthening of the executing 
agency, the Municipality of Quito”.61 
 
As is stated in the loan protocol, the central element of the program is the creation 
of the Rehabilitation Fund. Mayor Mahuad followed these recommendations and passed 
ordinance 0115 to create FONREVIV (Fondo para la Rehabilitacion de Vivienda, 
“Housing Rehabilitation Fund”) but the mechanisms for managing the funds were never 
fully clear and the ordinance stayed inactive until the Pon a Punto tu Casa (PPC) 
program revived it in 2003. Even though FONREVIV was never put into practice, the 
Municipality of Quito and ECH communicated with the IDB partners about their interest 
in using part of the loan to buy by eminent domain properties to rehabilitate them through 
the structures of the new Vivienda Solidaria program.  
 As Eduardo Rojas mentioned62, the IDB did not find any objection to the 
program and money was invested in buying some of the properties adjacent to the ones 
already owned by the Municipality on Briceño and Caldas Streets (see Table 4.1). 
Municipal properties were appraised and transferred to the ECH as part of the capital 
investment project; the rest were purchased by the right of eminent domain with the 
justification of urban rehabilitation of the Historic Center.  
                                                 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Telephone Interview, October 2007.  
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Table 4.2.1: Vivienda Solidaria, Purchased Properties 
Vivienda Solidaria Program (1998) 
Purchased Properties 
Property    
(Historic House) Street M2 
Commercial 
Appraisal 
(Sucres) 
Commercial 
Appraisal 
(Dollars*) 
Cost /sq. 
meter 
(Dollars) 
454 Caldas 917 99,099,000 22,022 24 
524 Caldas 607 63,129,330 14,029 23 
494 Caldas 2852 295,282,350 65,618 23 
529 and 497 Caldas 2350 222,156,000 49,368 21 
459 Caldas 662 68,525,870 15,228 23 
651 and 641 Briceño 1132 107,005,140 23,779 21 
635 and 623 Briceño 1226 115,891,380 25,754 21 
Total   971,089,070 215,798 
 
* In 1998 one dollar = S/.4,500     
Source: ECH document No. 663-ECH- June,1998 
 
The next section will examine the planning process that the ECH developed in 
order to design the program, the definition of objectives and the definition of the target 
population of the housing units. This program had to deal with a renters’ organization 
like in the case of the House of the Seven Patios; in this case the same methodology was 
applied to create the mechanisms for helping the residents to access the new housing.   
Planning Process and assessment of needs 
 
The planning process and the assessment of needs for the Vivienda Solidaria 
program involved (1) the tenants’ relocation, (2) the product design and target population, 
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(3) the construction process, (4) guidelines for designs to select prospective condominium 
buyers and (5) commercialization and sales.  
 
Tenants’ Relocation 
  
 Tenants were notified by the Municipality that the houses, which were municipal 
property, were going to be rehabilitated into condominium housing developed by the 
ECH in the context of the Historic Center Rehabilitation programs. Pact-Arim was the 
NGO in charge of the communication process with tenants and of their relocation.  
It is important to note that these tenants already knew about some of the House of 
the Seven Patios’ ex-tenants experience because some of them had been relocated in the 
same Caldas’ and Briceño’s Street Municipal properties where they were able to meet the 
neighbors living on these streets. Tenants organized into a “Comite Pro-Defensa de las 
Calles Caldas y Briceño” (“Pro-defense Committee of Caldas and Briceño Streets) to 
ensure their access to the new rehabilitated housing and started conversations that led to 
the signing of corresponding agreements between the Municipality and the tenants’ 
organization.  
The methodology for managing the relocation process was developed through 
conversations with the representatives from the tenants’ organization, though signing 
relocation agreements with the tenants, and through a socio-economic study of 
households to be able to set rental prices for the units that were going to be occupied.  
Different from the House of the Seven Patios’ tenant relocation process, which 
involved only 17 households, the Vivienda Solidaria program dealt with relocation or 
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temporary displacement of about eighty families63. These eighty families were part of the 
tenants’ organization; there is no data about people that were not part of the organization, 
if there were any. The process was developed in phases or, more clearly, property-by-
property according to the urgency of having the space uninhabited in order to be able to 
initiate constructions process.  
 The first agreement was signed with tenants of Briceño 651, 623, 635 and Caldas 
459 (August, 199864), with sixteen households, representing a total of 59 people. Nine 
other households had voluntarily moved with the idea that they would rather personally 
look for alternative housing during the rehabilitation. The second agreement was signed 
with tenants of Caldas 454 and 524 (September, 1998), and later a third agreement was 
signed with tenants of Caldas 494 (April, 1999). The agreement documents helped to 
communicate the purpose of the relocation by presenting to the tenants some details of 
the Vivienda Solidaria program that the Municipality had been working on. 
For the Municipality the agreement’s objective was to guarantee the tenants’ 
cooperation in leave the properties while for tenants the objective of the agreement was to 
ensure their possibility of returning to the rehabilitated units as homeowners. The 
agreement had a temporary time frame related to the construction process’ timeline. 
During that period the agreement established that tenants could rent the housing units of 
the Municipality’s San Roque project by following specific terms and conditions for that 
rental period, such as risk of eviction in the event that they fall behind in rent payments or 
default on their water or electricity bills payments. Violating these terms had an 
                                                 
63
 “Análisis de Familias del Comité Caldas y Briceño”, ECH 
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additional penalty of losing the opportunity to apply for one of the Vivienda Solidaria 
housing units. 
 Clause number four of the agreement describes the application priority that ex-
tenants had during the commercialization process, which is very poorly articulated: 
“Una vez terminados los trabajos de rehabilitación del inmueble se 
procederá a la propuesta de adjudicación de la nueva vivienda siempre que 
al momento cumpla con los requerimiento financieros exigidos por las 
instituciones de crédito comprometiéndose la ECH a dar prioridad y 
privilegiar la adjudicación del reubicado en las mejores condiciones 
financieras posibles a los reubicados de la Caldas  Briceño, por lo que la 
Empresa del Centro Histórico sugerirá dar el mayor plazo posible, los 
interés y la entrada más baja a las instituciones financieras” (Agreement, 
Sept. 1998p:3) 
 
“Once the rehabilitation work of the property has finished, the process will 
proceed with the application and selection stage for residents of the new 
housing, on the condition that it satisfies the financial requirements set by 
the creditor institutions for the ECH to give priority and privileged status 
to the relocation of the people living in the Caldas and Briceño streets in 
the best possible financial conditions, and for that reason the Corporation 
of the Historic Center suggests that the financial institutions give the 
longest possible period for payment and the lowest interest and down 
payments.” 
  
The agreement also guaranteed the priority of housing application to those 
previous tenants that had voluntarily left the municipal properties to find rental places in 
other parts of the city. It also established that the ECH had the responsibility if 
associating the relocated families within different programs of the Social Sustainability 
project that involved specified activities such as: (1) identification and motivation, (2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
64
 “Convenio de Reubicación de los Inquilinos de las Casas de la Calle Briceño No. 651, 623, 635 y Caldas 
459”; Quito. Agosto 1998 
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relocation and monitoring, (3) urban appropriation, (4) training and employment65. All of 
these activities were proposed with the objective of improving quality of life and of 
incorporating ex-tenants into the Vivienda Solidaria program.  
These good intentions were put into practice only lightly and inconsistently. After 
having informal conversations with some of the relocated tenants who later became 
owners of Vivienda Solidaria housing units, I realized that the Social Sustainability part 
of the project never went very deep into sustainability issues. According to one resident, 
people from Pact-Arim and ECH held some meetings to explain to the residents some of 
the regulations and the Ecuadorian laws that established responsibilities and obligations 
in condominium ownership and living. Nothing beyond this appears to have been done.   
 Tenants living in San Roque (Figure 11) were still waiting to be relocated into 
their new units in August 1999 when the ECH proceeded with the call for application of 
ex-tenants to qualify for their access to Vivienda Solidaria units. Later events 
demonstrate that application process was not clear for ex-tenants. In September, 1999 the 
representative of the tenant’s organization wrote a letter to the current mayor of Quito66 
asking why even though the signed agreement guaranteed their priority access for the 
housing units now that access was reduced and was excluding ex-tenants because the 
prices of housing units were set too high for their economic possibilities.  
                                                 
65
 “Convenio de Reubicación de los Inquilinos de las Casas de la Calle Caldas 454 y 524”; Quito. Agosto 
1998 
66
 Letter that later was directed to the ECH. Received in ECH offices on September 28, 1999. 
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Figure 11. “San Roque” Condominium Complex  
 
 This point was a valid concern because the agreement had a clause establishing 
that relocation would not be possible if there was (1) default in rent and services 
payments, (2) non-compliance with banks for financing purposes and (3) cases when the 
prospective buyer [ex-tenant] could not provide the down payment value to purchase the 
housing unit67. The tenant’s organization representative mentions this situation in one 
letter:  
-“we need to recognize regretfully that we have come to feel that we been 
deceived, and that this offer had the objective of displacing us from our 
housing on Caldas and Briceño Streets as a way to respond in a cold 
calculated way to the economic interests of the ECH” 
 
 The tenants’ organization’s concern shows one pitfall within the management of 
the relocation and the management of information about the socio-economic situation of 
                                                 
67
 “Convenio de Reubicación de los Inquilinos de las Casas de la Calle Caldas 454 y 524”; Quito. Agosto 
1998 p:5 
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the old tenants. According to the letter, it seems that ex-tenants were surprised by an 
advertisement in the local newspaper with the announcement that the Vivienda Solidaria 
units were open to general applicants. It seems that communication was so poorly and 
disrespectfully administrated that ex-tenants thought that the Vivienda Solidaria units 
were built just only for them. Clearly, no one explained to them that the Vivienda 
Solidaria program that ECH had planned to increase the number of total units since the 
signature of the inter-institutional cooperation agreement in 1997.  From the beginning of 
conversations with the tenants, they had the right to know about that the SIV system 
could assist them and that it would be better to start saving some money in order to really 
be part of the program; the ECH had never planned to give them housing for free or to 
assume similar methods as in the House of the Seven Patios (rent to own methods).   
 The ECH responded to the tenants’ letter with another “Document of 
Agreement”(December, 1999) signed by the manager of ECH saying that ECH agrees to 
maintain the agreement with ex-tenants that are part of the tenants’ organization and to 
help them access housing units that are affordable for their socio-economic conditions, on 
the condition that they would comply with the established application requirements 
needed by MIDUVI for the down payment voucher subsidy; if they did not meet these 
requirement, it was not the ECH ‘s responsibility.  
During the application process some households applied for Vivienda Solidaria 
units at the Caldas and Briceño Streets and others applied to purchase Vivienda Solidaria 
units that were available for sale in the San Roque Condominium Complex and La 
Victoria condominium building (Figure 12) . From a total of 60 families that had signed 
the agreement, 24 families were temporarily relocated to the San Roque building. Out of 
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these, 21 families presented the application documents to return to their neighborhood. 
The other 36 families voluntarily found new places to rent. Of these, only 17 families 
presented the application documents. There were 20 displaced families that did not sign 
the relocation agreement with ECH. Four of these families presented application 
documents. So, from a total of 80 families displaced, only 42 families presented 
applications (See Table 4.2). There is no data available that shows how many of these 42 
applications were in fact accepted or what the income ranges of those 42 applicants were. 
Figure 12: “La Victoria” Condominium Building 
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Table 4.2.2: Vivienda Solidaria:  Families Displaced 
Vivienda Solidaria (1998-1999) 
Displaced tenant families from Caldas and Briceño Streets 
 
Number of 
Families 
Relocated in 
San Roque 
Voluntarily 
moved 
Not 
Submitted  
Application 
Submitted 
Application 
Signed 
Agreement 60 24 36 22 38 
Not Signed 
Agreement 20 0 20 16 4 
Total 80 24 56 38 42 
Source: ECH document “Analisis de Familias del Comité Caldas y Briceño” 
 
Product Design  
 The Vivienda Solidaria program had the goal of targeting families from 
vulnerable socio-economic sectors for receiving housing units. The sales prices need to 
be structured in accordance to the standards of social housing defined by MIDUVI which 
had to be housing in a price range of $6,000 to $ 10,000 in order to be able to access to 
the down payment subsidy.  The vulnerable population was defined as households that 
did not earn more than $250 as a monthly income. In 1997-1998, when the program was 
designed, the minimum legal monthly salary was s/. 100,000 Sucres, which was about 
$20 dollars68. This meant that the program was designed to provide housing to vulnerable 
households earning up to twelve minimum salaries each month.  
 The program also specifies a standard family group as one that earns a salary in a 
range between $250 and $400 dollars. The highest salary that MIDUVI accepted within 
the guidelines for application for the down payment incentive (SIV) was $400. According 
                                                 
68
 One dollar = s/. 5,000 in 1998 and in 2000 one dollar = s/.25,000. Souce: Banco Central del Ecuador. 
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to MIDUVI and Ecuadorian social housing law the housing unit that applicants can buy 
with the down payment incentive cannot be bigger than 60 square meters. Therefore, 
bigger apartments were targeted to families that were able to comply with other 
established rules that were part of the Selection Process Guidelines.  
The social goals of the program to create a mix of income ranges among the new 
inhabitants was applied in the condominium rehabilitation project designs so that almost 
every project that would be sold through the Vivienda Solidaria program during the 
period of 1999 until 2002 would have ‘social housing’ characteristics in at least 50 
percent of its units (see Table 4.2.3).  
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Table 4.2.3: Vivienda Solidaria, Condominium Housing and Number of Units 
Vivienda Solidaria (1999-2003) 
Condominium Housing and number of units 
Condominium Housing Number of Housing Units 
Accessible with 
SIV 
Accessible 
without SIV 
Briceño 623-635 19 12 7 
Briceño 641-645 16 7 9 
Caldas 454 16 9 7 
Caldas 459 10 5 5 
Caldas 494 50 35 15 
Caldas 497 6 4 2 
Caldas 524 9 3 6 
Caldas 528 15 0 15 
Caldas 529 18 14 4 
Caldas 562 21 0 21 
La Victoria 50 20 30 
San Roque 90 82 8 
Venezuela 1325 11 2 9 
Chavez 310 15 0 15 
Rocafuerte 708 45 17 28 
Benalcazar 1028 15 5 10 
Total 406 215 191 
Source: ECH, Collected Summer 2007 
 
Housing units’ prices per square meter were established according to the location 
of the apartment within the historic house (See Table 4.4). I wanted to know if units that 
were affordable with SIV subsidies were in a good location or if they were the cheapest 
by square meter because of their poor location within the housing project. These data 
would be more valuable if the information available could respond to this question but 
the only way to know would be by looking at the architectonic plans or actually checking 
each of the apartments in their physical location.  
 116 
Table 4.2.4:  Vivienda Solidaria, Apartment Characteristics and Price by Square Meters 
Vivienda Solidaria Program (1994) 
Apartments Characteristics and Price per Sq. Meters 
Housing Type Characteristics Price/m2 (dollars) 
Type A Front location, street view, upper stories 205 
Type B Front location, street view, first floor 170 
Type C Back location, upper stories 180 
Type D Back location, first floor 160 
Duplex / Back Two story apartment at the back 190 
Duplex / Patio Two story apartment at the patio 200 
Duplex / Front Two story apartment front location 200 
Type E With patio or terrace 200 
Type F First floor, no much natural light 150 
Type G at the back with some limitations 160 
Type H Tower 215 
Commercial A At the street 280 
Commercial B At the back 265 
Commercial C No windows to the street 250 
Commercial D Windows to the interior 230 
Commercial E Especial condition 200 
Source: ECH-Internal Document, box 135. Collected Summer 2007  
 
Another question about how the project’s design relates to its social goal concerns 
the number of bedrooms per housing unit and their total square meters (Table 4.2.5). Data 
on these features was collected from Jessica Lopez’s thesis in which she also analyzed 
the Vivienda Solidaria program69. She provides data on condominium housing 
composition, looking at the number of bedrooms in each housing unit. She used the data 
to prove that units were in compliance with architectural codes. Any project in order to be 
approved to get construction permits need to be in compliance with codes and the 
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 López Quiroz, Jessica. “Valoración Económica de la Calidad Paisajista del Centro Histórico de Quito, 
Programa ‘Vivienda Solidaria’”. Thesis Dissertation for a Title in Economics, Catholic University. Quito, 
2005 
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common habitability requirements according to the construction permit process of the 
city.  However, when looking at the housing policy question, this data need to be 
complemented with information about the share of affordable units within each building 
and the bedroom configuration of these units.  For example, if the demand side was 
composed mostly of families of four70, how many of the 215 units that were accessible 
with SIV were big enough to house the ex-tenants and the other low income applicants?  
Table 4.2.5:  Vivienda Solidaria, Square Meters by numbers of Bedrooms 
Vivienda Solidaria  
Square Meters by number of bedrooms 
Type of Housing Unit Minimum Allowed 
M2* 
Minimum M2 Built 
by the Program 
Maximum M2 Built 
by the Program 
One Bedroom 28.50 33.06 86.57 
Two Bedrooms 38.00 40.07 116.56 
Three Bedrooms 49.00 57.00 138.91 
Source: Lopez Quiroz, Alexandra (2005) p:72 and ECH 
* Allowed by architecture norms for the Metropolitan Area of Quito.  
 
The Vivienda Solidaria program records cannot provide the answers to these 
questions. It should have been a priority to learn form these experiences by recording and 
studying these variables while designing housing policy. The assessment of needs 
generally looked at income affordability but it should also consider the needs relating to 
certain aspects of the physical space. Vivienda Solidaria had the opportunity to work with 
the prospective owners in the design of the condominium houses types, at least with the 
ones that had already passed the first selection process and had expressed an interest in 
living in the Historic Center. Good information for project design could have been 
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 Obtained  average by looking at the family composition data of the Agreement of Relocation with 
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collected, such as architectural details for single applicants (efficiency apartments, Figure 
13) or desired communal spaces such as shared laundry areas or community spaces. The 
negotiations around the construction of the apartments were difficult; the architectural 
and construction methods were the exclusive responsibility of Pact-Arim and ECH while 
the construction process was managed privately through an announcement in the public 
media stating that Vivienda Solidaria program would select the most competitive 
development office to build the housing units.  
Figure 13. Efficiency Apartment Ideas 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.conversehome.com/plans.html, http://www.wesleyhousing.com 
                                                                                                                                                 
residents of Briceño 651, 623, 636 y Caldas 459. Signed Document of  
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Selection Process Guidelines and Sales 
 
The program had an Evaluation Committee made up of four members: one from 
Pact-Arim, one from the ECH, one from the Contracts Commission of the Municipality 
and the last one was the Manager of ECH. The Committee had the responsibility of 
setting the price of housing units that would be considered by the ECH board for final 
approval. According to the document describing the commercialization process, the sales 
process started with a public announcement in local newspapers. Under the requirements, 
the announcement had to be published only once through the local newspaper with 
largest circulation rates, calling for people interested in acquiring housing from the 
program. Interested people was asked to fill out a form to submit a qualifying application 
by providing household socio-economic information such as household income and 
expenses or whether or not they were Historic Center’s residents. At the same time ECH 
had to send a letter to financial institutions to invite them to participate in the program by 
facilitating financial assistance to prospective homeowners, especially to the ones that 
were going to receive governments’ subsidies. The down payments subsidies were to be 
managed and delivered through private banks.  
The next step in the process was the applicants’ pre-selection by following the 
ranking system created by ECH, which had been approved by the IDB. The ranking 
system used computerized software with which the information provided in the 
application form was ranked according to the policy for evaluating households’ 
characteristics and determining their eligibility. The ranking system was the same for 
both types of units, the ones that were small and cheap enough to be considered social 
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housing for SIV purposes and the more expensive and bigger ones that were not in 
compliance with SIV subsidies system and had market prices.  
Applications were ranked based on a number of different characteristics such as if 
the head of the household was a single person or a couple, couples receiving more points 
the single-head households. Another interesting element of the ranking was to give some 
families priority in the selection process if, for example, the applicants’ families had 
relatives with disabilities. Another factor in the ranking was based on whether the 
applicant was a resident of the Historic Center.  
Applicants looking for an apartment using SIV subsidies were ranked highly 
when they fit the low income profile of the selection policy. On the other hand, applicants 
looking for an apartment who earned too much to be able to apply for the SIV subsidy 
were ranked high if their incomes were high in order to attract some residents of a higher 
income range. This raking process was the basis for the mixed income housing program, 
as it targeted both lower and higher income applicants. Vivienda Solidaria reflected ideas 
of inclusionary housing that have been seen in some parts of the US and Europe. I will 
come back to this issue in the final conclusion of this report, when I suggest strategies for 
increasing the inclusionary scope of housing policy in Quito.  
The next step in the commercialization and sales process was the final selection of 
applicants according to the ranking assessments. The selected households were contacted 
and asked to meet the sales requirements and complete the SIV paper work. According to 
the data provided by the ECH, some households had to finance the amount of money to 
meet the total price of the unit after the down payment. Other households had savings or 
other assets (not housing) that were translated into capital for the purchase of the house. 
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Here it is important to remember that the economic situation in Ecuador in 1999 was very 
fragile and the public trust in financial institution had been lost. Some people had their 
savings invested in their houses, not in banks, and others had their savings account frozen 
by presidential mandate71. These events particularly influenced sales phases two and 
three.   
4.3 PROGRAM OUTCOMES  
 
The Vivienda Solidaria program initiated its activities in 1997, the year when the 
ECH signed the inter-institutional agreement with MIDUVI, BEV and Pact-Arim to 
cooperate in the rehabilitation of historic housing properties owned by the Municipality 
located on the northern border on the Historic Center’s limits. The program followed 
policy ideas and mechanisms in order to include the current residents that were renting 
rooms and apartments in those deteriorated housing.  The general objective of the 
program was “to develop a thousand housing units within the comprehensive 
rehabilitation of the Historic Center, to guarantee the participation of residents, investors 
and the community in general by putting together local and national efforts in the process 
of State modernization”72. The specific objectives were (1) the improvement of quality of 
life through projects that can help alleviate quantitative and qualitative housing deficits, 
(2) the Historic Center’s reactivation as a residential zone, (3) the achievement of social 
                                                 
71
 Current president of Ecuador, Dr. Jamil Mahuad under and executive decree declared State of 
Emergency in the whole Ecuadorian territory imposing a “frozen in savings”. Today, the national 
government with the anticorruption agency maintain a law suit with previous president for extra-limitation 
in functions administration.  
72
 ECH, Powerpoint Presentation “Vivienda Solidaria ” 
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participation to create a better decision-making process, and (4) to promote heterogeneity 
through encouraging occupation by different demographic groups73.   
The Vivienda Solidaria program (1997-2002) was the program through which the 
municipality pursued its second phase of large-scale endeavors in housing rehabilitation 
projects aimed at increasing the quality of distressed neighborhoods of the Historic 
Center. Unlike the House of the Seven Patios, this project included outside sources such 
as the SIV system and Pact-Arim collaboration. For this project, Junta de Andalucía was 
not part of the institutions involved, perhaps because they were busy building other 
houses similar to the House of the Seven Patios project like “Casa Ponce” and “El 
Penalillo” (Figure 14).  To analyze the Vivienda Solidaria program’s outcomes I will 
evaluate it results in order to draw some conclusions, lessons and implications for the 
next programs to be implemented in Quito’s Center.  
                                                 
73
 Ibid.  
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Figure 14: “El Penalillo” Condominium Complex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Municipality took ownership of some of the properties on Caldas and Briceño 
Streets and assisted with relocation process for 60 households in the already-built 
condominium building San Roque, very close to the House of the Seven Patios. ECH 
designed the methods that were used to select applicants by ranking households based on 
certain desirable characteristics. 
 
 124 
Table 4.3.1: Vivienda Solidaria, Purchased Properties 
Vivienda Solidaria (1999-2002) 
Incomes of Home buyers by Phases 
 
Household Incomes (USD) 
Phase Minimum Maximum Media 
Phase 1 - 1999 36.12 660.00 162.00 
Phase 2 - 2000 75.00 2,000.00 443.39 
Phase 3 - 2001 92.00 1,500.00 472.72 
Phase 4 - 2002 180.00 2,855.00 981.08 
Source: Lopez Quiroz, Alexandra (2005) p:75 and ECH  
 
As it was described above, the application process benefited some low income 
local residents of the Historic Center that were able to apply with the SIV subsidy and 
also benefited higher income residents of the Historic Center that were interested in 
buying units. According to the economic analysis of the program developed by Jessica 
Lopez, (2005), housing prices were not stable but rather each phase of construction set 
new prices per square meter. The rising prices might be related to inflationary process, 
but also to slight changes in policy. According to Figure 16, the price per square meter 
started at $85.33 dollars in 1999 and went up to $450 dollars in 2003. This can be 
compared with other data presented by Lopez (2005) which show the income range that 
was most likely to purchase the Vivienda Solidaria units during each phase. Of course, 
housing units began to increase beyond the SIV qualified price range from phase 2 until 
phase 4 of the project, and  the households that most benefited from the Municipal effort 
were those earning more than $400 as monthly salaries (Table 4.3.1). 
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Figure 16: Vivienda Solidaria’s Price per Sq. Meter (1999-2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lopez Quiroz, Alexandra (2005) p:98 
Table 4.3.2 shows a summary of housing projects sold using the Vivienda 
Solidaria model, some with SIV subsidies and some without. The total amount of money 
invested in subsidies was $378, 310.05. The agreement with MIDUVI established the 
reservation of one million dollars for giving housing subsidies in the Historic Center. 
This shows that the government at that time had access to money for maintaining the 
assistance to lower income residents, so the switch in target population for housing units, 
especially for the units built and sold in phases 3 and 4 ,were not an outcome of the lack 
of funds for providing incentives. Increases in land prices could be considered a factor 
that made units more expensive but the fact is that ECH started the program in 1999 
already owning the properties in advance.  
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Table 4.3.2: Vivienda Solidaria, Down payment Vouchers by Housing Project 
Vivienda Solidaria (2000) 
Down payment vouchers by housing project 
Condominium Housing Number of Housing Units  
with SIV SIV Value 
Benalcazar 5 10,000.00 
Caldas 70 130,934.00 
Rocafuerte 17 34,000.00 
La Victoria 20 28,574.59 
Venezuela 2 4,000.00 
Briceño  19 29,311.40 
San Roque 106 141,490.06 
Total 239 378,310.05 
Source: Lopez Quiroz, Alexandra (2005) p:74 and ECH 
 
One of the specific objectives of the program was to promote social participation 
throughout the decision-making process. After talking with some residents and after an 
interview with Pedro Jaramillo, manager and representative of Pact-Arim, I learned that 
the social participation component of the Vivienda Solidaria program was planned to 
consist of a series of workshops to help new residents live in co-property arrangements. 
According to Jaramillo, there was a switch in the municipal policy and those activities 
came to be considered unnecessary expenses. The result is that only some Vivienda 
Solidaria condominium houses are part of co-property organizations. I had conversations 
with residents and they believe that these organizations in Caldas Street are working 
better to maintain the houses’ appearances than in Briceño Street. (Figures 17, 18, 19. 
20).  
 127 
Figure 17: Vivienda Solidaria, Briceño Street 
 
 
Figure 18: Vivienda Solidaria, Caldas Street 
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Figure 19: Vivienda Solidaria, Caldas Street 
 
 
Figure 20: Vivienda Solidaria, Caldas 497 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Vivienda Solidaria became an exemplary program funded by the IDB and had the 
possibilities of becoming a sustained program to contribute to the rehabilitation of the 
Historic Center. However, the political environment had changed in Quito and the 
program suffered the consequences. The Municipality totally ceased the program in 2003 
and instead prepared new housing programs for the Historic Center, this time not meant 
to be affordable for the low-income resident population but rather to be in a middle or 
upper price range. This decision was a product of the new administration of the ECH 
which maintained its administrative structure and continued buying empty lots and 
historic houses, now producing housing at prices between $400 and $1,200 per square 
meter. Four years since the projects started, some of those condominium buildings are 
still in the construction and sales processes. They remain empty for various reasons that 
include an unclear sales process for customers, poor level of housing unit finishes and 
design, and prices such as the $800 per square meter rate at the new Camino Real 
condominium building.  
One of the desired goals of Vivienda Solidaria was to give incentives to attract 
and stabilize the residential use and to give incentives to the private market to invest. 
Data collected in the National Office of Properties Registration (Registro de la 
Propiedad) was useful to elaborate a simple analysis of properties transactions in three 
different areas of Quito. There is computerized data since 1999, and it shows that the 
Historic Center’s area real estate transactions are very low in comparison with “La 
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Villaflora” southern area and “Cotocollao”, northern area. When selecting the data to be 
compared I was not able to see the whole data base, and I had to quickly choose three 
comparable areas. These southern and northern areas are not really the areas where most 
of the housing development in the Metropolitan district is happening, but was useful to 
prove how low the real-estate activity in the Historic Center is.  
Figure 21. Real State Trends in there areas of Quito 
Villaflora (Southern Area), Cotocollao (Northen Area) 
 
 
 In the meantime, in 2003 QUITOVIVIENDA was formed as a new public-private 
partnership in charge of the housing policy for the metropolitan district. This agency had 
the responsibility to manage both land development in the peripheries and Pon a Punto tu 
Casa, the topic of the next chapter, in the Center.  
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Chapter 5: “Pon a Punto tu Casa” Program 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Pon a Punto tu Casa (Put your House up to Date) program is the housing 
element that resulted from Quito’s integral rehabilitation agenda, itself a municipal policy 
affected by global trends of historic center intervention and decentralized management. 
The Municipality of Quito’s housing strategy for the Historic Center switched its 
emphasis from the direct production of new and rehabilitated housing with positive inter-
institutional agreements to financing private homeowners with low-interest loans to 
rehabilitate their own housing.   
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The Historic Center came to be seen as an important economic resource for the 
city as a whole, the integral rehabilitation plans attempted to comprehensibly address 
urban issues from transportation to social inequality and housing. However, the housing 
component appears to be partially contradictory to the stated goals of integral 
rehabilitation, in particular when looking at the ‘Pon a Punto tu Casa’ program (PPC) 
which is in fact the only currently-active (as of 2008) housing program in the Historic 
Center of Quito. 
Even though PPC states that one of its objectives is to help residents remain as 
inhabitants of the Center, the way it has been implemented and managed seems to 
overlook the fact that the majority of residents are renters, contradicting these objectives 
by driving older, affordable housing units out of the rental market, and replacing them 
with a smaller number of more expensive renovated units.   
The origins of the program begin with Ordinance 3050, amended by Ordinance 
3188 in August, 1996. Ordinance 3050 produced the mechanisms to create a fund to 
rehabilitate housing in the Historic Center. This fund was called FONREVIV 74 and was 
designed to find the resources by transferring development rights to private agencies. The 
idea was to sell building height rights to developers in the metropolitan area, and to use 
that money with the fund for the benefit of the Historic Center.  
Ordinance 3188 is the second part for the program mandated by Ordinance 3050 
and it establishes that the funds will be managed by the Financing Director of the 
Municipality as public funds. The Unidad de Vivienda of the Planning Department was 
the municipal division in charge of managing the funds to provide credit and technical 
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assistance to homeowners to rehabilitate their property exclusively for housing 
purposes.75 The mechanism for raising the funds was controversial76, as was the idea of 
the funds being managed as public accounts, since this conflicted with some conceptions 
of municipal management in the context of modernization and decentralization. For not 
entirely clear reasons, FONREVIV was never implemented even though some height 
rights were sold, and the ordinance remained inactive until 2003 when the Unidad de 
Vivienda was transformed into a public-private corporation called QUITOVIVIENDA. 
The Pon a Punto tu Casa program was established after the Mayor of Quito, the 
General Management of “QUITOVIVIENDA” and the Junta de Andalucía cooperation 
agency signed an agreement of cooperation on July 22 of 2003 that would last for an 
undefined period of time and that had the objective of creating the bases, required 
conditions and implementation tools necessary to execute this housing program. The 
program started in August of 2003 with funds from the Municipality and the Junta de 
Andalucía cooperating agency with the legal status of fideicomiso (trust fund). Under the 
ordinance No. 0115 of March 3rd of 200477, the Municipal Code was reformed to revive 
the Fund for Housing Rehabilitation in the Historic Center, now to be managed through 
PPC’s own mechanisms. After this, the idea of transfer of developments rights was 
discarded. 
                                                                                                                                                 
74
 FONREIV :  Fondo para la Rehabilitación de Vivienda en el Centro Histórico 
75Metropolitan District of Quito, Ordinance 3188. August, 1996.   
76
 Personal Interview with Arch. Jorge Carvajal, director of the Housing Unit, later QUITOVIVIENDA’s 
General Manager.  
77
 Published in “Registro Oficial”No.315 on April 16 of 2004, 
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5.2 PLANNING PROCESS, IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
Political and Planning Trends 
 
While Vivienda Solidaria was still in its last phase of sales, Quito elected a new 
mayor. In 2000 the era of the Democracia Popular party that begun in 1987 with Rodrigo 
Paz had come to an end. General Paco Moncayo from the Izquierda Democratica party 
became the new mayor to put in practice the PGDT (2001) comprehensive plan in which 
the established housing policy to implement land banking and development strategy in 
the peripheries and to put into practice the Pon a Punto to Casa program in the Historic 
Center.  
From 2003 to present the manager of QUITOVIVIENDA has been Jorge 
Carvajal, the same architect who managed the House of the Seven Patios. Carvajal and 
Junta de Andalucía knew each other already and were able to quickly reorganize 
FONREVIV program into the PPC program. At that same time similar programs were 
being implemented in Santiago, having begun in 1991.  
The Santiago experience that I described in chapter 1 had a similar program that 
ran parallel to housing production in the Comuna area. The Chilean program, like PPC, 
provides credits and technical assistance to rehabilitate the Cités. Since 2000 the housing 
production methodology of QUITOVIVIENDA and ECH has been very similar to the 
Chilean strategy but is interesting to note that, after talking with some of the officers and 
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ex program managers, none of them mentioned knowing about the programs 
implemented in Santiago.  
The background for the creation of this ordinance is stated in the fideicomiso document: 
- It is indispensable to reinforce the Historic Center of Quito as an emblematic 
urban space y to recuperate its residential character. 
- For this purpose, several actions had made an important advance in terms of 
restoration and recuperation of the Historic Center. 
- Besides the public and municipal funds invested in the rehabilitation of the 
Historic Center, it is important to increase the participation of the private sector 
and to provide incentives for that participation. 
- To recuperate the residential character of the Historic Center, it is important to 
designate funds to housing rehabilitation, involving social stakeholders in the 
process and to guaranteeing the necessary support to lead to action 
- And that one way to achieve these objectives is to implement a program that will 
allow short-term loans for homeowners and renters of the Historic Center of Quito 
to improve housing habitability conditions. 
In November 16th of 2006 this ordinance was reformed to establish the main objectives of 
the program: 
- To contribute to the recuperation of the Historic Center as a place to live through 
the provision of economic credits to improve or rehabilitate housing  
- To improve the quality of the housing supply in the Historic Center and to favor 
its property values while ensuring its preservation in the long term.  
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General Paco Moncayo was reelected mayor of Quito in 2004. The continuous 
modernization and decentralization process produced a new institutional merger between 
QUITOVIVIENDA and ECH into EMDUQ (Metropolitan Corporation for Quito’s Urban 
Development). Physically QUITOVIVIENDA never moved from its original offices in 
the planning department building and decision making within PPC program is still done 
internally because they still use the same fideicomiso signed with Junta de Andalucía.   
EMDUQ uses the commercial name INNOVAR.UIO and its office is in charge of 
different urban development projects not only in the Historic Center but for the rest 
metropolitan area as well. To illustrate the scope of their current main projects, EMDUQ 
is now developing the subway system that Quito is going to introduce as its new public 
transit system; they are also managing the program for informal settlements 
improvements funded with IDB credits. Today EMDUQ’s responsibilities are very 
different compared to its initial ones with Vivienda Solidaria. The remaining real estate 
projects (Figure 22 and 23), now unaffordable to most of the Historic Center’s 
population, are managed by a single bureaucrat. Construction processes are run through 
external contracts with private professionals and sales are contracted to a private 
company, PRO-INMOBIALIARIA, all coordinated by EMDUQ.  
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Figure 22: “Casa Ponton”  (2007) 
 
 
Figure 23: “Camino Real” (2007) 
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Planning Process and assessment of needs 
 
The objective of the PPC program is to rehabilitate housing in the Historic Center 
with a focus on the areas that are shown in Figure 23, by providing homeowners credit 
with a 5 percent interest rate for a period of ten years. This is low interest when compared 
to the minimum interest rate for housing mortgages in Ecuador, which is 12 percent. To 
be able to access the credit the property first needs to be among the structures catalogued 
as historic properties78. Satisfying this condition, the owner will be able to ask for $8,000 
dollars for each housing unit that the house can accommodate within its rehabilitation 
project.  
Figure 23: Pon a Punto tu Casa, Priority Areas 
 
                                                 
78
 The Municipality of Quito developed a complete inventory of historic houses, documented in paper-
based forms which are archived in the Documentation Center at the Planning Department Building in the 
Historic Center. According to Arq. Ximena Ron, PPC officer, these forms sometimes are not up to date 
because some homeowners have made modifications over the years. However, right now it is the only 
source the PPC has to determine if the owner actually owns a historic property or not.   
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After their credit is approved, homeowners need to find an architect that will be 
responsible for the rehabilitation’s design and management. At the beginning of the 
program the PPC technical team, experts in historic conservation, had to plan and manage 
the process. Now situated within a market economy, owners benefiting from the program 
have to turn to professional help available in the private sector. 
For Jorge Carvajal, General Manager of QUITOVIVIENDA, this is one of the 
weaknesses of the rehabilitation process because “its hard to say, but in some way [some 
of the private professionals] do not have the spiritual and technical skills to accomplish 
the job as they should”79. Besides the lack of interest in the properties’ current residents, 
the program and these third party professionals may be putting the homeowners at risk of 
losing the historical value of their houses because of bad architectural and management 
decisions in their interventions80. The program provides homeowners with plenty of 
incentives: a two-year grace period exemption to property taxes and assistance with 
property ownership paperwork (“propiedad horizontal)”, with the plans and with the 
autonomous construction permit process.81 
The PPC has a Technical Committee with the responsibility of analyzing the 
social and economic feasibility of the client’s application and of evaluating the 
accomplishment of the fideicomiso’s objectives as well. This evaluation starts by 
                                                 
79
 Personal Interview, July 2007  
80
 Arq. Jorge Carvajal General Manager of QUITOVIVIENDA, said he thinks that it would be good to 
consider some kind of special training and professional certification to be able to work in historic 
structures.   
81
 In order to facilitate the rehabilitation process the program provides its own construction permit, 
avoiding the review process of the Historic Center Planning Commission and the construction inspection 
that the new permit process of Quito requires. The disadvantage of this incentive is that, because 
construction activities do not get registered on the same new and modern municipal system, it would be 
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assessing the capacity of debt that the client can afford that, while considering other 
economic factors of the household finances, is based primarily on the value and potential 
of the property.  
According to Ximena Ron, architect and program coordinator, the potential of the 
property is measured according to how much the clients can increase their earnings by 
renting the new apartments in the rehabilitated houses: “if a property in its moment gave 
the owner a total of $150 dollars [per month] by renting the single rooms, now they have 
the possibility to increase that income as an income that can help to pay the credit. 
…Because one of the objectives is that the house get paid by itself, I mean with the 
apartment’s leasing”82.  
Clearly, there is no intention or policy to find a formula to help all or some rental 
prices to remain affordable to the common residents that, as we saw before, are in the 
majority on or below the poverty line.  
Another striking bit of data is that, from a study contracted by 
QUITOVIVIENDA83, less than half (44.6 percent) of surveyed owners mentioned that 
there are good possibilities for renting the new rehabilitated apartments in case they 
participate in PPC program, while 22.5 percent mentioned that there is no possibility at 
all, and 34.1 percent said they had slim possibilities of renting. Homeowners have their 
own understandings of rent demand in the Historic Center and, as these results show, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
hard to measure strategic outcomes and outputs of the program in terms of its overall influence in the 
historic center development.  
82
 Personal Interview in Spanish on August 2007, translation by the author.  
83
 Survey analysis: “Evaluación de Concepto “Pon a Punto tu Casa”, made by DATANALISIS: 
Investigacion de Mercados.  
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are skeptical of how possible it is to find renters willing to pay higher prices in order to 
make the renovation a profitable business.   
This same study recommends that the program do a market analysis of rent 
demand to be able to help landlords promote their new apartments. Is the program 
indirectly and unconsciously promoting the current renting residents’ displacement? Is it 
promoting gentrification? How is the PPC calculating the house price-rent ratio and the 
gross rental yield? Has the program proved economically feasible and appropriate for this 
context? Tim Butler’s (1997) argument about gentrification is that it might be based not 
solely on housing demand, but is rather “a phenomenon deriving from the supply of 
housing opportunities arising out of the operation of the urban land market (p. 41)”.  
Following this argument (see also Ward 1993) as well the local reality of the 
Historic Center, gentrification is not a tendency created only by consumer preferences but 
is structured by policy and development plans for a new housing supply whose market, in 
the specific case of Quito, it not yet clear.   
I was able to interview several clients that used PPC credit to fix their houses and 
their stories help to fill in some of the details of how the program has worked. One client 
did not have to evict his tenants because the rehabilitation was not extreme enough to 
force him to ask people to leave, and as he put it, “they have known each other for so 
long and they understood about the nuisances that rehabilitation would cause them”84. I 
asked if he had to raise the monthly rent price and he said he did not. In this case 
renovation did not lead to displacement, but it did not lead to increased income for the 
owner either.  
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I had a phone interview with another PPC client who had a different experience, 
and contrary to the last conversation, this client told me that he is living by himself in the 
house since the new, remodeled apartments are difficult to rent because “everybody 
comes wanting to pay $50 and $80 (per month) and I do not have rooms at that price 
anymore”. In this case, the grace period that the PPC program gives to clients like this 
one creates a real market lifesaver until he or she can find some people that can afford the 
rent price. The interviewee did not want to tell me how much more was he asking, but 
data I collected at the PPC offices85 shows that the median monthly rent price after the 
rehabilitation was $143.42 with a median upfront deposit of $260.15.  
There is no data on rent prices before the rehabilitation process in houses that had 
tenants, however looking at the $87 medium rent price from the previously mentioned 
study, this means that on average renovated properties’ rents are $ 56.42 more expensive 
than before, or 65% higher than the neighborhood average. PPC is putting a burden on 
the Historic Centers’ tenants by raising rent prices while forcing homeowners to raise 
prices in order to finance their remodeling projects.   
5.3 PROGRAM OUTCOMES 
 
From the same study mentioned before, out of a sample of 213 interviews of 
homeowners it was useful to identify a total of 96.4 percent of properties that had some 
residential use. From that portion, 44.8 percent of owners had both resided in the property 
and rented housing units there, while another 9.1 percent share housing through unpaid or 
                                                                                                                                                 
84
 Phone Interview, Caso # 1, 2004.  
85
 Spread sheet from the program assistant. File name: “seguimiento y evaluacion PPC.xls” 
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informal arrangements. The PPC keeps records of the application forms of loan holders, 
which describe housing characteristics by asking owners to specify their property’s uses: 
personal, for renting, both personal and renting, or other arrangements. 
 The application form does not keep records of received rental income, if there 
was any, and so there is no systematic way to calculate fair price-rent ratios or a gross 
rental yield in order to have records from which to systematically evaluate the policy. 
One of the expected results expressed in one PPC presentation was “to increment the 
price of the property and rent incomes”. But there appears to be no stated limit on how 
much rents can increase to maintain a fair market without speculation. Since census data 
shows that the majority of owners who rent out their properties in the Center are 
relatively low-income people, how does the PPC assist these small landlords to calculate 
the new rents to an affordable rate without pricing them out of the market? 
Displacement occurs because of real constraints on these projects of architectonic 
rehabilitation and the on the possibilities of their results. First, the idea is to provide 
better housing conditions by producing less crowded units while preserving historic 
structures.  Therefore, for example, if a house had six single rooms for rent to six 
different households, after the rehabilitation half of those households would have to find 
a different place because the new house will allow just three remodeled small apartments, 
in compliance with Quito’s architectural norms. The project has kept no records of 
renters showing who is able to stay and who is not because of these changes in rental 
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price affordability and rental unit availability.86  The response of program officials to 
questions about this issue is that most of the houses are not occupied to start with, but 
there is no information on how many properties had previous tenants, which is not 
recorded on the application form.  
The program coordinator Ximena Ron mentioned houses are in overcrowded or 
deteriorated conditions or are being used for storage, emphasizing the positive factor of 
having new residential units in the cases when the property was unused. The other 
positive outcome is the opportunity to upgrade housing stock for a safer and more 
sustainable central city. Visual contamination, structural safety, better indoor air quality, 
and more efficient and new materials for water and sewer services are several of the 
potentially good outcomes of the PPC program (Figure 24). Sometimes it seems that no 
one is worrying about the issue of resident displacement because houses are really 
changing back to residential uses after being abandoned or used in other way.  
Considering that these renovated units are not counted in the City’s building 
permit system, nor is there a record of if they were previously rented, it is difficult to 
know how many new units are entering into the Center’s rental market. The records count 
neither lost units nor new units deriving from renovation. With respect to the issue of loss 
of residents and affordable units, the officials I interviewed did not deny that sometimes 
there have been difficulties with displacement of renters after houses are rehabilitated 
                                                 
86
 According to the tenements rights establish by a national law landlords should give a three month period 
of time to allow tenants to find a new place after the contract is due, that if there is a contract signed which 
is not generally common. (Gilbert, 1993) 
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with 5 rental apartments instead of 10 single rooms for rent, and they also suggested that 
the municipality should take responsibility for addressing those issues. 87 
The loss of affordable units is not a good externality of this subsidized business, 
and is simply returning responsibility to the government for providing affordable housing 
for the low income population. The lack of a policy for maintaining or replacing the 
affordable rental housing seems to be evidence that the primary intention here is to 
support the residential use of the Historic Center mainly for owner-occupied housing 
units and not specifically for renters.  
                                                 
87
 Personal interview in Quito, August 2007.  
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Figure 24:  “Pon a Punto tu Casa”, Sample Project 
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Owners use credit mainly for the following elements of their historic houses: 63.8 
percent do roof repairs; 42.7 percent make electric and sewer repairs; 37.1 percent to 
build bathrooms and kitchens; 37.1 percent increase structural reinforcement; 33.8 
percent to rehabilitate patios and zaguanes. This is the positive side of the program, 
showing that it has the strength to distribute a public subsidy that drives renovation and 
helps move the local economy.  
Local professionals and local business are benefited by the construction activity, 
which is well-known as a good economic multiplier in a market-based economy. Until 
2006 the program provided credit to rehabilitate 78 properties, representing 261 housing 
units with a total investment (by private owners and with PPC credit) of 2.07 million 
dollars. However, the Historic Center’s conditions of concentrated poverty and the 
possibility of resident displacement emphasizes that it also “needs social investment not 
as a complement or compensation, but as a strategy of social development” (Carrion, 
2007p.52) to be consisted with the social policy included in the planning rhetoric and in 
confronted in terms of real and current social constraints.  
When policies are oriented by ideas of a market-based economy or a neoliberal 
approach, public intervention is justified when a public good needs to be regulated in 
order to guarantee its use for public benefit. Public intervention is also justified when 
there is a market failure. The Historic Center of Quito, as an emblematic urban area of the 
country, should be considered a public good that is experiencing market failures because 
of its unsatisfactory affordable housing provision for the majority of its residents. The 
public-private entrepreneur called PPC is providing a subsidy to homeowners and 
considers the resulting rental prices increases to be an acceptable outcome. Houses stay 
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empty because more upscale renters are reluctant to move to the Center due to its 
reputation as a lower class and indigenous neighborhood with dilapidated buildings and 
high rates of crime and poverty. In this case neoliberal solutions based on credit and the 
market may not be producing the desired effect for most stakeholders. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The Historic Center of Quito continues to be subject to policies that are 
implemented with the goal of an ideal desired state of neighborhood rehabilitation. Even 
though there are some divergences in the different visions of what kind of Center we 
want to create (Carrion, 2007), Quito’s Center and the larger metropolitan area have a 
comprehensive plan that is in place to guide policy implementation through the use of the 
different planning tools which need to be revised. In a neoliberal city that follows current 
global trends, one of the different mechanisms for financing and managing programs is 
through ‘Public-private companies’, in which private developers manage public funds, 
allocated to them by the government for an expected public benefit.  
PPC is one good example of such a strategic program for housing rehabilitation 
managed and implemented under this public-private method, and of the different 
contradictions and complications that can arise from such programs when the social goal 
is neglected. The main goal of the program is to provide better quality housing in the 
Historic Center in order to maintain and improve its residential use as part of an integral 
rehabilitation (Figure 25). By assisting homeowners to improve their properties and 
potentially their landlord business, the program is serving only the 23.95 percent of the 
resident population who are homeowners that live in the Center. The rest are renters and 
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sharers who are not only missing in the policy part of the program but who also are being 
affected by one of the externalities of the program, the factor of increased rental prices. 
Figure 25: Housing Tenure-Renters and PPC applications’ Map 
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What is the subject population that most benefits from subsidized low interest 
credit? Who is being affected by the negative externalities produced as side effects of the 
improvement of housing stock? How will the public-private corporations and the 
municipal government respond to the population’s need for affordable rental housing and 
to the loss of rental housing units? 
If this is to be a market-oriented program, it needs to include some more 
progressive and socially-oriented policies parallel to its market-based principals, because 
the market alone is not replacing the loss of units. Gilbert (1993) has mentioned that 
“incentives to private landlords may worsen the distribution of incomes (p.158)” and he 
suggests that “encouragement for rental housing has to be considered as part of a much 
wider social and economic strategy” (p. 158). The Historic Center of Quito-Census 2001: 
Housing Tenure Renters’ map shown above illustrates that most of the PPC applications 
come form the residential areas that are more densely occupied by renters.  
The importance of rental housing has not really been elaborated on in this report; 
however studies have argued that the existence of centrally-located accommodation is a 
necessity for many households and to ignore it is a kind of planning irresponsibility 
(Gilbert, 1993). “Renting has to be recognized as both a respectable and a necessary 
housing option (Gilbert, 1993 p. 158)” and as an important and ‘traditional’ or maybe 
already ‘historic’ function of the Center.  
The ways in which public initiatives and private interests can exist in a 
complementary fashion are difficult to define and should be part of a broader future 
research. To achieve this, the program needs to be fully evaluated in order to come up 
with a better formula for accomplishing all of its strategic objectives without leaving old 
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renting residents behind. Knowing that there is a widespread deficit of housing in the 
larger metropolitan area, where are these displaced people going to live in the long term? 
If prices for the almost 70% housing units in the Center that are rental properties 
keep rising, the population that is now renting at the affordable prices will have to find 
other places to live. The loss of old housing units that are in poor condition needs to be 
measured because the city housing market will need to replace units, if only in other parts 
of the city, to prevent an overall decrease in rental units. Remembering one of Pareto’s 
criteria helps us to think about the problem: “if at least one person is better off from a 
policy action and no person is worse off, than the community as a whole is 
unambiguously better off for the policy”88 PPC is not meeting the Pareto criteria, since it 
is leaving to many people worse off, while its benefits are ambiguous.  
“Smart Growth” ideas for growth management suggest that city planning should 
ensure a diverse supply of housing opportunities affordable for different income levels. 
The PPC program can be indirectly improved by the formulation and application of an 
inclusionary housing policy for the historic center area first and later it can be expanded 
to the whole metropolitan area. The performance of the PPC program needs to be 
improved. It is not expected that the program itself will address the housing needs for the 
low income population of the Historic Center of Quito but at least it should not decrease 
housing opportunities in the area as a whole without considering the consequences. The 
following chapter of this report is the concluding section that proposes ideas to create the 
most promising housing policy for the Historic Center of Quito based on the past 
experiences analysis and knowledge of how to create a comprehensive housing policy 
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that promotes inclusiveness of the low income people that now live or would like to live 
in the Historic Center. 
                                                                                                                                                 
88
 Mikesell p.14 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Housing policies in Latin America, including Quito, have shown similarly 
evolving trends around the region, especially during the 1990s when global economic 
strategies changed towards neo-liberal policies and state restructuring meant modernizing 
services while incorporating the private market into the provision of public services and 
goods. In this context, social policies including housing have proven necessary to provide 
housing opportunities to satisfy lower income housing demand because private real estate 
companies are not interested in this market niche.  
Current national housing policies in Latin American cities have for the most part 
been oriented around land development or land regulation benefiting low income 
households. These types of policies are providing some housing opportunities that lead to 
home-ownership, especially in the peripheral areas of the city. But it cannot be assumed 
that all housing needs are satisfied and all problems are solved by home-ownership. In 
the meantime rental housing has remained neglected, ignoring the fact that a significant 
portion of population may choose89 that option. In this concluding section I argue that 
rental housing should be taken into account as part of a city’s housing stock, and that to 
ignore it is a planning mistake; “renting has to be recognized as both a respectable and a 
necessary housing option (Gilbert, 1993 p. 158)” 
                                                 
89
 Choices vary depending on economic trends and on how the housing and land markets work in a 
particular city but also on other social and political conditions should be taken into consideration. 
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In Quito, for example, the 2001 census shows that 41.6 percent of total housing 
units are rented while 7.6 percent are shared90. In the Historic Center the renters’ share 
remains stable at 70 percent after almost 10 years of implemented programs aimed at 
increasing homeownership opportunities in the Historic Center of Quito. As Carole 
Rakodi (1995) mentioned, the capacity to choose any type of tenure or to move from one 
type to another depends on the existing resources that households have and on the 
particular situation of an urban area.  
As housing policy trends evolved in Latin American cities, so did the theme of 
historic center rehabilitation, seeking strategies for improving the inner city and 
promoting the historic areas for tourism.  Even though some regional meetings such as 
one in Quito (1977) or another in Havana (1993) linked Historic Center redevelopment to 
more global processes, regional cooperation is not yet strong enough to open up  
communication paths that would truly take advantage of different global ideas and be 
able to learn from other regional experiences. During my interviews I always asked the 
program managers if they knew about or had had the opportunity to learn about how 
other cities were developing similar programs; the majority of program managers said no.   
Hopefully, now that Quito is planned to be the seat of the new organization of 
Latin American cities with historic centers, OLACHI91, communication about both 
housing policies and historic center rehabilitation will be improved. There have been 
many different pilot program experiences around the region, but these have not helped us 
understand the best approach to problems and they seldom expand beyond the pilot stage; 
                                                 
90
 Ecuadorian census for type of tenure is divided among owners, renters, free (shared), for services (ie: 
domestic servants), and others. The data above includes the ‘free’ and ‘for services’ data together.  
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rather, they tend to be discontinued and replaced by other programs. In the case of Quito, 
out of the three experiences that were analyzed in this report, two of them were 
implemented between 1990 and 2003 while the only ongoing program began in 2003.  
This report examined the implementation of three programs, (1) House of the Seven 
Patios”, (2) “Vivienda Solidaria” and (3)“Pon a Punto tu Casa,” in the context of 
Quito’s overarching planning and development strategies. The examination of the 
planning and social policies behind the programs is useful for drawing some conclusions 
about the current state of housing development for the low income population’s needs. 
The objective of this section is to answer the main research question by proposing 
some thoughts about what can be learned from previous experiences, to be used in the 
formulation of a comprehensive housing policy that will be the guideline for 
implementing any housing program and for improving the current one. In order to 
propose recommendations for current policy, this report analyzed available data on 
present92 population conditions and drew lessons from previous experiences that might 
apply to these specific conditions.  
 The case study of the Historic Center’s urban conditions demonstrates that out of 
the total 50,982 people, 21.2 percent of households are classified as being in conditions 
of poverty, with 3.2 in extreme poverty and a full 80.9 percent at the ‘poverty line’93. It is 
striking to realize that the majority of the Center’s population is not only impoverished 
but also young, with the largest age group between 19 to 30 years old ( Figure 26).  
                                                                                                                                                 
91
 Organización Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Centros Históricos 
92
 However, most of the data is based on the Ecuadorian Census made in 2001.  
93
 ‘Poverty line’ (Linea de pobreza) is defined by as households with incomes that are low  but enough to 
afford the basket of goods.   
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Figure 26: Population Pyramid, Historic Center of Quito. 
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Source: Data from DMQ, 2007. 
 
The median monthly income of the population is $202.65, which means that an 
affordable monthly rent or monthly mortgage payment cannot be more than $50 dollars if 
we consider that 30 percent of income spent on housing is reasonable.  
The demographic data helps to frame some points of departure for the policy 
recommendations. The idea of a comprehensive housing policy is to tackle different 
social needs by regulating the real estate market and helping it to meet housing demand, 
or also by providing direct subsidies to the demand side. Either way, policy should 
specify a priority population group. This report recommends that priority should be 
placed on the people who make up the majority of residents of the area. Much of this 
population is made up of young people who are low income and who may choose to rent 
single rooms because of details that should be further investigated, but that presumably 
correspond to part of their ‘life cycle’ (Turner 1976) as well as to other factors that are 
hard to define as a uniform pattern of choice or constraint (Gilbert, 1993; Gilbert and 
Varley, 1991; Turner 1976). Factors such as (1) income, (2) family obligations, (3) 
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housing location and condition and (4) security of tenure influence a household’s choice 
of a particular form of tenancy94.  
 Some of the young population might be couples with or without children, some 
might be singles or students, but all together they occupy approximately 10,82195 rental 
units. As Hardoy (1992) mentioned, the preservation of urban historic heritage as an 
element of our culture “demands putting in first place the creation of adequate living 
conditions for the resident population and protecting the comprehensive vitality of the 
Historic Center”. Adequate living conditions mean not only housing, but also services 
and facilities that complement housing conditions. The concept of adequate living can 
take rental housing into account as a solution without assuming that families or 
individuals are always economically or socially ready to become homeowners. 
The Ecuadorian census does not ask about household income, monthly price or 
monthly mortgage payments. The “Survey of Living Conditions 2005-2006” asks about 
incomes and rent prices, but the sample for the Historic Center was too small to be truly 
representative. It is difficult to design an accurate comprehensive housing policy without 
having a deeper understanding of the economic details of the Historic Center’s residents. 
However, because this is not a definitive policy report, I can use the data available in 
order to draw some conclusions about the analyzed programs while recommending ideas 
for future official policy formulation, keeping in mind the priority placed on low-income 
current residents.   
                                                 
94
 It is important to consider that low income renters or sharers of central urban areas have different choice 
dynamics than do those living in ‘self-help’ peripheral areas. 
95
 Total number of housing units is 16,313, but the total of occupied housing units is 15,459. 70 percent of 
thouse units are rented, equaling 10, 821.  
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This thesis emerges at a time when the redevelopment of the Historic Center of Quito 
is a current and ongoing process. Beginning in 1990, the Municipality started to 
implement pilot housing programs while searching for the best approach to deal with the 
housing problem.  
The House of the Seven Patios, a single house converted into a condominium, is 
an example of a pilot intervention that, although it did not include clear financing 
methods or purposes in advance, did have a strong social commitment. The socio-
economic research about the re-housed renters proved the program’s intention of 
accommodating the project to this population’s needs. But knowledge about their socio-
economic conditions did not help planners to develop a sustainable method to provide 
them access to ownership without over-using public funds. Residents of the House had to 
adjust to changing strategies that hindered both the efforts of the co-property-owners’ 
organization and financial return for the Municipality.  
A more comprehensive program, Vivivenda Solidaria incorporated different local, 
national and international institutions with clearly-formulated guidelines to target social 
goals and to maintain the units affordable; however, this program was negatively affected 
by changes in management and contributed to the speculative real-estate market in the 
Historic Center. The success of the program is that it produced mixed-income affordable 
units and produced financial returns that allowed the Municipality to reinvest in other 
properties. The failure of the program is that although the mixed-income “solidaria” 
policy required the project to be accompanied by a social component to help co-property-
owners create community and to prevent overcrowding, the social component was only 
implemented during phase one, and was discontinued for most of the project. The main 
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failure characteristic is that the program did not lead to policy to ensure its sustainable 
implementation in the Historic Center of Quito.   
Pon a Punto tu Casa is a financing program restricted to housing rehabilitation, 
not housing creation, emphasizing the importance of heritage conservation of the built 
structures and detracting from the larger social goal of addressing the housing need. The 
success of the program is that it is locally managed and is helping to improve the old 
rental housing stock. The failure is that management methods are not producing 
information to evaluate outcomes; therefore, unawareness of PPC externalities are 
causing an uncontrolled disappearance  of a number of  rental units that were affordable 
for the low-income resident of the Historic Center.   
In the current comprehensive rehabilitation plan, the only strategic program which 
attempts to address real housing needs is the PPC program. As I illustrated before, this 
program is not sufficient, nor is it the right venue, to address real housing needs. This 
thesis suggests that housing needs in the Historic Center of Quito need urgent attention 
and need to be addressed through a comprehensive housing policy that will guide 
program intervention. Before land becomes too expensive, and before population 
displacement becomes a bigger metropolitan housing problem, policymakers in Quito 
need to initiate discussion about the housing issue.  
Quito’s comprehensive plan for the Center is missing urban and socio-economic 
guidelines for framing housing needs and specifying how are they meant to be addressed. 
Housing policy design is not housing program design. Since the 1990s, the Municipality 
of Quito’s planning department, along with MIDUVI, QUITOVIVIENDA, ECH, 
EMDUQ, FONSAL, Junta de Andalucía, IDB, and Pact-Arim, would have been able to 
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use a policy every time they sat down to figure out what to do in terms of housing, rather 
than re-inventing strategies each time. The next section provides specific 
recommendations for the development of the new and creative comprehensive housing 
policy.   
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
Considering local socio-economic and institutional needs to create and manage a 
comprehensive housing policy, this thesis recommends the incorporation of the following 
topics:  
a. Urban Economics 
 
Balanced economic activities: 
 
- A tourist historic city that is beneficial to the metropolitan area needs to ensure a 
balanced urban environment. The equilibrium of economic activities goes along 
with policies for protecting the stability of local businesses and balancing them 
with the new economic activities entering the market of the tourist historic city. 
Economic activities in the Center are the main source of employment, recreation 
and affordable shopping for people that are living or that would like to live in the 
same area. To cite the view of an international specialist, Francesco Lanzafame96 
argues that the focus of a policy, besides on housing production for the low-
income and middle-income population, needs to on be the equilibrium of 
economic activities in order to prevent social disparity and segregation.  
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The comprehensive housing policy should regulate commercial spaces of new 
buildings, creating guidelines for specific space characteristics and uses that 
support this goal of economic equilibrium. Along with physical space and use 
regulation, people that work and live in the Historic Center should have incentives 
to purchase or rent a home in the same area.   
b. Municipal Powers:  
 
The right of eminent domain to create a bank of properties: 
 
- The comprehensive plan PGDT (2001) suggests that the Municipality has the 
responsibility of maintaining urban historical sites and culture. The right of 
eminent domain is a key Municipal tool that needs to be applied within the 
Historic Center’s housing policy to build a bank of properties, using the same 
strategy as land banking. The House of the Seven Patios and Vivienda Solidaria 
are both good examples of how the Municipality can enforce its powers in the 
name of the public good.  
                                                                                                                                                 
96
 Housing and Urban Development Specialist, IDB Washington. Personal Inteview, November 29th, 2007.  
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c. Information:  
 
A geo-referenced housing stock monitoring systems:  
 
- The bank of properties, along with complete census and land use data, should be 
tied to a geographical information system to create an urban laboratory to be used 
to identify areas for redevelopment, as in the case study of Cuzco. This system 
should be online and accessible to the public so that private developers and 
homeowners can search it and understand the state of the housing stock and the 
housing market of the Historic Center. To reiterate what a local developer and 
Historic Center stakeholder, Pedro Jaramillo mentioned97, there should be a 
system to control property appraisal speculation and this should be a Municipal 
role. I argue that the ‘geo-referenced housing stock monitoring system’ should 
include municipal appraisal to maintain the market informed and to protect 
consumer rights against land and property speculation that makles more difficult 
the production of affordable housing units. Jaramillo proposes that if the 
monitoring system detects an overpriced unit, the housing policy should give the 
Municipality powers to be the first purchaser of the property, which can go to the 
bank of properties. He mentioned that this method is currently working well in 
French Historic Centers.  
                                                 
97
 Personal Interview, August, 2007 
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The production of an annual housing needs assessment report: 
- The comprehensive housing policy should designate an agency responsible for 
developing and annually updating a housing need assessment report according to 
population growth and economic changes. Either QUITOVIVIENDA or EMDUQ 
should to be the agency responsible for providing this document, which should be 
a public document in which income thresholds of policy beneficiaries will be 
defined and which specifies other housing market indicators that a healthy market 
needs. In order to have access to local or national funds and grants, affordable 
housing non-profits, local developers, community-based programs, or any other 
organization, should comply with EMDUQ’s housing needs assessment report. 
The report should also inform the system of building permits in order to maintain 
a shared data base for the geo-referenced monitoring system.  
 
A demand database: 
 
- Lessons from the Santiago case study suggest that both House of the Seven Patios 
and Vivienda Solidaria lost the opportunity to create a comprehensive list of 
households interested in housing units in the Historic Center. The policy should 
ensure that this database is accessible to the public for private developers, 
community-based organizations and any other institution that would like to do a 
housing market analysis to start a project. Housing producers need to know 
economic and family configuration details to design a product that relfects the real 
demand.  
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A method of communication:  
 
- The communication component of housing policy and programs is the key for 
achieving a smooth and efficient process. Tenants of RECUP-BOCA, PRHP, 
ReHa, Vivienda Solidaria and House of the Seven Patios decided to get organized 
as a community of neighbors. In several cases in Quito, tenant organizations’ 
letters about both the Vivienda Solidaria and House of the Seven Patios projects 
expressed misunderstandings and suspicion that the signed agreements would not 
be complied with. The name of one organization “Comite Pro-defensa de 
Vivienda98” [“Committee for the Defense of Housing”] demonstrates that the 
organization was formed because of a perceived need by the residents to defend 
themselves against the thereat of displacement. The housing policy of the Historic 
Center should specify methods of communication and what type of media 
strategic programs should use to communicate with prospective owners or renters.  
A guideline for international cooperation agreements:  
 
- International cooperation from Spain and France (Junta de Andalucía and Pact-
Arim) has been an important resource for funding and for program 
implementation. These agencies’ knowledge and experience in construction and 
in architecture could be a valuable support for the next strategic programs. As 
Carrión (2007) mentioned, this cooperation needs to be based on strong locally-
developed policy in order for it to be sustainable.   
                                                 
98
 Complete name: Comité Pro-Defensa de Vivienda de las Calles Caldas y Briceño. 
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d. Sustainability:  
 
A sustainable agreement with the national government: 
 
- Both the House of the Seven Patios and Vivienda Solidaria were built on a social 
policy that incorporated direct national subsidies (SIV) to facilitate access of low 
income renters to homeownership. Not all applicants benefited, however, because 
even though some households qualified for SIV down payment subsidies, they did 
not meet the requirements of financial institutions. Some were not able to find 
access to mortgages in order to pay the remaining balance. The policy should 
ensure a sustainable agreement with the national government to guarantee 
cooperation and SIV subsidies to complement local the local programs. The 
agreement should be based on the annual housing needs assessment report that 
EMDUQ needs to develop to set up annual funding thresholds and the policy 
should take advantage of the SIV national policy for part of its funding. Presently, 
this program is funded locally, no longer with IDB loans. With the inclusionary 
zoning or inclusionary housing policy working together with the national 
government, some units of new housing condominiums within private or public 
developments can be designed in order to meet SIV requirements and to be sold 
with SIV subsidies. Units for sale need to be priced within the range of $12,000 to 
$20,000 and SIV holders need to be from quintiles 1, 2, and 3, which would mean 
a household income of $600 a month or less.   
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An agreement with financial institutions:  
- A housing policy discussion should take into consideration what financial 
institutions consider to be the problems faced in providing credit and should 
recognize that home ownership is not always the housing solution. This is 
especially true in Quito’s Historic Center where the majority of the resident 
population has informal employment. Without a continuous income to 
demonstrate financial stability, financial institutions are reluctant to recognize an 
individual’s ability to meet mortgage payments. The definitive policy should 
incorporate guidelines to share the mortgage responsibility with MIDUVI or 
EMDUQ so that low and middle income residents can have access to credit.  
 
The methods for flexible and free association: 
 
- The diversification of resources and cooperation agreements was a good lesson 
learned from the Vivienda Solidaria program and the other case studies from the 
region. Inter-institutional agreements for incorporating different mechanisms to 
administer and to finance the programs resulted in improved, sustainable 
management through the sharing of social and institutional responsibilities. The 
policy should ensure the precise mechanisms by which housing providers and 
other agencies will be required follow when associating with the purpose of 
building housing in the Historic Center.  
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An open dialogue with the community: 
 
- The sustainability of these housing policies can be addressed by incorporating the 
public during the policy formulation. The idea that each new mayor has the sole 
authority over stopping or continuing a program should be changed. The public, 
local and metropolitan users and residents of the Historic Center need to be 
involved in the policy formulation process in order to become the legitimate 
guardians of a desired housing policy and housing systems. The community 
should design the policy to define how participation will happen in a ways that 
keeps the policy goals and objectives updated and safe. 
 
A sustainable source of funding for research:  
 
- In the short term, follow-up studies need to be developed, especially related to 
housing stock and family socio-economic conditions. The next Census will be in 
2010 and approproate census questions should be prepared in order to take 
advantage of the government’s effort. In the long term the comprehensive housing 
policy could create a source of funding to encourage local and international 
academic research, which is always necessary in order to learn more and to 
discover pitfalls and outcomes that should be improved. The policy should ensure 
that the research that is developed is independent, so that researchers are not tied 
to any agency’s obligations or philosophies. A research fund could annually 
establish different topics of interest depending of the local needs.  
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e. Inclusionary Housing Market 
 
An affordable rental housing stock:  
 
- Rental housing is often a better option than ownership for residents with the 
economic characteristics of a very low income population. The ‘annual housing 
needs assessment report’ will calculate the necessary number of units, with certain 
characteristics (number of rooms, location within the house) that the private 
market and public-private developers should continue to make housing available 
to people from a range of different households incomes. One solution for those 
households that cannot meet the rental market price of unsubsidized units is that 
the policy can consider the creation of a local rental voucher policy for low 
income residents. The US federal government Section 8 is a project-based 
voucher program that provides subsidies to ‘qualified’ families so that they can 
meet a monthly rental market price. Such a policy should guarantee a stable and 
accessible rental housing stock and should incorporate the small landlords who 
are owners of apartment-historic-houses to accept vouchers. The policy should 
also define what socio-economic characteristics define a ‘qualified’ household.    
 
An inclusionary zoning policy: 
 
- The negative externalities of the PPC should be addressed by considering 
Inclusionary Zoning policies or Housing Unit replacement programs. However, 
private owners and developers need to be an important part of the Historic 
Center’s housing goals. An ordinance should enforce the concept that for every 
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affordable unit removed during rehabilitation, an additional unit should be 
provided for those residents, preferably in the same area. Inclusionary Zoning can 
be an effective policy for the provision of affordable units in new constructions or 
rehabilitated buildings by the private market, either for ownership or for rental 
purposes. The incentive of PPC’s low interest rate credit could be an enforcement 
tool of such policy. Inclusionary Zoning can provide guidelines for the location of 
the affordable units within the building. For example, the selected unit that will 
remain affordable during a period of 10 years will be located on the first floor 
allowing the first choice (to rent or to own) to low income elderly residents. Small 
landlords can identify an applicant’s income compatibility through the existing 
identification method of the national government (SELBEN)99. Recipients of 
these vouchers should be 18 years or older100, and with incomes of 80% or less of 
the monthly area median income101. With the data available, that would mean a 
monthly income of $162.12 or less.   
An architectural code and norms adapted to local needs 
 
- If a historic house is rehabilitated, alternatives to traditional family-sized units 
such as creating one or two bedrooms units need to be considered, but this should 
not be the only type of housing unit developed. The architectural norms for the 
Historic Center need to be revised to include the remaining laerge single rooms as 
efficiency units. This is a well-known housing type built in both the U.S. and 
                                                 
99
 SELBEN: Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales; Sistem of identification of 
Social Program’s beneficiaries 
100
 In Ecuador, a legal adult is an individual over 18 
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Europe for single young adults or for the elderly, for example. The idea is to use 
the demographic data to match housing needs whily allowing increased flexibility 
in architectural design.  
A right to an affordable and safe relocation 
 
- Both House of the Seven Patios and Vivienda Solidaria had the social policy to re-
house the resident rental population during the rehabilitation process. Pon a Punto 
tu Casa should amend the fideicomiso and ordinance 015 to incorporate that social 
component, even though the rehabilitation is done privately. Small landlords and 
renters should know about leasing rights, responsibilities and obligations. The 
comprehensive housing policy should specify clear methods for ensuring renter’s 
rights and clear procedures in the case that a house’s renovation requires evicting 
too many families at the same time.  
With this collected information, supplemented by additional research regarding 
opportunities and constraints for the development of a comprehensive housing policy, I 
recommend the creation of a Housing Task Force102. This task force should include all 
key stakeholders in order to initiate the official policy formulation and decision making.  
The need of a comprehensive and detailed planning direction to meet housing 
needs in the Historic Center situates the Municipality of Quito as the responsible agency 
                                                                                                                                                 
101
 Area Median Income (AMI) calculations is an established and common method used to address housing 
affordability standards in the United States. The primary difference is that in the U.S., these calculations are 
made using yearly income data and in Ecuador, this would have to be done with monthly data. 
102
 A task force is a temporary group of people that sit together to solve some established topic. Task forces 
can work for a short period of time like a month or longer periods like semesters, or a year. The period of 
time would depend of the required and available data that will informed discussion or conflicting dialogue 
that complicated decision making.   
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for facilitating the policy discussion.  This report is a modest guideline for begining the 
local dialogue.   
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Appendix A 
Table 3.2.6: House of the Seven Patios, Construction Details 
House of the Seven Patios -1993 
Construction Details 
 Housing Unit M2 Number of 
Rooms 
Number of People Hab/M2 
1 75.76 3 5 15 
2 85.26 4 6 14 
3 65.70 3 5 13 
4 36.34 1 2 18 
5 62.07 2 4 16 
6 48.22 1 2 24 
7 50.91 2 3 17 
8 59.07 2 4 15 
9 49.35 2 4 12 
10 37.79 1 1 38 
11 56.93 2 3 19 
12 33.18 1 2 17 
13 53.17 2 4 13 
14 49.02 2 3 16 
15 37.89 1 2 19 
16 33.90 1 2 17 
17 35.81 1 2 18 
18 78.94 2 4 20 
19 59.81 2 4 15 
20 143.69 4 7 21 
21 119.90 4 7 17 
22 93.18 4 6 16 
23 90.11 4 5 18 
24 95.54 3 4 24 
25 100.79 3 5 20 
26 68.64 2 4 17 
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27 79.29 3 5 16 
28 120.61 3 5 24 
29 65.03 1 2 33 
30 86.36 2 4 22 
31 103.53 3 6 17 
32 91.67 2 4 23 
33 80.99 3 5 16 
34 99.17 3 5 20 
35 52.36 1 1 52 
36 128.53 3 6 21 
37 114.13 3 6 19 
38 100.43 3 5 20 
c.1 22.15 0 0 0 
c.2 20.95 0 0 0 
Total 2,886.17  154 751 
Average hab./m2 20 
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Table 3.2.8: House of the Seven Patios, Sales Prices  
 
 175 
 
 176 
Table 3.2.9: House of the Seven Patios,Old Tenants (1993) 
House of the Seven Patios Old Tenants (1993) 
Affordability and Monthly Rent Price Calculation (in Sucres) 
Housing 
Unit  
M2 Standard 
Rental 
Price per 
M2* 
Tenants 
Offered 
Monthly 
Rental 
Payments 
Renter's 
Tenure 
Calculated 
Monthly 
Household 
Income** 
Rent 
Subsidized 
Amount 
1 75.76 104,549 60,000 old tenant 200,000 44,549 
2 85.26 117,659 70,000 old tenant 233,333 47,659 
3 65.70 90,666 30,000 old tenant 100,000 60,666 
7 50.91 70,256 60,000 old tenant 200,000 10,256 
12 33.18 45,788 40,000 old tenant 133,333 5,788 
16 33.90 46,782 50,000 old tenant 166,667 -3,218 
17 35.81 49,418 50,000 old tenant 166,667 -582 
19 59.81 82,538 70,000 old tenant 233,333 12,538 
21 119.90 165,462 166,000 old tenant 553,333 -538 
22 93.18 128,588 125,000 old tenant 416,667 3,588 
25 100.79 139,090 139,000 old tenant 463,333 90 
26 68.64 94,723 95,000 old tenant 316,667 -277 
27 79.29 109,420 90,000 old tenant 300,000 19,420 
30 86.36 119,177 120,000 old tenant 400,000 -823 
31 103.53 142,871 145,000 old tenant 483,333 -2,129 
32 91.67 126,505 150,000 old tenant 500,000 -23,495 
33 80.99 111,766 70,000 old tenant 233,333 41,766 
34 99.17 136,855 90,000 old tenant 300,000 46,855 
38 100.43 138,593 140,000 old tenant 466,667 -1,407 
Source: Unidad de Vivienda Archives, Quito 2007 
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Table 3.2.10: House of  Seven Patios, New Tenants (1993) 
House of the Seven Patios New Tenants (1993) 
Affordability and Monthly Rent Price Calculation (in Sucres) 
Housing 
Unit M2 
Standard 
Rental 
Price per 
M2* 
Tenants 
Offered 
Monthly 
Rental 
Payments 
Renter's 
Tenure 
Calculated 
Monthly 
Household 
Income** 
Rent 
Subsidized 
Amount 
4 36.34 50,149 30,000 new tenant 100,000 20,149 
5 62.07 85,657 90,000 new tenant 300,000 -4,343 
6 48.22 66,544 66,544 new tenant 221,813 0 
8 59.07 81,517 70,000 new tenant 233,333 11,517 
9 49.35 68,103 50,000 new tenant 166,667 18,103 
10 37.79 52,150 52,150 new tenant 173,833 0 
11 56.93 78,563 70,000 new tenant 233,333 8,563 
13 53.17 73,375 60,000 new tenant 200,000 13,375 
14 49.02 67,648 30,000 new tenant 100,000 37,648 
15 37.89 52,288 90,000 new tenant 300,000 -37,712 
18 78.94 108,937 109,000 new tenant 363,333 -63 
20 143.69 198,292 199,000 new tenant 663,333 -708 
23 90.11 124,352 130,000 new tenant 433,333 -5,648 
24 95.54 131,845 132,000 new tenant 440,000 -155 
28 120.61 166,442 170,000 new tenant 566,667 -3,558 
29 65.03 89,741 120,000 new tenant 400,000 -30,259 
35 52.36 72,257 100,000 new tenant 333,333 -27,743 
36 128.53 177,371 177,000 new tenant 590,000 371 
37 114.13 157,499 166,000 new tenant 553,333 -8,501 
c.1 22.15 30,567 80,000 new tenant 266,667 -49,433 
c.2 20.95 28,911 80,000 new tenant 266,667 -51,089 
Source: Unidad de Vivienda Archives, Quito, 2007. 
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